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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 History of Cryptography
The most ancient use of coding is probably that one found on the lacedaemo-
nian scytale (400 b.C.), a stick on which a leather tape was bundled up; on
the tap one wrote for columns parallel to the axis of the stick, letter for letter,
the secret text. Removed the tape from the stick, the text was transposed in
regular but sufficient way in order to avoid the reading without a second stick
equal to the first one.
In the ancient time well-known was hectographed code, in which each letter
was ciphered with a number couple, or codes in which each letter was replaced
with another letter.
In 800 a.d. Al-Kindi, an Arab mathematician, devised new methods of
breaking ciphers of the Qur'an. It was the most fundamental cryptanalytic
advance until Second World War. Al-Kindi wrote a book on cryptography
entitled Manuscript for the Deciphering Cryptographic Messages, in which he
described the first cryptanalysis techniques.
In Europe, cryptography became (secretly) more important as a consequence
of political competition and religious revolution. Although cryptography has a
long and complex history, it wasn't until the 19th century that it developed
anything more than ad hoc approaches to either encryption or cryptanalysis
(the science of finding weaknesses in crypto systems).
The First World War is the first great war after the invention of the radio;
this new mass media if from one side allowed to transmit messages practically in
an instantaneous way, on the other side it was much exposed to the interception
of the enemy: to capture a courier that brought an important message was more
difficult than to intercept a radio transmission. For this reason cryptographic
became very important and the first cryptography machines (with the relative
algorithms) were built.
But it was during the Second World War that research in cryptography
experienced a major acceleration and when the war ended cryptography was
1
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studied in many fields, from mathematics to electronics. In 1976, the algorithm
Lucifer developed by Horst Feistel at IBM, was officially adopted with the name
DES (Data Encryption Standard) as the first standard encryption algorithm,
encouraging the business community to make use of cryptography to secure com-
munication and business transactions. The same year, Whitfield Diffie, Martin
Hellman and Ralph Merkle announced a method to solve the key distribution
problem introducing the concept of asymmetric encryption and forming the ba-
sis for public key cryptography. Unfortunately, they did not succeed to find a
one-way function necessary to implement their method. In 1977, Ronald Rivest,
Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman, mathematicians at the MIT laboratory for
computer science, introduced the RSA, an asymmetric encryption algorithm
which finally allowed public key cryptography to be used in practice.
Nowadays cryptography is used to protect personal data: using a mobile
telephone, withdrawing money from a bank, storing medical data and so on. All
these operations are based on the use of a pocket-sized card with an embedded
integrated circuit, commonly named smart card or chip card.
The interest in secure devices has led to a great numbers of research works on
new attacks, on one side, and new countermeasures on the other side. Different
levels are considered starting from the algorithms to hardware realizations. In
particular, since the introduction of side-channel attacks (physical quantities re-
lated with the key), many works have been published on how to exploit or avoid
side-channel information leakage, i.e. information that can be retrieved from a
cryptographic device by measuring a quantity not directly involved in the se-
cret information treatment. Essentially from 20th century, cryptography makes
extensive use of mathematics and engineering, including aspects of physics, in-
formation theory, computational complexity, statistics, combinatorial, abstract
algebra, number theory, by involving more and more different aspects of sciences
in general.
1.2 Smart Card
A smart card consists of a plastic support in which a microchip is inserted; the
interface between microchip and external world can be a series of contacts (in
this case it is properly named contact-based smart card) or an antenna (contact-
less smart card) or both (dual-interface smart card).
Probably the beginning of the story of Smart Card is to be found in the
novel La nuit des temps (The drawn of time), in which the french science-
fiction writer René Barjavel wrote in 1968 about a magic ring used as a key
by Gondas, a very old and highly advanced civilization. The magic ring was
empowered with memory and communications:
... Every time a Gonda wanted something new, [...], he would
pay with his key. He would bend his middle finger, would enter
his key in a location chosen at this effect and his account at the
central computer would immediately be reduced by the value of the
merchandise or the request service ...
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Figure 1.1: An example of banking smart card.
The proliferation of simple plastic cards started in the USA in the early 1950s.
The low price of the synthetic material PVC made it possible to produce ro-
bust, durable plastic cards that were much more suitable for everyday use than
the paper and cardboard cards previously used, which could not adequately
withstand mechanical stresses and climatic effects.
The entry of Visa and MasterCard into the field led to a very rapid prolif-
eration of 'plastic money' in the form of credit cards. This occurred first in the
USA, with Europe and the rest of the world following a few years later. Today,
credit cards allow travelers to shop without cash everywhere in the world.
At first, the functions of these cards were quite simple. They served as
data storage media that were secure against forgery and tampering. General
information, such as the card issuer's name, was printed on the surface, while
personal data elements, such as the cardholder's name and the card number,
were embossed. Many cards also had a signature panel where the cardholder
would sign his or her name for reference. The embossed characters on the card
can be transferred to paper using simple, inexpensive devices, and they can also
be easily read visually (by humans).
The first improvement consisted of a magnetic stripe on the back of the
card. The fundamental disadvantage of embossed cards is that their use creates
a flood of paper receipts, which are expensive to process. One remedy for this
problem is to digitally encode the card data on a magnetic stripe located on the
back of the card. Although the storage capacity of the magnetic stripe is only
about 1000 bits, which is not very much, it is nevertheless more than sufficient
for storing the information contained in the embossing. In this way paper-
based transactions were replaced by electronic data processing. This required a
different method to be used for user identification, which previously employed
the user's signature. The method that has come into widespread general use
involves a secret personal identification number (PIN) that is compared with a
reference number. The reader is surely familiar with this method from using
bank machines (automated teller machines). The main drawback of magnetic-
stripe technology is that the stored data can be altered very easily. Manipulating
embossed characters requires at least a certain amount of manual dexterity, and
such manipulations be easily detected by a trained eye. By contrast, the data
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recorded on the magnetic stripe can be altered relatively easily using a standard
read/write device, and it is difficult to afterwards prove that the data have
been altered. Furthermore, magnetic-stripe cards are often used in automated
equipment in which visual inspection is not possible, such as cash dispensers.
Most systems that employ magnetic-stripe cards thus use online connections to
the system's host computer for reasons of security, even though this generates
significant costs for the necessary data transmissions. In order to reduce costs, it
is necessary to find solutions that allow card transactions to be executed oine
without endangering the security of the system.
The development of the smart card, combined with the expansion of elec-
tronic data-processing systems, has created completely new possibilities for de-
vising such solutions. Thanks to enormous progress in microelectronics, in the
1970s it was possible to integrate data storage and processing logic on a single
silicon chip measuring a few square millimeters. Smart card characteristic fea-
ture is an integrated circuit embedded in the card, which has components for
transmitting, storing and processing data. The data can be transmitted using
either contacts on the surface of the card or electromagnetic fields, without any
contacts.
The first patents were in 1968 and 1970 but the first real progress in the
development of smart cards came when Roland Moreno registered his smart
card patents in France in 1974. The great breakthrough was achieved in 1984,
when the French PTT (postal and telecommunications services agency) suc-
cessfully carried out a field trial with telephone cards. In this field trial, smart
cards immediately proved to meet all expectations with regard to high reliability
and protection against manipulation. Significantly, this breakthrough for smart
cards did not come in an area where traditional cards were already used, but in
a new application.
One of the most important advantages of smart cards is that their stored
data can be protected against unauthorized access and manipulation. Such con-
fidential data can be processed only internally by the chip's processing unit. In
principle, both hardware and software mechanisms can be used to restrict the
use of the storage functions of writing, erasing and reading data and tie them
to specific conditions. This makes it possible to construct a variety of security
mechanisms, which can also be tailored to the specific requirements of a par-
ticular application. In combination with the ability to compute cryptographic
algorithms, this allows smart cards to be used to implement convenient security
modules that can be carried by users at all times, for example in a purse or wal-
let. Some additional advantages of smart cards are their high level of reliability
and long life compared with magnetic-stripe cards, whose useful life is generally
limited to one or two years.
Smart cards can be divided into two groups, which differ in both functionality
and price: memory cards and microprocessor cards. Presently, both memory
cards and microprocessor cards are available as contactless cards.
In a memory cards the data needed by the application are stored, as the
name suggests, in a memory, which is usually EEPROM. Access to the memory
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is controlled by the security logic, which in the simplest case consists only of
write protection or erase protection for the memory or certain memory regions.
However, there are also memory chips with more complex security logic that can
also perform simple encryption. The functionality of memory cards is usually
optimized for a particular application. Although this severely restricts the flexi-
bility of the cards, it makes them quite inexpensive. Memory cards are typically
used for prepaid telephone cards and health insurance cards.
In a microprocessor card the heart of the chip, as the name suggests, is
a processor, which is usually surrounded by four additional functional blocks:
mask ROM, EEPROM, RAM and an I/O port. The mask ROM contains the
chip's operating system, which is `burned in' when the chip is manufactured.
The content of the ROM is thus identical for all the chips of a production run,
and it cannot be changed during the chip's lifetime. The EEPROM is the chip's
non-volatile memory. Data and program code can be written to and read from
the EEPROM under the control of the operating system. The RAM is the
processor's working memory. This memory is volatile, so all the data stored
in it are lost when the chip's power is switched off. The serial I/O interface
usually consists only of a single register, via which data are transferred bit by
bit. Microprocessor cards are very flexible in use. In the simplest case, they
contain a program optimized for a single application, so they can only be used
for this particular application. However, modern smart card operating systems
allow several different applications to be integrated into a single card. In this
case, the ROM contains only the basic components of the operating system,
with the application-specific part of the operating system being loaded into the
EEPROM only after the card has been manufactured. Recent developments
even allow application programs to be loaded into a card after it has already
been personalized and issued to the cardholder. Special hardware and software
measures are used to prevent the security conditions of the individual appli-
cations from being violated by this capability. Hardware attacks and, on the
other hand, hardware countermeasures that will be proposed in this work are
all related to applications based on microprocessor smart cards.
Finally, contactless cards, in which energy and data are transferred without
any electrical contact between the card and the terminal, have achieved the
status of commercial products in the last few years. As contactless cards can
work at a distance from the terminal ranging from few centimeters to a meter,
this means that such cards do not necessarily have to be held in the user's hand
during use, but can remain in the user's purse or wallet. Contactless cards are
thus particularly suitable for applications in which persons or objects should be
quickly identified such as access control, local public transportation, ski passes,
airline tickets. However, there are also applications where operation over a long
distance could cause problems and should thus be prevented, as for example for
electronic purse application.
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Figure 1.2: Common security requirements of embedded system from an end-
user perspective.
1.3 An overview on side-channel attacks
Information technology is evolving at an amazing pace. Personal computers,
fax machines, pagers, and mobile phones are in the hands of millions of people
worldwide. Similarly, interest in smart card technology has soared in the 1990's,
and by the year 2000 the number and variety of smart card-based applications
exploded around the world.
In an increasing number of large and important smart card-based systems,
from pay-TV through GSM mobile phones and prepaid gas meters to electronic
wallets, smart cards are used by millions of cardholders worldwide in more than
90 countries, primarily in Europe and the Far East, processing point-of-sale
transactions, managing records, and protecting computers and secure facilities.
For these reasons information engineers have developed an increasing interest
in the tamper resistance properties of smart cards and other special purpose
security processors. Tamper resistance is not absolute: an attacker with access
to semiconductor test equipment can retrieve key material from a smart card
controller by direct observation and manipulation of the chip's components. It
is generally believed that, given sufficient investment, any chip-sized tamper
resistant device can be penetrated in this way.
This is the reason for the increasing interest in new attack methods on one
side and in new countermeasures and new cryptographic algorithms on the other
side.
Cryptographic algorithms are building blocks of many security protocols
and can be implemented both in software and hardware. Software solutions
are cheaper and more flexible, while hardware implementations provide higher
speed and intrinsic security. A trade-off in cost and speed can be achieved by
hardware-software co-design.
On the other hand, the security of the implementation also needs to be con-
sidered. Namely, attacks on cryptographic algorithms are usually divided into
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mathematical and implementation attacks. The latter are based on weaknesses
in the implementation and can be passive or active. Passive attacks benefit
from side channel information, which is collected by measuring some physical
quantity.
More precisely, while secret data are being processed they can be deduced by
observing execution time, power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, etc.
The second class of implementation attacks, i.e. the active attacks, is more
invasive as they are based on the introduction of faults, which result in erroneous
calculations leading to the exposure of the secret key. The usual cause of these
faults can be sudden changes, i.e. glitches, in various parameters such as power
supply, clock, temperature, etc. An attacker could also use a light flash with
equipment such as a camera flash or a laser in order to induce a fault.
Cryptographic devices have several physical and logical interfaces and there-
fore a second criterion for categorizing an attack on a cryptographic device is
the interface that is exploited by the attack. It is possible to distinguish between
invasive and non-invasive attacks.
An invasive attack is the strongest type of attack that can be mounted on a
cryptographic device. An invasive attack typically starts with the depackaging
of the device. Subsequently, different components of the device are accessed
directly using a probing station. This part of an invasive attack can be passive
if the probing station is only used to observe data signals or active if signals in
the device are changed to alter the functionality of the device. In a non-invasive
attack, the cryptographic device is essentially attacked as it is and only directly
accessible interfaces are exploited. Most non-invasive attacks can be conducted
with relatively inexpensive equipment, and hence, these attacks pose a serious
practical threat to the security of cryptographic devices.
Passive non-invasive attacks are often also referred to as side-channel attacks.
The three most important types of side-channel attacks are timing attacks [51],
power analysis attacks [53], and electromagnetic attacks [42, 80]. The basic
idea of these attacks is to determine the secret key of a cryptographic device
by measuring its execution time, its power consumption, or its electromagnetic
field.
Side-channel attacks can be also active non-invasive attacks. The goal of
these attacks is to insert a fault (for example clock or power glitches) in a
device without depackaging it.
Regarding attacks, this thesis focuses exclusively on power analysis attacks
even if a general overview also of the other types of attacks is treated in the
following.
1.3.1 Timing analysis attacks
Timing analysis attacks are based on the fact that algorithms with a non-
constant execution time can leak secret information. A non-constant execution
time can be caused by conditional branches in the algorithm, various optimiza-
tion techniques, cache hits, etc. Unlike power attacks, the use of these attacks
is not restricted to cryptographic tokens. Timing attacks can also be applied to
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Figure 1.3: Side-channel attack types.
network based cryptosystems and to other applications whenever the attacker
can get hold of timing information.
The obvious way to prevent timing attacks is to implement cryptographic
algorithms with a constant execution time. Almost all modern implementations
are resistant against timing attacks, which makes a timing-only attack impos-
sible. However, the threat remains in combining timing information with other
side-channels. For example, timing information can be used by an attacker in
order to locate specific parts of the algorithm.
1.3.2 Power analysis attacks
Nowadays, CMOS is by far the most commonly used technology to implement
digital integrated circuits. The dominant factor for the power consumption of a
CMOS gate is the dynamic power consumption. Two types of power consump-
tion leakage can be observed. The transition count leakage gives information
about the number of changed bits, while the Hamming weight leakage is related
to the number of 1-bits being processed simultaneously.
Two types of power analysis attacks are distinguished. In a simple power
analysis (SPA) attack, an attacker uses the side-channel information from one
measurement directly to determine (parts of) the secret key. In differential
power analysis (DPA), many measurements are used in order to filter out noise
(Figure 1.4). While SPA exploits the relationship between the operations that
are executed and the power leakage, DPA exploits the relationship between the
processed data and the power leakage.
In DPA, an attacker uses a so-called hypothetical model of the attacked
device (see Figure 1.5).
The model is used to predict several values for the side-channel output of a
device. These predictions are compared to the measured side-channel output of
the device. The most popular comparison ways are the distance-of-mean test
and the correlation analysis. For both of these attacks, the model predicts the
amount of side-channel leakage for a certain moment of time in the execution.
In Chapter 2, which is fully focused on the power analysis, more details
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Figure 1.4: Differential Power Analysis to discover the secret key.
Figure 1.5: DPA behaviour.
about the SPA and DPA will be given.
1.3.3 Electromagnetic analysis (EMA) attacks
A most recently published side-channel attack is based on electromagnetic ema-
nation. The attack exploits the information in the electromagnetic field that is
caused by the currents flowing in each component of the cryptographic device.
There are two types of emanations: intentional and unintentional [2]. The
first type results from direct current flows. The second type is caused by various
couplings, modulations (AM and FM), etc.
It is well known that the US government has been aware of electromagnetic
leakage since the 1950s. The first published papers are work of Quisquater and
Samyde [80] and Gemplus team [42]. Quisquater and Samyde showed that it
is possible to measure the electromagnetic radiation from a smart card. Their
measurement setup consisted of a sensor which was a simple flat coil (see Figure
1.6), a spectrum analyzer or an oscilloscope and a Faraday cage. Quisquater also
introduced the terms Simple EMA (SEMA) and Differential EMA (DEMA).
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Figure 1.6: An example of electromagnetic analysis setup.
Gemplus observed the feasibility of EMA attacks and compared them with
PA attacks in favour of the first. Namely, EM emanation can also exploit local
information and, although more noisy, the measurements can be performed from
a distance. This fact broadens the spectrum of targets to which side-channel
attacks can be applied. Of concern are not only smart cards and similar tokens
but also SSL accelerators and many other cryptographic devices.
The two papers mentioned above deal exclusively with intentional emana-
tions. On the contrary, the real advantage over other side-channel attacks lies in
exploring unintentional emanations [2]. More precisely, EM leakage consists of
multiple channels. Therefore, compromising information can be available even
for DPA resistant devices for which no contact measurements are available.
Namely, besides carefully exploring all available EM emanations an attacker
can also focus on a combination of two or more side-channels. Agrawal et al.
defined these so-called multi-channel attacks in which the side-channels are not
necessarily of a different kind [12]. For example, they discussed combined power
and EM analysis but also multi-channel DPA attacks.
1.3.4 Fault attacks
Fault attacks are based on hardware faults; they were introduced by Boneh et
al. [17]. The attack is based on the following idea: if a wrong result is released
the adversary can use that information to break the cryptosystem.
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Boneh et al. classified the faults into three categories. The first type are
transient faults which can occur randomly causing a faulty computation to be
executed. The second type are latent faults, which are hardware or software bugs
that are difficult to locate. The third type are induced faults for which physical
access to the hardware is necessary. These are the most interesting because of
the active role of the attacker. For example, optical fault induction attacks,
as introduced by Scorabogatov and Anderson [87], use a flashgun targeting a
transistor to change the state of a memory cell in a microcontroller. The authors
have proved this optical probing to be feasible as they managed to change an
arbitrary bit of an SRAM array. They also suggested to use self-timed dual-rail
logic as a defense to these attacks, which could also help against power analysis
attacks.
Fault attacks can be considered as the almost dangerous implementation
attacks as countermeasures usually include complex techniques which are not
easy to implement on constrained environment such as smart cards.
1.4 An Overview on countermeasures
Since differential power analysis constitutes a real threat to chipcard security
and attacks using DPA have been proved to be successful at breaking many
industry-standard cryptographic algorithms, a plethora of countermeasures has
been proposed to prevent power analysis attacks on chipcards.
The countermeasures against DPA attacks that have been published so far
can essentially be categorized into two groups: hiding and masking. The basic
idea of hiding is to remove the data dependency of the power consumption. This
means that either the execution of the algorithm is randomized or the power
consumption characteristics of the device are changed in such a way that an
attacker cannot easily find a data dependency. The basic idea of masking is
to randomize the intermediate values that are processed by the cryptographic
device.
A second criterion for categorizing a countermeasure is the level at which the
countermeasures are implemented, algorithmic or hardware level. On the algo-
rithmic (software) level, random masking of intermediate variables [46] is, for
example, a widely exploited technique. These are platform-dependent counter-
measures and, usually, a substantial processing-time overhead is needed. Hard-
ware countermeasures can be classified according to the involved abstraction
level during the design flow.
System-level techniques include adding noise to the device power consump-
tion [28], duplicating logics with complementary operations [94], active supply
current filtering with power consumption compensation, passive filtering, bat-
tery on chip and detachable power supply [85]. Observe that some of mentioned
techniques have a pure theoretical interest since, due to technological and cost
constraints, they cannot be employed to design tamper resistant chipcards.
Gate-level countermeasures include circuital techniques which can be im-
plemented using logic gates available in a standard-cell library, e.g. random
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masking [43], random pre-charging [21], state transitions and Hamming weights
balancing.
At last, the transistor-level approach to prevent DPA is based on the adop-
tion of a logic family whose power consumption is independent of the processed
data. In literature, many differential and dynamic logic families are available
which are suitable to design DPA resistant cryptographic hardware [96].
Although this technique is widely recognized as the most powerful DPA
countermeasure, its cost in term of design time is usually very high since a
full-custom approach is required.
Finally, in this work (see Chapter 5) hardware transistor-level countermea-
sures have been considered because they are platform-independent countermea-
sures and so they have any applicability algorithm.
1.4.1 Algorithmic countermeasures
The basis of power analysis attacks is elementary computations that depend on
a part of the secret key and on the input or output data, which are assumed to
be known.
Until recently, most of these attacks exploited some specific features of soft-
ware implementations of cryptographic algorithms, and many countermeasures
were designed at a software level. One of the most powerful software techniques
to counteract such attacks is to mask all input and intermediate data in order
to de-correlate any information leaked through side channels from actual secret
data being processed [32]. The idea is simple: the message and the key are
masked with some random values at the beginning of computations, and there-
after everything is almost as usual. Of course, the value of the mask at the end
of some fixed step must be known in order to re-establish the expected value at
the end of the execution. In section 1.4.2.2 is showed how to apply data masking
technique at the level of micro operations such as a logical AND.
A typical masking example is to mask implementations of the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) [70].
The Advanced Encryption Standard is a round-based symmetric block cipher.
The standard key size is 128 bits, but for some applications 192 and 256-bit
keys must be supported as well. The round consists of four different operations
namely SubByte, ShiftRow, MixColumn and AddRoundKey, that are performed
repeatedly in a certain sequence; each operation in a standard algorithm maps
a 128-bit input state into a 128-bit output state. The state is represented as
4x4 matrix of bytes. The number of rounds depends on the key size. In the
decryption process, the inverse operations of each basic function are executed
in a slightly different order. Figure 1.7 illustrates the general structure of the
AES encryption algorithm.
Except for SubBytes(), all transformations are linear, i.e., they have the
property that f(x+m) = f(x)+f(m). Hence, for such transformations, it is an
easy task to compute how the mask m has changed during the transformation.
As a consequence, it is also simple to re-establish the original mask m after a
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Figure 1.7: Basic operations of the Advanced Encryption Standard algorithm.
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(sequence of) transformation(s).
More difficult is the transformation SubBytes(). In fact, as SubBytes() is
non-linear, re-establishing the mask after a SubBytes() transformation is diffi-
cult. This is because SubBytes(x+m) = SubBytes(x) +m' 6= SubBytes(x) +
SubBytes(m). Consequently, SubByte is the main building block of AES. It
replaces each byte in a state by its substitute in an S-box that comprises a com-
position of two transformations: first, each byte in a state is replaced with its
reciprocal in the finite field GF(28), except that 0, which has no reciprocal, is
replaced by itself and this is the only non-linear function in the AES algorithm;
then an affine transformation f is applied. The S-box is usually implemented as
a look-up table consisting of 256 entries; each entry is 8 bits wide. Finally, the
round key is computed in parallel to the round operation. It is derived from
the cipher key by means of key expansion and round key selection operations,
which are similar to those of the round operation.
In the following, a method that can be used to mask AES SubBytes() (pre-
sented in [73]) is showed. The SubBytes() transformation is implemented as
a lookup table. In [73] a masking is proposed such that SubBytes(x + m) =
SubBytes(x) +m.
In order to achieve this with a lookup table the authors in [73] have to
compute a corresponding table MaskedSubBytes() for the mask m as showed in
the following algorithm:
INPUT: m
OUTPUT: MaskedSubBytes(x + m) = SubBytes(x) + m,
1: for i = 0 to 255 do
2: MaskedSubBytes(i + m) = Subbytes(i) + m
3: end for
4: Return(MaskedSubBytes)
Such a table needs to be computed for each mask value mi. If mi different
masks are used, then the complexity of this procedure is i·256. If we ensure that
the same masks mi are re-established before the SubBytes() operation in each
round the same i tables can be used throughout the complete AES calculation.
1.4.2 Hardware countermeasures
As shortly discussed in Section 1.4, hardware countermeasure are classified ac-
cording to the involved abstraction level during the design flow. In the following,
examples in the different levels will be briefly showed.
1.4.2.1 System-level countermeasures
The approaches shortly discussed in Section 1.4.1 are valid but it is extremely
difficult to guarantee perfect equalization and high-resolution. Moreover the
algorithm countermeasures (and the other countermeasures presented in the
following) require changes in the implementation of crypto-hardware or require
the algorithm itself to be altered in some way.
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Figure 1.8: Block diagram of the suppression circuit.
System level countermeasures, instead, in general is an approach which does
not affect the algorithm implementation in any way. For example Shamir in [85]
proposed a method in which the power supply is isolated from the cryptographic
hardware of a smart card by using capacitors to supply the current. Two ca-
pacitors are used; one supplies current to the chip while the other recharges
itself. Examination of the power line will only show a pattern resulting from
the charging of the internal supply capacitors.
Another approach, proposed by Ratanpal et al. [83], acts as an auxiliary
circuit to increase the difficulty of power analysis attacks against the underlying
hardware. This paper presents the DPA suppression circuit which can be added
to existing hardware devices implementing cryptographic algorithms. The idea
is DPA obtains information in the form of variations in the supply current.
If these variations are attenuated, DPA is more difficult to be performed. In
other words, the attacker requires more power samples to distinguish the cor-
relation spikes from noise. The circuit showed in Figure 1.8 works as follow:
instantaneous current drawn by the device under protection is sensed, and an
appropriate current is shunted so that the total current drawn from the sup-
ply shows less variation. Ideally, a circuit with infinite bandwidth and zero
response time should completely flatten the power supply current trace, and
thereby make DPA ineffective.
Obviously, while this ideal behaviour is not possible with practical circuits,
feasible circuits can suppress supply current variations enough to make the num-
ber of power traces required for DPA prohibitively large. A bit in detail, from
Figure 1.8 it is possible to see that when the current demand of the device de-
creases, the voltage at the bottom of Rsense starts to rise. This results in an
increase in the output voltage of the op-amp. As a result, transistor Mshunt
starts drawing more current and pulls the voltage down. Essentially, the feed-
back loop forces the voltage at the bottom of Rsense to a constant reference
voltage Vref . The value of the peak current drawn by the device can be set
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through Vref to ensure continuous operation of the negative feedback loop. The
feedback loop, however, has limited bandwidth. High frequency components of
the power signal are filtered through the R·C combination of Rsense and Cfilter.
1.4.2.2 Gate-level countermeasures
The masking schemes, which have been discussed in 1.4.1, are all algorithmic
countermeasures and can be implemented either in software or in hardware.
However, masking on gate level using a special masked logic has been pro-
posed as well. In [97] and [43] it has been shown how to apply data masking
techniques at the level of micro operations such as logical AND, XOR, etc., and
how to use these operations as building blocks for implementation of inversion
in composite fields directly on masked data.
As it has been already explained, the only operations which are tricky to
mask occur during the computation of the AES S-box. In particular, if the
S-box is implemented in composite field arithmetic, it is the AND gate which is
difficult to mask.
The main contribution of the just cited papers is therefore the design of
a masked AND gate and its clever use to secure implementations of the AES
S-box. In these papers the bitwise XOR (⊕) random masking is considered, in
which data x is randomized into x⊕ rx by a random mask rx. In this case the
output mask for z = x⊕y is the bitwise XOR of the two input masks, for x and
y. Then, if z = f(x), for an elementary function f, and if we want to obtain a
masked output Z˜ = z ⊕ rz from a masked input X˜ = x⊕ rx, then the function
f has to be modified into a new, masked function F˜ so that Z˜ = F˜
(
X˜, rx, rz
)
.
The problem considered, for example, in [64] is how to compute securely
in hardware, on the logic gate level, the masked function AND. For the AND
function z = f(x, y) = x • y, by applying the distributive property and by
grouping the terms appropriately, it is obtained
Z˜ = z ⊕ rz =
((
(rz ⊕ (rx ⊕ ry))⊕
(
rx • Y˜
))
⊕
(
ry • X˜
))
⊕
(
X˜ ⊕ Y˜
)
(1.1)
in which all the computations are secure (see Figure 1.9).
Another example of hardware countermeasure at gate level is the technique
proposed in [19], based on the insertion of random delays on the input signals of
each pipeline stage of the processor data-path thus resulting in a randomization
of the charge quantity from the power supply. In Figure 1.10 the proposed
technique to scramble the current consumption is shown: considering a generic
pipeline stage in a cryptographic processor, each input to the combinatorial
network is delayed by a random time ∆i = 1, ..., N . That allows to introduce
a variance on the current supply waveform and, above all, the charge quantity
transferred during a clock cycle is also decorrelated from the processed data
thanks to the modification of the internal sequence of transitions caused by the
input delays.
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Figure 1.9: Example of masked AND.
Figure 1.10: Pipeline stage with random delays.
In [19] details about the practical implementation are also reported. In
fact, it is also shown how the proposed technique can be easily adopted in the
framework of a standard semi-custom design flow. For example a randomized
propagation delay D flip-flop is presented in which the delay time depends on a
random bit R (see equation (1.2) and Figure 1.11).
tpd = t
FF
pd + t
MUX
pd + ∆ ·R (1.2)
For all these presented techniques the presence of a true random number
generator (RNG) is required (see Chapter 6 for details about RNG's). Many
works have been published in the technical literature on the implementation
of RNG modules ([14], [21], [22], [15] and [25]). In particular, in [23] a new
concept for an oscillator-based RBG (Random Bit Generator) which exploits
the relative jitter between two identical ring oscillators sharing the same delay
elements is proposed. The oscillators start synchronously and a detecting circuit
signals when a relative jitter greater than a given threshold has been accumu-
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Figure 1.11: Random D flip-flop (RDFF).
lated. Therefore, the generation rate is automatically adapted to the available
noise and no pseudo-random patterns are generated thus improving the module
testability [24].
1.4.2.3 Transistor level countermeasures
The transistor-level approach is based on the adoption of a logic style whose
power consumption is constant or independent of the processed data.
Static Complementary MOS logic, which is the default logic style in standard
cell libraries used for security IC's, only consumes energy from the power supply
when its output has a 0-1 transition. In fact, during the 1-0 transition the energy
previously stored in the output capacitance is dissipated and in the two events
of a 0-0 or a 1-1 transition no power is used. This asymmetric power demand
provides the information used in DPA to find the secret key.
A logic style with data-independent power consumption does not reveal this
information. When logic values are measured by charging and discharging ca-
pacitances we need to use a fixed amount of energy for every transition. In
this way, Tiri et al. in [96] proposed the Sense Amplifier Based Logic (SABL),
a logic style that uses a fixed amount of charge for every transition, including
the degenerated events in which a gate does not change state. In every cycle, a
SABL gate charges a total capacitance with a constant value. SABL is based
on two principles. First, it is a dynamic and differential logic style and there-
fore has exactly one switching event per cycle and this independently of the
input value and sequence. Since a differential logic family uses the direct and
the negated representation of the input and output signals and a dynamic logic
family alternates precharge and evaluation phases, both outputs are precharged
to 1 in the precharge phase and exactly one of the two outputs evaluates to 0 in
the evaluation phase. Second, during a switching event, it guarantees that the
load capacitance has a constant value. SABL completely controls the portion
of the load capacitance that is due to the logic gate. The intrinsic capacitances
at the differential input and output signals are symmetric and additionally it
discharges and charges all the internal node capacitances trough a special pull
down network.
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Figure 1.12: SABL inverter.
The SABL gate is based on the StrongArm110 flip-flop (SAFF) [72]. To
realize a basic gate, Tiri keeps the sense amplifier half flip-flop and replaces the
input differential pair by a differential pull down network (DPDN). Figure 1.12
depicts the SABL inverter gate.
During the evaluation phase (clk high) the cross-coupled inverter will toggle
to one state and provides a path to ground. The transistor in the middle with
the gate connected to supply (always on) prevents a floating node by serving
as a path for subthreshold currents and guarantees that all internal nodes are
discharged. Under the assumption that the differential signals propagate in
the same environment, the interconnect capacitances are equivalent. Therefore
the total output capacitance is a constant. During the precharge phase (clk
low) all the discharged nodes and capacitances will be charged. Since in every
cycle the same capacitances are discharged and charged that makes the power
consumption of the gate independent of the input statistics.
Topics covered in this section will be taken up and further elaborated in
Chapter 5.
1.5 Contents of this thesis work
This thesis work reports the results obtained during a Ph.D. in electronic engi-
neering on both attacks and countermeasures side which this kind of research
offers.
More in detail, Chapter 2, starting from CMOS powtheer consumption, cov-
ers simple and differential power analysis which are the state of the art regarding
hardware attacks.
In Chapter 3, an active circuit (the so called Supply and Current Measure-
ment, or SCM) which promises to improve this kind of attack is proposed and
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experimental results are reported and the achievable advantage in terms of sensi-
tivity is discussed too. A complete comparison with the standard measurement
is performed to underline the improvement achievable using the proposed setup.
Finally, real attacks are performed first on a simple crypto core and than on a
FPGA implementing a part of the DES algorithm. The obtained experimen-
tal results are compared showing the advantages of the proposed solution with
respect the standard attack setup.
The setup proposed in Chapter 3 aims to improve the power attacks which
are based on dynamic power consumption of the circuits under attack. In Chap-
ter 4, the possibility to use leakage (static) current as a novel side-channel is
explored. Assumptions about information leakage in CMOS logic gates due to
static current are validated with experimental results and therefore a novel class
of attacks is proposed, called Leakage Power Analysis (LPA). A complete anal-
ysis of LPA effectiveness under process variations is addressed also in presence
of DPA resistant logic styles.
In Chapter 5, hardware countermeasures against power analysis are con-
sidered. More in detail, after an introduction about the state of the art on
countermeasures at different levels, the work is focused on the transistor level
countermeasures by proposing three new logic families for cryptographic appli-
cations in which each one offers advantages over the previous one.
Chapter 6 is focused on the Random Number Generators (RNG), hardware
building blocks of many cryptographic systems, which generate sequences of
random numbers (bits). After a short overview on RNGs, two different works
are reported. The first activity is focused on a power attack on a chaos-based
Random Number Generator which is designed and realized by the research group
of professor Setti of the University of Bologna. The aim of this attack is to verify
if it is possible to retrieve information regarding the internal state of the chaotic
system used to generate the random bits. As second activity, measures on
implementation of a RNG designed by Infineon Technologies (design center in
Graz, Austria) are shown proving the randomness of the generated sequence of
bits.
Finally, the conclusions of this research work are drawn in Chapter 7.
Chapter 2
Power analysis
2.1 Power consumption of CMOS circuits
The total power consumption of a CMOS circuit is the sum of the power con-
sumptions of the single logic cells which compose the circuit. Hence, the total
power consumption essentially depends on the number of logic cells in a circuit,
the connections between them, and how the cells are built.
When operating a CMOS circuit, the circuit is provided with the constant
supply voltage VDD and with input signals. The logic cells in the circuit process
the input signals and draw current from the power supply.
Most modern cryptographic devices are implemented in CMOS logic. The
power consumption of CMOS logic gates can essentially be divided into two
parts.
The first part is the static power consumption Pstat. This is the power
that is consumed if there is no switching activity in a cell. When a MOS
transistor is off current is not exactly zero but a weak (leakage) current flows
through the channel producing a power consumption. We denote this leakage
current by Ileak. Hence, the static power consumption Pstat can be calculated
according to (2.1). This phenomenon is increasing significantly for modern
process technologies with very small channel length.
Pstat = Ileak · VDD (2.1)
The second part of the power consumption is the dynamic power consump-
tion Pdyn composed by switching and short-circuit power consumption. Let us
use the simplest CMOS logic cell, the CMOS inverter, to describe these two
contributions. As depicted in Figure 2.1, the inverter contains two transistors
which act as voltage controlled switches. When the input voltage to the inverter
is high, the top switch opens while the bottom switch closes. This grounds the
inverter's output and so it goes low. Conversely, when the input voltage is high,
the top switch closes and bottom opens setting the output to +V which thus
goes high. When performing output 0 → 1 transitions, the CMOS inverter
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Figure 2.1: CMOS inverter power dissipation: 0-1 (left) and 1-0 (right) output
transition.
draws a charging current from the power supply to charge the output capac-
itance CL. On the contrary, when performing output 1 → 0 transitions, the
CMOS inverter discharges current from the capacitance CL to power ground.
This current flow generates switching power consumption. The average charg-
ing power Pchrg that is consumed by a cell during the time T can be calculated
as shown in (2.2) in which pchrg(t) denotes the instantaneous charging power
consumed by the cell, f is the clock frequency, and a is the so-called activity
factor of the cell. The activity factor corresponds to the average number of
0→ 1 transitions that occur at the output of a cell in each clock cycle.
Pchrg =
1
T
∫ T
0
pchrg(t)dt = α · f · CL · V 2DD (2.2)
Moreover, there is a brief instant, when the inverter is in transition between
states, when both transistors conduct current. This causes a short circuit from
+V to the ground which temporarily dissipates (short-circuit) power. The av-
erage power consumption Psc that is caused by the short-circuit currents in a
cell during the time T can be calculated as shown in (2.3) in which psc(t) is the
instantaneous short-circuit power consumed by a cell, Ipeak denotes the value of
the current peak that is caused by the short circuit during the switching event
and tsc is the time for which the short circuit exists.
Psc =
1
T
∫ T
0
psc(t)dt = α · f · VDD · Ipeak · tsc (2.3)
2.2 Power Analysis
In 1996 Kocher suggested the idea that power consumption of a cryptographic
token can convey sensitive information to an adversary [51]. There, Kocher
noted that padding the execution time of operations with dummy computations
(e.g., empty loops) may be an ineffective defense against timing attacks since
the power consumption of dummy computations can be much different from
meaningful ones. In this case, an adversary could plot, or trace, the power
consumption of a token as it executes a particular operation and then educe a
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Figure 2.2: Power attack in practice.
valid timing measurement from the length of the initial pattern in the trace.
It is not difficult to imagine a situation where an adversary might have the
opportunity to collect power consumption data.
In 1998, Kocher and the results of his research were again featured in the New
York Times [W98]. The story there summarized some of the details concerning
power analysis that Kocher had recently announced. One particularly startling
claim was that for some tokens, a power trace of a single cryptographic operation
is enough to completely reveal the value of an embedded secret key. Even more
startling was the claim that by examining roughly 1000 power traces Kocher
and his employees had managed to break every smart card product they had
examined in the last year and a half.
As more technical details [52] concerning these discoveries were released,
it became clear that power analysis was a serious threat to the security of
cryptographic tokens.
To better explain this concept, it is sufficient to consider that the amount of
current drawn by electronic devices from a power source during their operation
varies depending on the performed computations. To measure the current con-
sumption, a small resistor (approximately 10− 50Ω) is connected in series with
the device's power supply. An oscilloscope can be used to measure the voltage
difference across the resistor and the current can then be deduced using Ohm's
law (see Figure 2.2). Digital oscilloscopes can be used to sample voltage signals
at high frequencies giving a trace of the current over an interval of time.
The source of current for most devices is supplied at a constant voltage and
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so the power dissipated by these devices is proportional to the flow of current
through them. Because of this, power analysis attacks work just as well with
current measurements as they do with power measurements. Hence, the only
difference between a power analysis attack and a current analysis attack is a
constant factor.
The most dominant source of power dissipation (for technology nodes up to
100nm) is usually caused by the charging and discharging of internal capacitive
loads attached to gate outputs. A thorough discussion of all three factors is
given in [106] and [33].
Power consumption information is useful to an adversary because it is corre-
lated to the calculations the token is performing. Power analysis attacks come
in many variants.
The basic PA technique, known as simple power analysis (SPA) [51] mon-
itors the power supply of a cryptoprocessor while executing a known encryp-
tion algorithm and correlates the time-domain current waveform with various
phases of the algorithm. If the algorithm has a key dependent execution flow,
for instance if it has branches dependent on the value of key bits, the current
waveform presents easily recognizable features that reveal key information. SPA
has limited effectiveness if the algorithm flow is data-independent, but it can be
effective to crack naive implementations.
Differential power analysis (DPA) [53], and its variants such as higher-order
power analysis [59], is significantly more dangerous, in fact it is effective even
when execution flow is not data-dependent and for some encryption algorithms
it does not even require knowledge of the plaintext.
To perform DPA, an attacker needs a collection of m power traces Ti[j], i =
1, . . . ,m (j is the discrete time index of the values in the trace) and their corre-
sponding ciphertext values Ci. The critical step in applying DPA is the defini-
tion of a selection function D (Kb, Ci)→ {0, 1} that, given subkey Kb consisting
of a (small) subset of b key bits, can split the set of m traces and ciphertext
values in 2 disjoint subsets. The definition of D depends on the encryption
algorithm and it is the critical step in a successful DPA attack.
The fundamental premise for the applicability of DPA is that the power
profile for an encryption algorithm depends in some parts on the value of the
secret key. Infact, as already discussed in Section 1.4, all known DPA counter-
measures attempt to falsify this premise. An intuitive approach is to enforce
independence of Ti[j] on the value of the secret key, or in other words, modify
the algorithm or the hardware to reduce the sensitivity of the power profile to
the secret key value. Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to guarantee perfect
equalization and high-resolution as will be discussed in Chapter 5.
2.2.1 Simple Power Analysis
Simple power analysis (SPA) is a technique whereby information about the
operation of a cryptographic token is deduced directly from a power trace.
Depending on how a cipher is implemented, this information may reveal key
material.
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Figure 2.3: An SPA trace of an RSA signature operation.
In order to show an example of how to use SPA, a short presentation of RSA
algorithms is necessary. The RSA cryptosystem is a public-key algorithm that
offers both encryption and digital signatures (authentication).
Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman developed the RSA in
1977 [82]; RSA stands for the first letter in each of its inventors' last names.
Generally speaking, the RSA algorithm take two large primes, p and q, and
computes their product n = p · q; n is called the modulus. Choose a number, e,
less than n and relatively prime to (p−1)(q−1), which means e and (p−1)(q−1)
have no common factors except 1. Find another number d such that (ed− 1) is
divisible by (p− 1)(q− 1). The values e and d are called the public and private
exponents, respectively. The public key is the pair (n, e); the private key is
(n, d). The factors p and q may be destroyed or kept with the private key. It
is currently very difficult to obtain the private key d from the public key (n, e).
However if one could factor n into p and q, then one could obtain the private
key d. Thus the security of the RSA system is based on the assumption that
factoring is difficult.
Figure 2.3 shows a portion of a trace from a smart card calculating an RSA
signature. Each of the nine spikes indicates the beginning of a square or multiply
operation. Initially, registers are loaded with values to be squared or multiplied.
Multiplications require additional register loads which increases the width of the
leading spike. As a result, square operations (narrow spike) can be distinguished
from square-and-multiply operations (narrow spike followed by a wider spike).
Thus, five key bits can be determined from the trace: 00111.
Interpreting SPA characteristics is more easily done with some details about
the target implementation. With complete details (e.g., source code), an at-
tacker can focus on particular regions of a power trace to try to distinguish the
characteristics of specific operations. Generally, any implementation where the
path of execution is determined by key bits has a potential vulnerability to this
attack.
Kocher et al. [53] were the first to discuss the application of power analysis
to implementations of cryptographic algorithms. They were also the first to
point out that the dependency of the power traces on the executed instructions
can lead to a serious security problem.
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Figure 2.4: DPA basic operations.
2.2.2 Differential Power Analysis
Differential power analysis (DPA) is probably the most threatening attack to
result from Kocher's research. The goal of DPA attacks is to reveal secret keys
of cryptographic devices based on a large number of power traces that have been
recorded while the devices encrypt or decrypt different data blocks.
To carry out a DPA attack, an attacker must have a number of power traces
collected from a token as it repeatedly executes a cryptographic operation. The
attack proceeds by deducing bits of the secret key, used in each operation, from
the observed power consumption. An attacker must also have knowledge of
either the inputs or outputs processed by the device during each operation.
Usually, an encryption token will use the same key over multiple operations and
any generated ciphertext can be freely obtained by an eavesdropper.
The main advantage of DPA attacks compared to SPA attacks is that no
detailed knowledge about the cryptographic device is necessary. In fact, it is
usually sufficient to know the cryptographic algorithm that is executed by the
device. Another important difference between the two kinds of attacks is that
the recorded traces are analyzed in a different way. In SPA attacks it is directly
analyzed the power consumption trace along the time axis to extract informa-
tions about what the cryptographic device is doing. In case of DPA attacks,
the shape of the traces along the time axis is not so important. DPA attacks
analyze how the power consumption at fixed moments of time depends on the
processed data. Hence, DPA attacks focus exclusively on the data dependency
of the power traces.
DPA attacks exploit the data dependency of the power consumption of cryp-
tographic devices. They use a large number of power traces to analyze the power
consumption at a fixed moment of time as a function of the processed data. The
basic DPA technique is shown in Figure 2.4.
Suppose an adversary is able to partition power traces from several crypto-
graphic operations into two groups according to the intermediate value of some
bit, b, calculated during each operation. This bit is manipulated during each
operation and its value may affect the observed power consumption. If this is
the case then the two groups of traces should show respectively different power
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biases at locations when b is manipulated. Averaging the traces in each group
helps reducing any noise that may be obscuring these usually small biases. Plot-
ting the difference of the two average traces reveals any locations in the traces
where these biases occur.
More in detail, the flow to execute a DPA attack consist of five steps.
The first step of a DPA attack is to choose an intermediate result of the
cryptographic algorithm that is executed by the attacked device. This interme-
diate result needs to be a function D = f(d, k), where d is a known non-constant
data value and k is a small part of the key.
The second step consists on running the encryption algorithm for N random
values of plain-text input. For each of the N plain-text inputs, PTIi, a discrete
time power signal, Si[j], is collected and the corresponding cipher-text output,
CTOi, may also be collected. The power signal Si[j] is a sampled version of
the power consumed during the portion of the algorithm that is being attacked.
The i index corresponds to the PTIi that produced the signal and the j index
corresponds to the time of the sample.
The next step of the attack is to calculate a hypothetical intermediate value
D for every possible choice of k. For each possible key, the power traces Si [j]
are divided into two sets using the intermediate value as in 2.4:
S0 = {Si [j] | D = 0}
S1 = {Si [j] | D = 1} (2.4)
The next step is to compute for each possible key the average power signal
for each set:
A0 [j] =
1
|S0|
∑
Si[j]∈S0
Si [j]
A1 [j] =
1
|S1|
∑
Si[j]∈S1
Si [j]
(2.5)
where | S0 | + | S1 |= N .
Finally, by subtracting the two averages, a discrete time DPA bias, T [j], is
obtained for each key:
T [j] = Ao [j]−A1 [j] (2.6)
When the hypothized key is correct this means that the hypothesis on D
matches with the real value assumed by the cryptographic core and thus two sets
in (2.4) are split in a right way. Therefore A0 and A1 in (2.5) have very different
values and thus their difference in (2.6) will be greater than zero. Conversely
when a wrong hypothesis on the key is taken in consideration, current traces
are splitted in two sets statistically uncorrelated with the value of D. Hence in
(2.5) both A0 and A1 are the mean of current traces statistically uncorrelated
with each other and thus A0 ≈ A1. This means that the difference in (2.6) in
this case is approximately zero.
It is evident that the most critical step of a DPA attack is the selection of the
function D. Infact the number of power consumption traces that an attacker
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Figure 2.5: Enciphering computation of the DES algorithm.
need for a successful attack will change depending on selected D: more D is
related to power consumption and less power traces will be used to find this
relation and therefore the unknown part of D, the key.
In order to show an example of how to choose the function D for a DPA
attack, a short presentation of DES algorithms is necessary.
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) [37] was invented in 1975 by IBM.
The algorithm is designed to encipher and decipher blocks of data consisting of
64 bits under control of a 56 bits key (48 bits key and 8 bits for parity check).
Deciphering must be accomplished by using the same key as for enciphering,
but with the schedule of addressing the key bits altered so that the deciphering
process is the reverse of the enciphering process. A block to be enciphered is
subjected to an initial permutation IP, then to a complex key-dependent com-
putation and finally to a permutation which is the inverse of the initial permu-
tation (IP-1). The complex key-dependent computation is a Feistel-Structure
and consists of 16 rounds (see Figure 2.5):
Li = Ri−1
Ri = Li−1 ⊕ f (Ri−1,Ki) (2.7)
where Ki denotes the subkey of the i-th round.
The cipher function f is defined as f (Ri−1,Ki) = P (S (E (Ri−1,Ki))) (see
Figure 2.6) in which P stands for a permutation, S stands for an S-box crossing
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Figure 2.6: Calculation of f(Ri−1,Ki) in the DES algorithm.
and, finally, E(X) is the operation to enlarge the X length. The 16 subkeys
Ki are derived from a manipulation on the key; L0 and R0 are derived from a
manipulation on the plaintext.
After the previous short introduction, a practical example of how DPA can
be used to attack a DES implementation is described. Selecting an appropriate
D function will result in a DPA bias signal that an attacker can use to verify
guesses of the secret key. An example of such a D function is as follows:
D (C1, C6,K16) = C1 ⊕ SBOX1 (C6 ⊕K16) (2.8)
where C1 is the first bit of CTOi that is XORed with one bit of S-box
#1; C6 is the six bits of CTOi that are XORed with last round's subkey K16;
K16 represents the six bits of the last round's subkey that feed into S-box #1;
SBOX1(x) is a function returning the first bit resulting from looking up x in
S-box #1. This particular D function is chosen because at some point during a
DES implementation, the software needs to compute the value of this bit. When
this occurs or anytime data containing this bit is manipulated, there will be a
slight difference in the amount of power dissipated depending on whether this
bit is a zero or a one.
From all above-mentioned considerations, starting from one input to the D
function was K16, six bits of the subkey, even if the attacker does not know
these bits, he can use brute force and try all 26 possible values. For each guess,
the attacker constructs a new partition for the power signatures and gets a new
CHAPTER 2. POWER ANALYSIS 30
Figure 2.7: DPA traces examples.
bias signal, T [j]. If the proper D function was chosen, the bias signal will show
spikes whenever the D bit was manipulated. If the D function was not chosen
correctly (i.e., the wrong subkey bits were guessed), then the resulting T [j] will
not show any biases. Some DPA trace examples that is possible to obtain are
showed in Figure 2.7.
Using this approach, an attacker can determine the six subkey inputs to S-
box #1 at round 16 of DES. Repeating this approach for the seven other DES
S-boxes allows the attacker to learn the entire round 16 subkeys (48 bits). The
remaining 8 bits can be found by brute force or by successively applying this
approach backwards to previous rounds.
Kocher et al. tested this attack and claimed it was successful on all smart
cards they examined.
2.2.3 An overview on Correlation Power Analysis
DPA was later extended to correlation power analysis (CPA) in which a cor-
relation coefficient is used to estimate the linear relationship between a power
consumption model and the real power traces for each hypothized key.
The power consumption model is a model of the relationship between the
power consumption and the input vector. For instance is commonly used Ham-
ming weight of the data being manipulated.
The correlation coefficient measures the linear relationship between two vari-
ables.
In statistics, we can express the linear relationship between two points of
a trace based on the covariance or the correlation. The covariance quantifies
the deviation from the mean and a definition is given in (2.9) as the aver-
age of the product of the deviation for the random variables X and Y . The
covariance is a linear measure because it is based on the average deviation.
The equivalent formula (2.10) shows that the covariance is also related to the
concept of statistical dependence. If X and Y are statistically independent,
then E(XY ) = E(X)E(Y ), and therefore Cov(X,Y ) = 0. On the converse, if
Cov(X,Y ) = 0, then X and Y are independent.
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Cov (X,Y ) = E ((X − E (X)) · (Y − E (Y ))) (2.9)
Cov (X,Y ) = E (XY )− E (X) · E (Y ) (2.10)
A related, but more commonly used method to measure a linear relation-
ship between two values is the correlation coefficient ρ (X,Y ). The correlation
coefficient is defined in terms of the covariance as can be seen in (2.11). It is a
dimensionless quantity and it can only take values between plus and minus one.
ρ (X,Y ) =
Cov(X,Y )√
V ar(X) · V ar(Y ) (2.11)
As in CPA attack term X or term Y is the key and it is normally unknown,
this means that in a CPA attack the correlation coefficient is typically unknown
and needs to be estimated. The estimator r is defined in (2.12) and this is what
is commonly called correlation coefficient in a CPA attack.
r =
∑n
i=1 (xi − x) · (yi − y)√∑n
i=1 (xi − x)2 ·
∑n
i=1 (yi − y)2
(2.12)
More details about CPA can be found in [61]. In this work, and in special
way in Chapter 4, a new attack is presented whose procedure is similar to the
CPA.
Chapter 3
The Supply and Current
Measurement
3.1 Introduction
When an algorithm or protocol is executed in a cryptographic device (e.g. a
chip-card), secret data are manipulated (e.g. cryptographic keys and user PINs).
A main requirement for the device is to physically protect these sensitive data
against observation thus protecting itself against cloning. The traditional re-
search in cryptanalysis has been mainly focused in investigating weaknesses in
algorithms and protocols and, since only few years, the implementation is con-
sidered a part of the security evaluation of cryptographic systems.
As discussed in the previous chapter, since differential power analysis (DPA)
has been introduced by P. Kocher et al. in 1998 [53], many research activities
have been directed in developing countermeasures to enhance the device resis-
tance against DPA while, on the contrary, few contributions aimed to enhance
the quality of the measurements needed for the attack itself have been reported
in the technical literature [31, 58].
Starting point for any power analysis attack is the measurement of the in-
stantaneous current consumption waveforms from the device under attack. The
quality of the available measurements strongly influences the execution time (i.e.
the number of waveforms needed for the attack) and, at the end, determines
the attack success. The state of the art consists of using a small series resistor
between the VSS or VDD pin on the card and the measurement ground. The
time varying voltage drop on the resistor V (t) = RIDD/SS(t) can be measured
using a differential probe and sampled by a digital oscilloscope [7]. Even if in
principle this setup is rather simple to implement, in practice, obtaining good
quality measures is not straightforward.
There are some ideas, known in literature, to improve the effectiveness of a
power attack with respect the standard resistor-based setup:
 by reducing the possible sources of noise by improving the measuring
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Figure 3.1: Model of the power supply interconnection.
setup;
 by pre-processing the acquired current traces, for example by a filter;
 by using the so called Higher-order attacks [56];
 by considering optimal strategies such as template attacks [34] or stochas-
tic models [89];
 by combining the power-based attack with another side channel leakage
source (e.g. electromagnetic radiations).
In this chapter the first solution has been exploited showing that the resistor-
based setup is not really the optimal solution to measure the current consump-
tion of an IC and a more effective technique based on an active circuit is intro-
duced. Moreover further experimental results using the proposed circuits are
reported and its effectiveness in a practical power analysis attack is assessed.
More in detail the first activity in this work was to confirm experimentally
the advantages found in simulation, comparing current measurements using the
standard setup with the same measurements using the proposed solution. Sec-
ondly, a simple real attack has been performed using both the classical setup
and the new one. Finally, a more complex DPA attack on a non-secure software
DES has been performed to better compare two setups.
3.2 The proposed idea
A lumped component model for the interconnection between the chip internal
power supply network and the external measurement resistor R, used in a clas-
sical setup to measure the power consumption, is depicted in Figure 3.1. If the
current through VSS is measured, a similar model holds.
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Figure 3.2: Supply and current measuring circuit (SCM).
From the model above results the measuring resistor R and the distributed
parasitic capacitance on the chip-internal power connection cause a time con-
stant that limits the bandwidth of the useful signal IDD/SS(t). Therefore, es-
pecially for large IC's, low values must be used for R. Typical values are few
Ohms. On the other hand, R is also the amplification of the current signal and
low values for R imply a low sensitivity of the measurement. As a consequence,
a trade-off between bandwidth and sensitivity is required where the best choice
depends on the particular device under attack. Moreover, the probing resistor
R causes voltage bounces that affect the circuit behavior whose actual voltage
supply becomes V ′DD = VDD − I(t)R (insertion error).
To overcome the highlighted limitations, an active circuit has been proposed
(Figure 3.2) which features a low impedance current measuring input and a
high transimpedance gain, while providing, at the same time, the device under
measure with a stable voltage supply. In the followings, the circuit is called
supplying and current measuring circuit, or simply SCM.
As shown in Figure 3.2, SCM is based on a transimpedance amplifier used
as input stage to read the current consumption signal IDD(t) or ISS(t) from
a device under analysis. The transimpedance reference input is connected to
VDD or VSS and, of course, a balanced power supply +VCC/−VEE is necessary.
A second low frequency voltage feedback loop (closed after a voltage buffer),
provides the device connected at the probing input with a stable VDD/VSS .
The output signal is taken after a second de-coupling buffer and, within the
circuit bandwidth, it holds:
Vout(t) = −Rf
2
Iin(t) (3.1)
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where the 50Ω/50Ω output partition has been taken into account.
From a simplified AC model, the following expression for the circuit transfer
function has been obtained:
Vout
Iin
(s) = −1
2
AvLRfs
(1 +Av)Rf + (1 +Av)Ls+ [CfLRf (1 +Av) + CinLRf ]s2
(3.2)
where Av is the voltage gain of the transimpedance amplifier op-amp, Cin is
the circuit input capacitance, Cf is a compensation capacitance and the output
buffers are supposed ideal. For Av  1, (3.2) becomes:
Vout
Iin
(s) ' −1
2
LRfs
Rf + Ls+ CfLRfs2
(3.3)
and for the first pole it holds ωp ≈ Rf/L which can be used to choose L for
a given low cut-off frequency.
A discrete component implementation of the proposed circuit has been de-
signed where high slew rate and low noise have been adopted as main criteria for
the selection of the components. The op-amps AD8009 have been used both for
the transimpedance and the two voltage buffers. A 500Ω value has been chosen
for the transimpedance resistor Rf thus obtaining a gain of about 250V/A. A
150µH inductance L fixes the circuit low cut-off frequency at about 1MHz.
S-parameters measured with the network analyzer are depicted in Figure 3.3
and the corresponding transimpedance gain and input impedance show a flat
frequency response and an input resistance below 150Ω up to about 300MHz
(Figure 3.4).
A noise analysis of the SCM has been also performed which resulted, within
the circuit bandwidth, in the following expressions for the equivalent input noise
voltage/current generators:
vni =
Rf
2
√√√√(i−n )2 +(√4kTRf + en
Rf
)2
(3.4)
ini =
√√√√(i−n )2 +(√4kTRf + en
Rf
)2
(3.5)
where en is the op-amp equivalent input noise voltage generator and i
−
n is
the transimpedance input noise current generator (at the non-inverting input).
For the minimum detectable signal (MDS), it holds:
CHAPTER 3. THE SUPPLY AND CURRENT MEASUREMENT 36
Figure 3.3: S-parameters of the supply and current measuring circuit.
Figure 3.4: Measured transimpedance gain (above) and input impedance fre-
quency response (below).
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MDS =
√√√√√
i2n− +
(√
4kTRf + en
Rf
)2B (3.6)
where B is the circuit bandwidth. From the AD8009 databook data, it
follows MDS ∼= 20 pA√
Hz
√
B.
3.3 Focus on the SCM advantages with respect
to a resistor
Using the SCM to monitor the current consumption of a device under attack
provides several advantages with respect to a standard setup based on a probing
resistor.
Firstly, it is possible to reach higher gain-bandwidth products with a higher
flexibility: a 50Ω matching does not imply the transimpedance gain.
Moreover the insertion error in the measurement introduced by a resistor
is reduced using the SCM due to the smaller transimpedance amplifier input
resistance.
Actually, using the classical setup, during the current consumption mea-
surement, the voltage drop over the resistor decreases the voltage supply of
the device under measurement. This effect limits the maximum value that is
possible to use for the resistor.
It follows that the SCM can in principle reveal smaller current peaks with re-
spect to a resistor-based setup. It means the noise input current level is smaller
than in the resistor case. Moreover the presence of parasitic effect introduced by
the resistor (RC effect) is limited using the SCM. Furthermore, the frequency
components of the current signal below 1MHz are filtered: the static consump-
tion of the device under measure is filtered amplifying only the high frequency
components which are data dependent. On the other side, the peaking phe-
nomena at high frequency are optimized using the SCM obtaining a smaller
trans-characteristic overshoot.
3.4 Measurement setup
The measurement setup used for the experiments is the same in both cases.
The SCM has been mounted on a board as depicted in Figure 3.5 together with
a MAX3000A FPGA from Altera used as device under attack (DUA). In this
prototype the SCM has been connected to the VSS pins of the FPGA.
The measurement setup includes a Tektronix TDS 754d digital oscilloscope,
an Agilent 33250A clock generator and a Hewlett-Packard E3631A triple-output
power supply to provide 3.3V for the FPGA pads and +5/ − 5V for the SCM
itself (Figure 3.6).
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As shown in Figure 3.5, the board is divided in two parts: in the lower
part the SCM is visible and the FPGA is mounted in the upper part. A 500Ω
value has been chosen for the transimpedance resistor R thus obtaining a gain
of about 250V/A. In the right side there is a BNC connector to take the current
measurement. Three pins allow to connect the FPGA ground to the resistor
(standard resistor-based attack) or to the SCM (proposed attack).
A portion of the Serpent algorithm [3] has been adopted as a case study to
prove the effectiveness of the SCM.
Since the Data Encryption Standard algorithm ([37]) is nearing the end of its
useful life, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology has issued a
call for a successor of the DES, to be called the Advanced Encryption Standard
or AES. The Serpent algorithm was a candidate for AES.
Serpent encrypts a 128-bit plaintext to a 128-bit ciphertext in 32 rounds
under the control of 33 128-bit subkeys. The user key length is variable, 128,
192 or 256 bits; short keys with less than 256 bits are mapped to full-length
keys of 256 bits by appending one 1 bit to the MSB end, followed by as many
0 bits as required to make up 256 bits. The cipher itself consists of: an initial
permutation IP; 32 rounds, each consisting of a (4-bit) key mixing operation,
a pass through S-boxes, and (in all but the last round) a linear transformation
(in the last round, this linear transformation is replaced by an additional key
mixing operation); a final permutation FP. A set of eight S-boxes is used four
times. Each round function uses only a single replicated S-box. Thus after using
S7 in round 7, it uses S0 again in round 8, then S1 in round 9, and so on. A
Serpent S-box maps four input bits to four output bits. Because of the reduced
dimensions of the FPGA on the board, this algorithm is perfect for our intent.
It must be clear that the first measurement target is to demonstrate an
improvement in power attack using the SCM circuit with respect to a standard
setup (resistor). For this reason it has been chosen to consider only on central
round of Serpent algorithm, with the result of the xor function, between a
prefixed key and the data, as input signal of a Serpent S-box (the seventh).
As shown in Figure 3.7, the tested circuit includes a 4-bit S-Box with its
output register, an input XOR with a 4-bit key and a state machine which
generates (in 256 clock cycles) all possible transitions for the 4-bit data xor'ed
with the key.
To stimulate the FPGA with all possible input transitions to the S-box,
the design into the FPGA includes a state machine, in addition to the S-box,
that generates all possible transitions. Using two counters, the state machine
increases one counter every clock edge; when this counter reaches the terminal
count, the other counter increments. Assigning address signal to one counter
at a time, the addresses performs all possible transitions. In this way, in fact,
the sequence of address signal values (in decimal) is 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 2, 0, 3, 0, 4,
. . . , 0, 15, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 3, . . . , in which the values in odd positions are
the outputs of a counter while the values in even positions are the outputs of
the other counter. The state machine provides a trigger signal for the digital
oscilloscope too.
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Figure 3.5: Prototype board with the SCM and an Altera MAX3000A FPGA.
The output data is available externally for test purposes but, during the
current consumption measurement, the pads are tri-stated to avoid noise inside
the current profile due to current spikes on pads, since FPGA core ground and
pad ground are connected together in the board.
An advantage of this design is the possibility to study the differences occur-
ring in the current consumption profile changing an external key bit. The 4-bit
key is generated externally and, during the measurement, is static (key = 0001).
The described circuit has been synthesized from a VHDL description and has
been mapped on the available FPGA. A 5MHz clock frequency and a 1GS/s
sampling rate have been used for the measurements.
3.5 Experimental results
A screenshot from the oscilloscope is shown in Figure 3.8 where the SCM output
V (t) is visible. Peak amplitudes ranging from 0.5V to about 2V can be observed
as the processed input data change during the 256 acquired clock cycles (only
the first 24 periods are depicted in Figure 3.8).
Analyzing the V (t) waveform, a 14.8MHz oscillation has been observed com-
ing from the FPGA. It is clearly visible when the clock is disabled and it can
be also observed in Figure 3.8, superimposed to the current consumption of our
case study circuit. Unfortunately, the available FPGA does not provide the
possibility to disable this on-chip oscillator.
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Figure 3.6: Measurement setup.
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Figure 3.7: Circuit used as a case study.
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Figure 3.8: Oscilloscope screenshot.
To evaluate the improvement of the introduced circuit with respect to a
resistor-based setup, the same measurement has been repeated using a 50Ω
resistor and a differential probe to read out the voltage drop. A comparison
between the two waveforms when the FPGA is executing the same operations
is shown in Figure 3.9 (first 24 clock cycles). When the resistor is used, V (t)
peaks show a maximum amplitude of about 50mV , that means 40 times smaller
than the corresponding peaks generated by the SCM. On the other hand, larger
resistors cannot be used since, with 50Ω, the available bandwidth is already
quite small compared to the SCM, as follows comparing the peak durations in
Figure 3.9.
After the data acquisition, the next step was to define the right figure of
merit in order to assess the obtained experimental results and to compare them
in the two cases. The idea is to compare the SNR (Signal to Noise Ratio)
obtained using the SCM circuit and the resistor-base setup respectively, defining
a quantity S which is the useful signal and a quantity N which represents the
superimposed noise in the set of collected traces.
In order to quantify the achievable improvement in terms of sensitivity to
the current consumption variations, the same measurement has been repeated
20 times both with the SCM and the resistor. Therefore the current profile are
integrated over the input signal period to extract the energy.
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Figure 3.9: Waveform using a 50Ω resistor (above) vs. SCM (below).
In Figure 3.9 a current profile distortion is possible to note. This distortion
is due to the oscillation generated by a free running oscillator inside the FPGA.
Since the FPGA model used in the test board does not allow to disable this
oscillator, this problem has been resolved after the wave acquisition. More in
detail, the adopted solution is to integrate not respect the input signal period
but respect to the superimposed oscillation period, or a multiple of this period,
to cut off this component. Since the exact value of the oscillation period is
unknown, an SNR value for different integration windows w has been calculated.
The measurement noise has been evaluated as the average, over the 256 clock
cycles, of the energy/cycle variance calculated over the 20 repeated acquisitions:
N =
1
256
256∑
j=1
σ2Ej (3.7)
where,
Ej =
w∑
i=1
V [i · Tclk] (3.8)
with w ≤ 200, being 200 the number of samples in each clock period.
The useful signal is the variance, calculated over the 256 cycles, of the mean
energy/cycle:
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S = σ2
E
(3.9)
where,
E =
1
20
20∑
j=1
Ej . (3.10)
Finally, the signal to noise ratio:
SNR = 10log10
S
N
(3.11)
has been adopted as figure of merit.
The obtained results are plotted in Figure 3.10 as a function of the inte-
gration window length w for the resistor and the SCM respectively. In both
cases, the SNR shows a maximum for w = 135. Actually, sampling at 1GS/s,
a 135-sample window includes an integer number of periods of the 14.8MHz
on-chip oscillator, thus filtering out that asynchronous disturbance. Comparing
the maximum values, it follows that a 20dB improvement in the SNR can be
obtained using the proposed technique.
3.5.1 Attacking a simple crypto-core
The current traces collected for the evaluation of the SNR have been used to
implement a differential power analysis too. In particular, the first 16 clock
periods of each trace have been extracted from the complete curve since they
correspond to the transitions (0, i), ∀i = 0, . . . , 15, for the input 4-bit data.
A Matlab program has been written to implement a DPA starting from a
definition of a S7_serpent(d, k) function that receives as input a data d and a
key k, makes a bit-xor between d and k and calculates the output of the Serpent
seventh S-box. After selecting a target-bit (the third bit in this case), for all
possible keys (24) the current traces are divided in two sets with respect to the
target-bit value and for each set the average trace is calculated. Finally, the
difference between two average traces is evaluated.
The obtained differential curves for the 16 key hypotheses using the SCM and
a 50Ω resistor are reported in Figure 3.11.a and Figure 3.11.b respectively. In the
SCM case, the trace corresponding to the correct key hypothesis (key = 0001)
shows a clearly visible peak which is sensibly higher than the other peaks in
the plot (ghost peaks). On the contrary, the correct peak is only slightly higher
than the ghost peaks in case the resistor-based setup is used. The peaks for
each key hypothesis normalized to the peak obtained for the correct key are
reported in Table 3.1 for both cases: in the second case, the attack is not able
to discriminate with high confidence between the correct key (0001) and keys
0010, 0101.
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Figure 3.10: SNR comparison - resistor (above) vs. SCM (below).
Table 3.1: Normalized DPA peaks.
key SCM 50Ω
0000 0.31 0.31
0001 1 1
0010 0.30 0.97
0011 0.19 0.42
0100 0.19 0.42
0101 0.31 0.97
0110 0.45 0.72
0111 0.30 0.57
1000 0.26 0.48
1001 0.41 0.26
1010 0.22 0.54
1011 0.22 0.70
1100 0.22 0.70
1101 0.22 0.70
1110 0.17 0.29
1111 0.25 0.53
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3.11: Result of the differential power analysis using the SCM (a) and a
50Ω resistor (b).
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3.5.2 Attacking a DES
In order to test the proposed current measuring technique in a real scenario, a
DPA on a non-secure software DES running on a 8051 like micro-controller has
been implemented.
As a preliminary step, a stand-alone version of the SCM which can be con-
nected to the device under analysis was manufactured. A clock frequency of
5MHz has been used for the 8051 and the current traces are sampled at 250MS/s.
At the beginning of the encryption, the micro-controller sends a data on the I/O
port which is used as trigger for the oscilloscope to start the acquisition of the
current trace (250000 samples).
The attack is implemented on the first round of the algorithm using one of
the S-boxes outputs as target bit. Different S-boxes and different output bits
have been tested obtaining similar results.
The differential curves for the 64 hypotheses on the 6-bit subkey are shown
in Figure 3.12.a and Figure 3.12.b for the SCM and the 50Ω resistor-based
setup respectively. In both cases, 512 traces are sufficient to identify the correct
key (0x38). However, the SCM provides a better correlation coefficient (0.2514)
which corresponds to the higher ratio between current key peak and ghost peaks
visible in Figure 3.12. This result confirms the analysis on the SNR reported in
Section 3.5.
3.6 Conclusions
An effective current measuring technique has been introduced which promises
to considerably enhance power analysis attacks against cryptographic devices.
The proposed idea is based on a transimpedance amplifier to provide a low
impedance current input and an additional DC feedback loop to control the
voltage at the input pin, thus supplying the device under attack with a stable
voltage.
From the analysis and simulation of the SCM, several advantages have been
showed with respect to the standard-resistor setup. These advantages were
confirmed experimentally.
Compared to a resistor-based measurement, the presented circuit showed a
20dB improvement in the sensitivity to the current consumption variations of
a device under attacks. Therefore, it is expected a reduction of the required
number of acquisitions to implement a successful DPA attack against secure
implementations. Attacks performed on a FPGA implementing a section of the
Serpent algorithm and on a software DES running on a 8051 micro-controller
showed an improvement if the SCM is used.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3.12: Result of the differential power analysis using the SCM (a) and a
50Ω resistor (b).
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Next steps in this research activity will be the implementation of DPA at-
tacks against cryptographic co-processors to prove the actual advantage that
the introduced technique brings in terms of required number of acquisitions
and success of attacks against cores where DPA countermeasures are employed.
Moreover, to perform the reported measurements, it has been necessary to pay
attention to protect the circuit from external (electromagnetic) noise. This
means that a better solution to overcome these problems would be to implement
the SCM enclosed in a shielded package thus realizing a sort of current probe.
This requires an implementation of the SCM circuit as compact as possible. In
fact minimizing the circuit dimensions will allow to keep the interconnections
short and therefore to expand the bandwidth minimizing parasitic effects.
Chapter 4
Leakage Power Analysis
Attack
4.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 2, Power Analysis attacks have been extensively showed
to be a major threat to the security of data that are processed and stored in cryp-
tographic devices, such as Smart Cards. These attacks exploit the dependence
of the dynamic power consumption on the inputs of a cryptographic algorithm,
i.e. the input ciphertext (plaintext) that is to be decrypted (encrypted) and
the secret key. The cost in terms of equipment and computational effort are
rather low, hence these attacks can be easily performed. In Chapter 3 an ac-
tive circuit (the so called SCM) has been proposed which considerably enhances
power analysis attacks against cryptographic devices with respect the standard
resistor-based setup. The comparison between two setups has been performed
by using the standard Differential Power Analysis post-processing technique.
Among the existing post-processing techniques, the Correlation Power Anal-
ysis (CPA) is well known to be relatively simple and effective [61, 16]. In CPA, a
power model is adopted to estimate the dynamic power consumption required to
physically evaluate a signal generated within the crypto-chip as a function of the
input and the secret key [16]. Then, a portion of the secret key is guessed, and
the resulting dynamic power consumption is estimated with this model. Suc-
cessively, the correlation coefficient between this estimation and the measured
power is evaluated. Finally, the correct key is identified by taking the key guess
that leads to the highest value of the correlation coefficient [61, 16]: indeed, the
closer to the actual key is the guessed key, the greater is the correlation between
the estimated and measured power.
In sub-100nm technologies, the dynamic power is no longer the dominant
contribution to the chip power budget, due to the much faster increase of leakage
(i.e., static) power at each technology generation ([36, 68, 5, 48]). For example,
at the 65nm technology node the leakage power is in the order of half the chip
49
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power consumption, and is planned to be an even greater fraction in successive
technologies by the ITRS Roadmap [48]. Hence, the leakage power can be easily
measured in the same way as the dynamic power is measured in traditional
Power Analysis attacks. Due to the strong leakage dependence on the input of
digital circuits [5], leakage can also provide a significant amount of information
on the secret key, hence Power Analysis attacks based on leakage can be devised.
In the following, these attacks will be referred to as `Leakage Power Analysis'
(LPA) attacks.
Until now, information security issues related to the leakage dependence
on processed data were given in [45], and these considerations were applied
in [44] to simulate an attack to a simple crypto-core. In [45] and [44], some
basic concepts are presented, but LPA attacks are discussed neither in terms of
experimental issues, nor from a theoretical point of view. In this thesis, Leakage
Power Analysis attacks are formalized and analyzed from both a theoretical
and experimental standpoint in a systematic manner. Advantages and practical
problems related to the LPA attack are discussed through comparison with
traditional attacks targeting the dynamic power. Various examples, simulations
and experimental results are reported to better understand LPA attacks, as
well as to validate the underlying assumptions. In particular, a practical LPA
attack procedure is presented for the first time. A closed-form model of the LPA
attack result is also developed to better understand the attack. The impact of
technology scaling is also analyzed to evaluate the LPA effectiveness in future
technologies.
Analysis shows that LPA attacks are a major threat to information security
in sub-100nm technologies. Moreover, since many countermeasures to Power
Analysis attacks targeting the dynamic power have been proposed until now
[61], LPA becomes the weak point in the information security of cryptographic
circuits, if not taken into account during their design.
In this chapter the leakage sources in MOS devices and CMOS logic gates are
reviewed, and basic hypotheses are validated with experimental and simulation
results. Therefore a well defined procedure to perform LPA attacks is introduced
and measurement and practical issues are discussed to validate the proposed
methodology. A detailed theoretical analysis about the simple models used in
LPA attacks is first treated and then confirmed by experimental results. Real
attacks to a register and a cryptographic core are showed. At the end of this
Chapter the effect of process variations on LPA attacks are studied and it is
also shown that LPA attacks are effective even in the presence of transistor-level
countermeasures against DPA. Conclusions and further developments close the
Chapter.
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4.2 Review of leakage sources in nanometer CMOS
logic gates
The leakage current conducted by MOS transistors operating in cut-off region
consists of three main sources: sub-threshold, gate tunneling and inverse junc-
tion current [95]. In current technologies, the sub-threshold current is the most
important leakage contribution in a MOS transistor, considering that the gate
leakage is reduced with the adoption of high-k materials, and the inverse junction
current is two orders of magnitude lower than the former [69]. More specifically,
the sub-threshold current I(leak,NMOS) for a single NMOS transistor is given by
[95] and [69]
Ileak,NMOS = I0
W
L
exp
(
− VTH
nkT/q
)
(4.1)
where VTH is the transistor threshold voltage, I0 and n are technology-
dependent parameters, W/L is the transistor aspect ratio, T is the tempera-
ture, whereas k and q are respectively the Boltzmann constant and the electron
charge. An analogous expression holds for the PMOS transistor (with VTH be-
ing the threshold voltage magnitude). Due to the exponential dependence in
(4.1), the leakage current is very sensitive to temperature variations, as well as
to process variations in VTH .
The leakage current of static CMOS logic gates strongly depends on their
input [5]. As an example, the leakage of an inverter gate (see Figure 4.1a) is
equal to the leakage of the NMOS (PMOS) transistor when this device is in
the cut-off region, i.e. if the input is low (high). Since the threshold voltage
of the NMOS and PMOS transistors are significantly different in real CMOS
technologies, from (4.1) the inverter leakage depends on the input value. This
significant leakage dependence on the input is confirmed by data in Tables 4.1-
4.2, which respectively report the simulated leakage of a minimum-sized inverter
gate in a 90nm and 65nm technology. From Table 4.1, the inverter leakage with
a low input is greater than that with a high input by a factor of 3-5 (this
is because the NMOS transistor has a lower VTH , compared to the PMOS).
From Table 4.2, similar results are obtained in the 65nm technology for realistic
operating temperatures of cryptographic device (i.e., at room temperature or
slightly greater). The strong dependence on the temperature is also confirmed
by Table 4.1 for the 90nm technology, whereas this dependence is weaker for
the 65nm technology in Table 4.2, due to the different temperature dependence
of the gate leakage.
The above considerations on the leakage dependence on the input value can
be extended to general static CMOS gates, whose pull-up and pull down net-
works are made up of series- and parallel-connected transistors. To understand
the leakage dependence on the input, it is sufficient to analyze the case of n
series-connected transistors, which are always present in either the pull-up or
the pull-down network of static logic gates. For simplicity, let us consider the
case of the two series-connected NMOS transistors in the NAND2 gate in Figure
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.1: Schematic of the CMOS Inverter (a) and NAND2 gate (b).
Table 4.1: Leakage current (nA) in various CMOS logic gates (90nm technol-
ogy).
Inverter gate
A T = 0°C T = 25°C T = 50°C
0 1.36 3.19 6.52
1 0.24 0.73 1.90
NAND2 gate
A B T = 0°C T = 25°C T = 50°C
0 0 0.17 0.47 1.1
0 1 1.36 3.19 6.52
1 0 1.02 2.44 5.09
1 1 0.48 1.47 3.79
Table 4.2: Leakage current (nA) in various CMOS logic gates (65nm technol-
ogy).
Inverter gate
A T = 0°C T = 25°C T = 50°C
0 2.67 2.98 3.66
1 0.13 0.47 1.40
NAND2 gate
A B T = 0°C T = 25°C T = 50°C
0 0 2.37 2.45 2.59
0 1 2.65 2.98 3.66
1 0 2.52 2.77 3.29
1 1 0.26 0.94 2.81
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4.1b. For example, let us compare the two cases B = 0 and B = 1, assuming
A = 1: when B = 0, leakage is greater than that with B = 1, as was already
observed for the inverter gate. Similar considerations can be easily reiterated
and extended to a generic number of series transistors, and hence to generic
static CMOS gates. Hence, the leakage current of static CMOS gates tends to
exhibit significantly different values depending on the value of each input, once
the other inputs are assigned. Obviously, this result applies to both combina-
tional and sequential logic gates, and in the following it will be applied to a
broad range of circuits.
4.2.1 Leakage in bit-sliced logic circuits
The strong leakage dependence on the input pattern of basic logic gates is a
property that can be exploited to understand the overall leakage of more complex
circuits. A practical example of complex circuits that is frequently encountered
in real circuits is the case of bit-sliced structures, i.e. circuits with m-bit inputs
that are made up of m identical replicas of the same building block. Examples
of bit-sliced structures are Arithmetic Logic Units, registers, register files and
bus drivers.
In bit-sliced structures, the overall leakage is equal to the sum of the leakage
currents of the m bit slices, each of which is assumed to be equal to the high (low)
level IH (IL) when the corresponding input bit is high (low), as was discussed in
the previous subsection (the dual case where IH is associated with a low input
is treated in the same way). Since the number of bit slices having a high leakage
current IH is equal to the number of input bits equal to 1, or equivalently the
Hamming weight w of the input word, the overall leakage results to
Ileak,TOT = w · IH + (m− w) · IL = w · (IH − IL) +m · IL . (4.2)
From (4.2), the overall leakage linearly depends on the Hamming weight w
of the input word, rather than the specific value of each bit.
4.2.2 Leakage dependence on the Hamming weight: sim-
ulation and experimental results
The dependence of leakage on the input Hamming weight in (4.2) is confirmed by
simulation results in Table 4.3 on a 4-bit register in a 65nm technology, assuming
a temperature of 27°C (very similar results are obtained for the 90nm technology,
hence they are omitted in the following). From this table, it is apparent that
the register leakage only depends on the weight w of the input data, and this
dependence is confirmed to be approximately linear according to Figure 4.2,
which plots the register leakage current versus w. Parameters IL and IH in (4.2)
that fit the curve in Figure 4.2 are found to be 9.86nA and 18.58nA, respectively.
To further assess the result in (4.2), experimental measurements were performed
on an off-the-shelf ON Semiconductor 8-bit register of MC74ACT273N family.
With these measurements, the effect of process variations and temperature was
CHAPTER 4. LEAKAGE POWER ANALYSIS ATTACK 54
Table 4.3: Simulated register leakage for different input data values (65nm tech-
nology, T = 27°C).
Input X Hamming weight w = H (X) Ileak,TOT [nA]
0000 0 39.44
0001 1 47.05
0010 1 47.05
0100 1 47.05
1000 1 47.05
0011 2 54.01
0101 2 54.01
0110 2 54.01
1001 2 54.01
1010 2 54.01
1100 2 54.01
0111 3 63.39
1011 3 63.39
1101 3 63.39
1110 3 63.39
1111 4 74.30
also captured. In particular, one hundred measurements were performed on each
of five different chips at different assigned temperatures. As an example, the
measured leakage obtained at T = 43°C is plotted versus the input Hamming
weight for the five chips in Figure 4.3. To be more specific, the values plotted for
each chip are the average value among one hundred repeated measurements. The
estimated standard deviation of these measurements was found to be lower than
the average by two orders of magnitude, which confirms that the measurements
are reliable and repeatable even in the presence of process variations. According
to Figure 4.3, the linear trend of leakage approximately holds even under process
variations that are seen both within the chip and among the five chips. More
comments on process variations will be provided in Section 4.7, where the slight
deviation from the linear trend will be explained.
The effect of temperature on (4.2) was experimentally observed by repeating
the above measurements in a very wide range of temperatures, from 27°C to
85°C. For example, the leakage measurement for T = 85°C is reported in Figure
4.4, in which the leakage trend is similar to that in Figure 4.3, and this was also
observed at other temperatures.
Hence, the simple model in (4.2) is confirmed to be valid regardless of the
specific operating temperature. This can be justified from (4.1), by considering
that the main impact of temperature on leakage is an equal exponential increase
in all transistor leakage currents (or equivalently in IL and IH), which preserves
the linear dependence in (4.2). This is also apparent from the comparison of
Figs. 4.3 and 4.4, in which the trend of Ileak,TOT versus w and the curve slope
is almost the same regardless of T, and the only difference is the increase of all
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Figure 4.2: Simulated leakage vs. Hamming weight in 4-bit registers at T =
27°C (65nm technology).
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Figure 4.3: Measured leakage vs. Hamming weight in an ON Semiconductor
8-bit register for five different chips (T = 43°C).
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Figure 4.4: Measured leakage vs. Hamming weight in an ON Semiconductor
8-bit register for five different chips (T = 85°C).
leakage currents by a factor of about 20.
Summarizing, the leakage current of a bit-sliced structure is directly related
to the Hamming weight w of the input data word, thus it can reveal a significant
amount of information on the processed data. This fact is exploited in the
following section to propose a novel class of Power Analysis attacks.
4.3 Leakage power analysis: a novel class of side-
channel attacks
As was discussed in Section 4.2, the leakage current reveals the Hamming weight
of the m-bit data X that is processed within a given circuit block. Hence, leakage
provides useful information to recover the secret key k of a cryptographic device
if the processed data X under attack are a function (or a portion) of k. Hence, a
Leakage Power Analysis (LPA) attack can be conceived that exploits the leakage
measurement, as discussed in the following.
In real circuits, the processed data X under attack are generated within
a given circuit block, which in general is only a part of the entire chip. In
practical cases, the power supply node of each block within the chip is not
accessible, hence the adversary can only measure the overall chip leakage, which
also includes the contribution of the considered block. Hence, the overall chip
leakage Ileak,TOT depends on the Hamming weight w = H(X) of the signal X
under attack (being H the Hamming weight operator), but it also includes many
other leakage contributions due to the other blocks within the same chip. As a
consequence, when applying random but known input values, the chip leakage
Ileak,TOT and H(X) are statistically correlated. This is exactly the premise
of the Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attack ([16, 61]), which is based on
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the measurement of dynamic power waveform (Section 2.2.3). As a result, a
similar attack procedure can be used in Power Analysis attacks that are based
on leakage measurements, which in the following will be referred to as Leakage
Power Analysis (LPA) attacks.
The following LPA procedure is similar to the CPA presented in [61], and
consists of five steps according to Figure 4.5. In the first step of LPA attacks,
the adversary chooses an internal m− bit signal X that is physically generated
within the cryptographic circuit under attack. In general, signal X depends on
both the input I and the secret key k of the cryptographic algorithm according
to a well-defined function f
X = f(I, k) (4.3)
where f is set by the algorithm, and hence is known by the adversary.
In the second step, the adversary applies 2m different input values Ii (with
i = 1. . . 2m), and measures the corresponding leakage current Ileak,i of the
cryptographic chip at the point of time in which X is physically evaluated. In
principle, this requires the knowledge of the clock period in which X is physi-
cally evaluated, as will be assumed in the following for the sake of simplicity.
Nevertheless, this assumption can be relaxed, as will be discussed in Section
4.4. As a result of this step, an array Ileak,i with size 2
m is obtained (see Figure
4.5).
In the third step, the physical value of X within the chip is estimated for
each input Ii according to (4.3). Since the generic input Ii is applied by the
adversary, the only unknown variable in (4.3) is the secret key k, hence it must
be guessed. For each possible guess kj of the secret key (with j = 1. . . 2
m), the
resulting value of Xij = f(Ii, kj) under the generic input Ii is found according
to (4.3). As a result of this step, a 2-D array Xij is found.
In the fourth step, the leakage current of the block generating X is esti-
mated. In particular, thanks to the linear relationship between the leakage
current within the block generating X and the Hamming weight H(X) in (4.2),
the current leakage is estimated by H(X). In other words, H(X) differs from
the measured leakage only by an unknown multiplicative constant. The output
of this step is a 2-D array Hij = H(Xij), with i = 1. . . 2
m and j = 1. . . 2m,
which contains the Hamming weight of X for all applied inputs and key guesses.
In the fifth step, the measured leakage Ileak,i and the estimated leakage Hij
are compared. For a given key guess kj , the sequences Ileak,i and Hij associated
with the random (but known) sequence of inputs Ii (with i = 1. . . 2
m) can be
thought of as random variables. When the key guess is correct (i.e., kj = k),
the estimated and measured leakage are maximally correlated. Theoretically,
if the linear dependence of Ileak,i on H(X) in (4.2) were exact and there were
no other leakage contributions, the correlation coefficient ρ(Ileak,i, Hij) between
Ileak,i andHij with kj = k would be exactly equal to 1 from basic statistics [107].
On the other hand, if the key guess is wrong (i.e., kj 6= k), the measured leakage
is no longer linearly related to the estimated H(X), hence the measured leakage
and H(X) are loosely correlated and the correlation coefficient ρ(Ileak,i, Hij) is
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Figure 4.5: LPA attack procedure.
CHAPTER 4. LEAKAGE POWER ANALYSIS ATTACK 59
lower than unity. Obviously, leakage is still linearly dependent on the Hamming
weight of the signal X that is physically evaluated within the cryptographic
circuit but the wrong guess of k leads to an incorrect estimation of X and hence
of H(X), thus (4.2) no longer holds.
This means that the correct guess of k (i.e., the secret key) is that leading
to the highest value of ρ(Ileak,i, Hij) among all possible guesses kj . Hence, the
adversary must evaluate the correlation coefficients ρj = ρ(Ileak,i, Hij) between
the measured leakage Ileak,i and the Hamming weights Hij for j = 1. . . 2
m, and
identify the value j∗ of j that maximizes ρj as in (4.4)
ρj∗ = max
j
ρj (4.4)
and the secret key is simply equal to
k = kj∗ . (4.5)
This is in accordance with the final step of CPA attacks, although they are
based on dynamic power measurements [1, 16, 61, 92].
4.4 Practical considerations on LPA attacks
In the following, practical issues and examples for each of the steps of the above
LPA attack are discussed for cryptographic devices based on a microprocessor
and an embedded core.
In regard to the first step in Figure 4.5, the signal X under attack can be
easily chosen from the knowledge of the algorithm. To reduce the attack effort,
X must be chosen as an internal signal whose dependence f(I, k) on I and k
is as simple as possible. For example, in microprocessor-based implementations
of DES and AES algorithm, the sub-keys k are loaded into registers to perform
the XOR with the ciphertext I (plaintext) during the decryption (encryption)
phase [53]. In these cases, the signal X under attack can be chosen as the input
of a register in the register file that stores k (or the XOR of k and the input,
I ⊕ k, which is successively evaluated), hence the simple function f(I, k) = I
(or f(I, k) = I⊕k with k = 000...00) can be adopted in (4.2). In crypto-devices
based on an embedded core, similar considerations can be made, although the
register under consideration is not in the register file, but divides two pipeline
stages.
An alternative choice for the signal X is the input (or output) of the bus
drivers, since most processed data are transferred through busses to the memory,
and their leakage is a significant fraction of the overall chip leakage [69] (hence
it can be easily measured [10, 11]). As far as the second step in Figure 4.5 is
concerned, the leakage measurements must be carefully performed. Indeed, once
the input is applied to a logic gate, its leakage current is well-known to have a
transient variation, and finally settles to the steady-state value after a period
ranging from less than one nanosecond to a few tens of nanosecond [69]. As an
example, Table 4.4 reports the leakage settling time of a 2-input CMOS NAND
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Table 4.4: Leakage current settling time for each input transition in a 2-input
NAND gate (65 nm technology, T = 27°C).
From To Settling
A B A B time
0 0 1 0 35.34 ns
0 0 0 1 239.01 ps
0 1 1 1 1.45 ns
0 1 0 0 509.81 ps
1 0 0 0 98.26 ps
1 0 1 1 1.51 ns
1 1 0 1 263.05 ps
1 1 1 0 89.89 ns
gate in a 65nm technology (very similar results were obtained in the 90nm
technology). From these considerations, the clock period is generally shorter
than the period required to observe the steady-state leakage. As a consequence,
the adversary must stop the clock signal at least for a few clock periods to
measure Ileak,i, starting from the period in which X is physically evaluated.
Therefore, this period of time with a stopped clock adds to the attack duration,
thus slightly reducing the number of attacks that can be performed in a time
slot.
It is worth noting that stopping the clock is usually feasible, as the adversary
usually has access to the reference clock that is generated outside the chip.
Moreover, the exact clock period in which X is evaluated within the chip can
be found with a moderate effort, if the adversary has sufficient knowledge of
the circuit implementation of the algorithm. For example, in microprocessor-
based implementations the correct clock period can be identified by counting
the number of memory accesses that are required prior to the evaluation of
X. In embedded core implementations, the identification of the clock period in
which X is physically evaluated is even easier, as the circuit implementation
usually consists of a low number of pipeline stages [108], hence the number
of clock cycles to consider is rather low (a few units, typically). Even in the
case where the adversary does not exactly know this clock cycle, but he/she
knows that it is among a limited number l of clock cycles, he/she can reiterate
the procedure in Section 4.3 for each period and then evaluate the maximum
correlation coefficients ρj for each of the l periods under analysis. Obviously, the
maximum ρj is expected to be achieved in the correct period, hence the secret
key is easily found by selecting the guess of k and the period that maximize ρj .
Since this increases the number of guesses by a factor of l (and hence the attack
effort), the adversary must have at least a rough idea on the clock period in
which the signal under attack X is physically evaluated.
Regarding the leakage measurement setup, it should be observed that leak-
age measurements are in principle simpler to carry out, compared to dynamic
power measurements in traditional DPA/CPA attacks. In fact, the latter ones
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require the acquisition of power consumption waveforms with a high bandwidth
measurement setup and a high sample-rate digital oscilloscope. Leakage mea-
surements do not require either high bandwidth or high sample-rate oscillo-
scopes, as they are simply DC measurements that can be carried out using a
simple ammeter. Typically, ammeters with pico-Ampere accuracy can be found
at very low prices (in the range of 500-1,000 $), hence the costs involved in the
attack are extremely low (even lower than those in DPA/CPA attacks). As a
further advantage of LPA, leakage measurements are rather insensitive to AC
additive noise since they are based on measurement averaging over a sufficiently
long period of time, as any other DC measurement.
A distinctive feature of LPA attacks is the high sensitivity to temperature, as
pointed out in Section 4.2, which deserves some attention during measurements.
Indeed, in Section 4.2.2 it was shown that the leakage model in (4.2) holds
regardless of the operating temperature. Nevertheless, it should be observed
that this is true only if the chip temperature is not time varying, otherwise
the leakage current may significantly increase (decrease) despite of a reduction
(increase) in the Hamming weight in (4.2), due to an unexpected temperature
increase (decrease). For this reason, it is important that the chip temperature
is kept constant during LPA attacks. In our experimental results, temperature
was set by means of a Peltier cell driven by a proper constant voltage.
The third and fourth step of LPA attacks do not exhibit particular problems
from an experimental point of view, but the choice of the bit width m of the
signal X under attack is crucial in terms of computational effort. Indeed, the
number of guesses exponentially grows as 2m, hence m must be at most 7-
8 for computationally feasible attacks. It is worth noting that this does not
limit the effectiveness of LPA attacks, as the overall key can be recovered by
reiterating the attack for the remaining m-bit portions of the key. This is feasible
in practical cases because the intermediate results of a cryptographic device
consist of small words that depend on a few bits of the key and not on the entire
key (for example, in microprocessor-based devices the width of the portion of the
key that is involved in a single encryption step is no greater than the processor
word length). Like any cryptographic operation, these intermediate results are
evaluated by combinational logic and stored in a register at a certain time during
the computation of the algorithm.
In regard to the last step in Figure 4.5, the correlation coefficient ρj =
ρ(Ileak,i, Hij) cannot be exactly evaluated since a finite number of samples of
Ileak,i and Hij are considered. In practical cases, ρj = ρ(Ileak,i, Hij) is esti-
mated by the sample correlation coefficient (often called Pearson's Correlation
Coefficient) in (4.6), where the number of applied inputs was assumed to be
2m for simplicity [107]
ρj =
∑2m
i=1 Ileak,iHij − 2mIleak,i ·Hij
(2m − 1) sIleak,isHij
(4.6)
where the sample mean Ileak,i and Hij are defined as
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Ileak,i =
1
2m
2m∑
i=1
Ileak,i (4.7)
Hij =
1
2m
2m∑
i=1
Hij (4.8)
and the sample standard deviation sIleak,iand sHij are
sIleak,i =
√√√√ 1
2m − 1
2m∑
i=1
(
Ileak,i − Ileak,i
)2
(4.9)
sHij =
√√√√ 1
2m − 1
2m∑
i=1
(
Hij −Hij
)2
(4.10)
Finally, it is useful to observe that the overall chip leakage contribution
includes the leakage current of many other blocks that do not physically evaluate
X, as occurs with the dynamic power consumption in traditional CPA attacks
[16]. These contributions affect both Ileak,i and Ileak,i in (4.6), and tend to
reduce the sample correlation coefficient with respect to the ideal value of 1, as
was observed in [16] for CPA attacks. In particular, in the case where the leakage
contributions of the other blocks are perfectly constant, they do not effect rj at
all, as is apparent from (4.6). The same result approximately holds also when
these contributions randomly vary with a reasonably uniform distribution when
applying the inputs Ii, as they tend to average out [16]. This intuitively justifies
why LPA attacks can be performed even in the presence of significant leakage
contributions that add to the leakage current of the block under attack. This
issue will be further discussed through an example in Section 4.6.
4.5 An analytical model of the correlation coeffi-
cient in LPA attacks
LPA attacks rely on the assumption that the correlation coefficient ρj∗ associ-
ated with the correct key can be discriminated from that of wrong guesses. This
requires that the value of ρj∗ under the correct key (i.e., ρj∗ = 1) is sufficiently
greater than those under the other guesses. For this reason, in the following the
correlation coefficient under wrong guesses is analytically evaluated according
to the approach in [8].
For the sake of simplicity, let us assume with no loss of generality that IL = 0
and IH = 1 in (4.2), that the signal under attack X is the XOR of the input I
and the key portion k (i.e., f(I, k) = I ⊕ k, for the reasons discussed in Section
4.4), that the key is k = 00. . . 00 (so that f(I, k) = I), and let us apply all
2m possible m-bit input values Ii to a bit-sliced circuit. The resulting leakage
Ileak,i associated with the generic value of X is linearly related to its Hamming
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weight H(X) according to (4.2). Hence, the correlation coefficient is equal to 1
when the correct key guess has been chosen, and is lower than 1 when a wrong
guess is made.
In the following, it will be matematically demonstrated that the higher is
the number of wrong bits in k (or in X, since X = f(I, k) = I ⊕ k) the lower is
the correlation coefficient ρwrong, and this dependence is linear.
The ρwrong is evaluated in the general case where the key guess is wrong by
an arbitrary number of bits e (with e = 1. . .m). For simplicity, let us assume
that the wrong bits in X are the most significant e bits, which define an e-bit
string that will be named XMSB in the following. Let us also define W as the
word obtained complementing the most significant e bits in X (i.e.,W is a guess
of X that is wrong by e bits), and WMSB as the string made up of the most
significant e bits in W (i.e., the wrong bits of X).
Let us consider all 2m possible inputs Ii,and assume that they are ordered
(from 1 to 2m) according to the binary value of the resulting Xi (from 00. . . 0
to 11. . . 1), i.e. I1 is the input leading to X = 00. . . 00, I2 is the input leading
to X = 00. . . 01, and so on. For a given input Ii (for i = 1. . . 2
m), the corre-
sponding values of the correct guess Xi and the wrong guess Wi have a different
Hamming weight (H (Wi) and H (Xi), respectively), due to the different contri-
bution of the most significant e bits. However, as discussed above, the bit strings
consisting of the (m− e) least significant bits of Xi and Wi are equal, hence
their Hamming weight (i.e., H (Xi) − H
(
XMSBi
)
and H (Wi) − H
(
WMSBi
)
respectively) is the same, thereby yielding
H (Wi) = H (Xi) +
[
H
(
WMSBi
)−H (XMSBi )] . (4.11)
Let us an example for the simplest case e = 1, with m = 8. In this partic-
ular case, only the most significative bit make the difference between H (Wi)
and H (Xi). By observing that X
MSB in this case can be only 0 or 1 (and
WXMB only 1 or 0 respectively) it follows that H
(
WMSBi
)−H (XMSBi ) = ±1.
Therefore the relationship between H (Wi) and H (Xi) (defined in (4.11) for the
general case) becomes
H (Wi) =
{
H (Xi)− 1 , XMSB = 1
H (Xi) + 1 , X
MSB = 0
(4.12)
Hence this means that the equation (4.11), describing the generic case with
e bits wrong, corresponds to 2e relationship between H (Wi) and H (Xi). Equa-
tion (4.12) shows a dependence only on H (Wi) of H (Xi). It is possible to
explicit the same dependence in (4.11).
SinceWMSBi is the bit-wise complement of X
MSB
i , the sum of the Hamming
weight of XMSBi and W
MSB
i is equal to e, hence
H
(
WMSBi
)
= e−H (XMSBi ) . (4.13)
By substituting (4.13) in (4.11), it immediately follow that
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H (Wi) = H (Xi) +
[
e− 2 ·H (XMSBi )] . (4.14)
Equation (4.14) is useful to evaluate the correlation coefficient ρwrong be-
tween H(Wi) and the leakage Ileak,i corresponding to the same value of Xi,
which by definition is
ρwrong =
∑2m
i=1
(
H (Wi)−H (W )
)
· (Ileak,i − Ileak,i)√∑2m
i=1
(
H (Wi)−H (W )
)2
·∑2mi=1 (Ileak,i − Ileak,i)2 . (4.15)
From equation (4.2) follows that the leakage Ileak,i in (4.15) is simply equal
to its Hamming weight H(Xi) by the assumption that IL = 0 and IH = 1. It is
useful to observe that H (Xi) and H (Wi) in (4.15) have the same average, since
they are evaluated over the same set of values Xi. Obviously the only difference
is the order, as Wi is evaluated by complementing the e most significant bits
of Xi, as discussed before. For the same reason
∑2m
i=1
(
H (Wi)−H (W )
)
=∑2m
i=1
(
H (Xi)−H (X)
)
.
Assuming that inputs are uniformly distributed m-bit symbol, the average
H (X)and variance 12m
∑2m
i=1
(
H (Wi)−H (W )
)2
of the Hamming weight result
to be equal to m/2and m/4 respectively. Starting from this consideration and by
substituting (4.14) in (4.15) we get
ρwrong =
∑2m
i=1
[
H (Xi) +
(
e− 2 ·H (XMSBi ))− m2 ] (H (Xi)− m2 )
2mm4
. (4.16)
To further simplify (4.16), observe that all terms Xi with i = 1. . . 2
m−e have
the same XMSBi (i.e., the first e LSBs), and this can be easily shown to hold
also for all terms Xi with i = (c− 1) · 2m−e + 1. . . c · 2m−e , being c an assigned
integer number ranging from 1 to 2e. Accordingly, we can group terms Xi in
2e different sets (each being identified by c = 1. . . 2e). As an example, the case
with e = 2 is shown in Table 4.5, where there are 22 sets, in each of which all
Xi's have the same X
MSB
i (00 for the first set, 01 for the second, . . . ). according
to this grouping, (4.16) can be written as
ρwrong =
∑2e
c=1
∑c·2m−e
i=(c−1)2m−e+1[H(Xi)+(e−2·H(XMSBi )−m2 )](H(Xi)−m2 )
2mm4
= 1 +
∑2e
c=1
∑c·2m−e
i=(c−1)2m−e+1(H(Xi)−m2 )(e−2·H(X
MSB
i ))
2mm4
(4.17)
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Table 4.5: Grouping terms Xi in 2
e sets according to XMSBi example with
e = 2.
where terms Xi belonging to the same set (according to index c) were
grouped under the same summation, and a few analytical manipulations were
introduced. Moreover, according to Table 4.5, by construction the (m− e) least
significant bits of each term Xi within a given set are exactly the same as the
corresponding terms of any other set (i.e., the (m − e) LSBs of the first term
are the same for all sets, and the same holds for the second term, the third
term. . . ). From the above considerations, after simple but tedious calculations,
the following properties can be derive
∑c·2m−e
i=(c−1)2m−e+1H (Xi) =
2m−e∑
i=1
H
(
X(c−1)2m−e+i
)
(4.18)(
e− 2 ·H
(
XMSB(c−1)2m−e+i
))
= −
(
e− 2 ·H
(
XMSB(2e−c)2m−e+i
))
(4.19)
H
(
XMSB(c−1)2m−e+i
)
+H
(
XMSB(2e−c)2m−e+i
)
= e (4.20)
for c = 1...2e. By substituting (4.18)-(4.20) into (4.17) and performing a
few analytical manipulations, the final expression of the correlation coefficient
is found to be
ρwrong = 1− 2
m−e · e · 2e−1
2mm4
= 1− 2
m
· e. (4.21)
Equation (4.21) mathematically proves that the correlation coefficient lin-
early depends on the number of wrong bits and therefore the most difficult
cases to discriminate from the correct guess are those with a minimum number
of wrong bits in X, i.e. wrong by just one bit. Hence the wrong correlation co-
efficient closer to the correlation coefficient corresponding to the correct guess
is
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ρwrong = 1− 2
m
. (4.22)
Moreover, equation (4.22) highlights that ρwrong is easily discriminated from
the correlation coefficient value associated with the correct guess (i.e., 1) if m
is a few units. On the other hand, if m is in the order of 8-10, ρwrong gets very
close to unity, hence it is very hard to distinguish the case of a wrong guess
from the correct key. For this reasons, LPA attacks can be successful only if
the number of bits under attack m is not greater than about 8. It is important
to note that this limit does not constitute an inconvenience because the target
of an attack is not the whole key but normally the key is divided into some
sub-keys to reduce effort of the attack.
4.6 Examples of LPA attacks
Let us apply the LPA attack procedure explained in Section 4.3 to three different
circuits. In the first one, the 4-bit register in 65nm technology discussed in
Section 4.2 is attacked in simulation. Let us apply a sequence of all possible
4-bit input values in the first column in Table 4.3, and stop the clock signal at
its high value. The measured leakage Ileak,i and the Hamming weight H(X)
for each input value are reported in the second and third column of Table 4.3.
The sample correlation coefficient ρ between the measured leakage vector Ileak,i
(with i = 1. . . 16) and the Hamming weight vector H(X) is then computed
according to (4.6). Using data in Table 4.3, ρ results to 1 for the correct logic
vector as expected, while ρ results to 0.41 if only one wrong bit is considered.
The latter value reasonably agrees with the theoretical value of 0.5, which is
obtained from (4.22) after setting m = 4. Hence, the LPA attack allows for
identifying the correct guess, as the corresponding correlation coefficient is the
highest. Moreover, it can be easily distinguished from the correlation coefficient
obtained with a key guess that is wrong by one bit.
In the above attack, a bit-slice circuit (i.e., a register) was considered. The
register is an ideal candidate as a block to attack with LPA for the previously
explained reasons. Nevertheless, the above considerations and attack procedure
can be also applied to circuits that are not bit sliced and involve non-linear
transformations. Indeed, even in this case leakage has a strong correlation with
the Hamming weight of the input data, although this dependence is no longer
linear due to the non-linear transformation. In the following, this is shown by
attacking the well-known Serpent 4x4 S-Box transformation, whose truth table
is reported in the first and second column of Table 4.6 [3].
As a second example of LPA attack, the simple crypto core in Figure 4.6
based on the Serpent S-Box transformation was considered. This crypto core
was synthesized in Cadence environment using a 65nm CMOS cell library. As
occurs in many cryptographic algorithms, in Figure 4.6 the plain word and the
secret key are mixed in advance by XOR gates and the result is ciphered by
S-BOX (a similar structure is observed in many other ciphers, such as DES and
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Table 4.6: S-Box truth table and leakage current (65nm technology, T = 25°C
and 100°C).
IN OUT Ileak,i(nA) @ T = 25°C Ileak,i(nA) @ T = 100°C
0100 1111 114.6 941.6
1001 1101 115.0 950.0
0000 0011 117.1 950.2
0001 1110 117.9 959.7
1000 1000 118.8 964.0
0011 0111 121.9 999.8
1100 0001 122.9 1007.8
0010 1010 123.4 1016.2
1011 0000 124.0 1024.0
1010 0110 124.8 1026.3
1111 1100 125.4 1031.6
0101 0100 127.1 1031.9
1101 0010 128.2 1032.7
0110 0101 129.6 1051.9
1110 1011 130.7 1052.8
0111 1001 131.6 1071.7
AES). Simulations on this crypto core were carried out by exploring all possible
combinations of plain words and keys. The results are shown in Table 4.6, where
leakage current values are sorted in an increasing order. Interestingly, sorting
the input combinations in an increasing order according to the leakage, the order
is the same regardless of the temperature, as was observed over an extremely
large range of temperatures (much wider than realistic operating temperatures).
Again, the LPA attack effectiveness is expected to be independent of the oper-
ating temperature, provided that it is kept constant during the attack. As an
example, the cases with T = 25°C and 100°C are shown in Table 4.6.
The resulting correlation coefficients in (4.6) of several attacks (i.e., for sev-
eral keys) for T = 25°C are summarized in Figure 4.7, where the `+' symbol
Figure 4.6: Crypto core based on Serpent S-Box.
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Figure 4.7: Correlation coefficient in a simulated attack.
Figure 4.8: Cryptographic circuit under experimental attack.
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Figure 4.9: Correlation coefficient ρj for all possible key guesses.
denotes the right key hypothesis, whereas the `*' symbol denotes a wrong key
hypothesis. Very similar results were obtained for T = 100°C. From Figure
4.7, the correlation coefficient turns out to be lower than unity, since the circuit
is not bit sliced. The same figure reveals that all correct keys are clearly dis-
tinguishable from wrong key guesses, as the former ones always lead to greater
values of the correlation coefficient. More specifically, the minimum value of the
correlation coefficient under a correct key is 0.11, whereas the maximum value
under a wrong key guess is 0.10, and in other cases the difference is much larger.
The third example of LPA attack has been conducted on a real circuit.
In particular, a portion of the crypto core in Figure 4.6 was implemented in
the eight bit architecture in Figure 4.8, employing an off-the-shelf ON Semi-
conductor 8-bit register of MC74ACT273N family. In particular, 256 leakage
measurements have been collected for all possible 8-bit input values with a fixed
key. Then, the correlation coefficient between the measured leakage and the
predicted Hamming weight H(X) was evaluated for each of the 256 key hy-
potheses. The resulting magnitude of the correlation coefficient normalized to
the maximum value are shown in Figure 4.9 for all key guesses. From this fig-
ure, the highest value of the correlation coefficient is obtained under the correct
key (01000010)2 = (66)10, as expected. There is also another equal peak with
opposite sign that is obtained under the symmetric key (10111101)2 = (189)10,
i.e. by complementing all bits of the correct key. This is easily explained by
considering that the XOR function is symmetric; hence, by complementing the
key bits, the XOR with the input is also bit-wise complemented.
Several other attacks with different keys and at various temperatures were
repeated, and results showed that they were always successful, as the correct
key was always associated with the greatest value of ρ. This confirms the effec-
tiveness of LPA attacks on real hardware and in real conditions.
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Figure 4.10: Experimental and predicted correlation coefficient vs. e.
Finally, to validate the model in (4.21), the LPA attack, experimentally
conducted on the crypto core in Figure 4.8, has been used. The correlation
coefficient between the measured leakage and the predicted Hamming weight
H(X) was evaluated for each of the 256 key hypotheses, and was normalized
to the maximum value (obtained for the correct key). Each measurement was
repeated 100 times and averaged to suppress the effect of noise and temperature
fluctuations. The resulting correlation coefficient normalized to the maximum
value is shown in Figure 4.10 versus the number of wrong bits e. Inspection
of this figure shows that equation (4.21) agrees very well with experimental
results, thereby confirming the linear dependence of ρwrong on e in (4.21). The
same or even better accuracy was obtained for other chips of the same type at
higher temperatures (up to 50°C, which covers the temperature range of real
crypto-chips).
4.7 Analysis of LPA effectiveness under process
variations
Until now LPA attacks were analyzed without explicitly accounting for process
variations. In the following, their effect of the attack effectiveness is discussed,
since their impact tends to increase in nanometer CMOS technologies.
Process variations are usually classified into interdie and intradie. The for-
mer ones impact all devices in the same chip in the same manner [39], hence
they induce a leakage variation that is equal for all transistors, according to
(4.1) [93]. Thus, the leakage contributions of all gates scale by the same factor,
which is similar to the effect of temperature variations previously discussed.
As a consequence, the linear dependence in (4.2) is preserved, and the sample
correlation coefficient (4.6) does not change. Hence, interdie variations do not
affect the result of LPA attacks.
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On the other hand, intradie variations affect different transistors in the same
chip in a different way [67], hence two flip-flops give a different leakage contri-
bution even when they have the same input. As a consequence, two different
input patterns with the same weight w lead to different register leakage currents.
Hence, in this case the leakage depends on the specific applied input (not only
on w), i.e. a slight deviation from the linear trend in (4.2) is observed, which
agrees with the experimental results in Figures 4.3 and 4.4. Hence, intradie
variations can potentially reduce the effectiveness of LPA attacks.
To understand the effect of intradie variations, it is useful to observe that
they induce a statistical variation in the correlation coefficient ρ in (4.6). Ac-
cordingly, the correlation coefficient ρ for a given key guess can be seen as an
uncertainty range centered on its nominal value, as shown in Figure 4.11.a. The
attack is feasible even in the presence of intradie variations if the value of ρ
under the correct guess can be distinguished from that under a wrong guess, i.e.
if we are reasonably sure (within a given confidence level, e.g. 99.9%) that the
two uncertainty ranges do not overlap, as in Figure 4.11.a. On the other hand,
if the two ranges overlap (see Figure 4.11.b) the attack may be unsuccessful.
To evaluate the amplitude of the uncertainty range, we first performed nu-
merical simulations by adopting the simplified leakage model in (4.1) for each
bit slice and introducing random intradie variations ∆VTH in VTH . Intradie
variations of other parameters (e.g., W, L, . . . ) can be always described as
an equivalent variation in VTH [93]. Hence this assumption does not limit the
generality of the subsequent considerations. Variations ∆VTH were randomly
generated with normal distribution, zero mean and standard deviation σVTH .
Obviously, for low (high) values of σVTH , the uncertainty width in Figure 4.11 is
small (large) and the uncertainty ranges do not (do) overlap, as shown in Figure
4.11.a (Figure 4.11.b). Accordingly, we evaluated the maximum standard devi-
ation σVTH ,max of VTH above which the uncertainty ranges overlap as in Figure
4.11.b, with a 99.9% confidence level.
Results show that σVTH,max/(nkT/q) ≈ 1 regardless of the value of m, if we
consider the uncertainty range of the correct key and of the key guesses that are
wrong by one bit. Under the typical value n = 1.5 and at room temperature,
σVTH ,max results to 37mV , which unfortunately is close to typical values of σVTH
in 65nm and 45nm CMOS technologies [62, 69]. Hence, in current technologies,
variations of VTH may lead to an overlap between the uncertainty range of the
correct key and that of a key guess that is wrong by one bit. As a consequence,
the attack may be successful in some cases (in a probabilistic sense), whereas
in some others the result of the attack may be incorrect (i.e., a key guess that
is wrong by one bit is mistaken for the correct key). Even in the latter case,
the attack is still successful under the assumption that the correct key and the
found key differ by at most by one bit: in this case, the adversary has to search
the key in an extremely narrow space with m+1 elements (i.e., the key found in
the attack, or one of the m keys that differ from it by only one bit), compared
to the exhaustive search among the 2m possible key guesses.
Now, let us justify the above assumption that the correct key and the key
found in the attack differ by at most one bit. The above discussed numerical
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.11: Correlation coefficient statistical distribution under moderate in-
tradie variations in the case of a successful attack (a) and a unsuccessful attack
(b).
simulations showed that σVTH,max/(nkT/q) ≈ 1.5 when we consider the key guesses
that are wrong by two bits (and even more if the number of wrong bits is
higher): in this case, σVTH ,max ∼ 56mV is significantly greater than σVTH both
for current and future technologies (for example, in 32nm technologies, σVTH is
projected to be about 40mV [62, 93]). This means that the uncertainty range
of the key guesses with two or more wrong bits never overlaps with the range
of the correct key (as in Figure 4.11.a), neither in current nor in future CMOS
technologies. The above numerical results are in good agreement with Monte
Carlo circuit simulations, which were performed on 1,000 trials of the same
65nm register circuit affected by process variations. By analyzing the statistical
distribution of the resulting 1,000 values of the correlation coefficient, it was
found that sometimes the correct key may be mistaken for key guesses with one
wrong bit, but it is never confused with guesses with two or more wrong bits.
This agrees well with the above considerations found with the simplified leakage
model. In particular, it was found that the attack identifies the correct key in
96% of the cases. Hence, in most cases the attack provides the correct result,
and in the other few cases the found key has at most one wrong bit, which again
agrees well with previous numerical analysis.
From the above considerations, LPA attacks are expected to be successful
even in the presence of intradie variations, both in current technologies and in
the next technology nodes.
To validate the above analysis of LPA effectiveness under process variations
an S-Box block has been considered as a representative example of a block that
is vulnerable to power analysis attacks.
In particular, the impact of intra-die variations on the effectiveness of LPA
attacks has been evaluated in a 4-input Serpent S-Box built with a standard
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CMOS library [3]. The S-Box was designed using a 65nm CMOS cell library
from STMicroelectronics in the Cadence dfII environment. BSIM4 models with
statistical parameters provided by the foundry were used to guarantee the best
accuracy of simulation results for what concerns both leakage current and pro-
cess variations [29]. To understand how the outcome of an LPA attack is affected
by intra-die variations, the attack has been performed on 400 samples of the cir-
cuit, each of which was generated by means of Monte Carlo simulations where .
The 400 sample circuits generated in each one of the different experiments were
all affected by mismatch variations. It is important to observe that each of 400
Monte Carlo iterations represents a realization of the circuit under test with a
particular configuration of process random variables.
As a first analysis to intuitively grasp the impact of variations, the leakage
current of each of the 400 sample circuits was ordered as a function of the
S-Box input value i (for i = 0. . . 24 − 1) in ascending order. In principle,
under small to moderate process variations, it is expected that the maximum
leakage is still obtained for the input value that leads to the minimum Hamming
weight w, assuming that IL > IH . This qualitatively agrees with the plot in
Figure 4.14 and Figure 4.15, where leakage is plotted versus the input Hamming
weight for the considered realizations of the circuit. Apparently, the trend still
resembles a linear dependence as in Figure 4.15, and the maximum leakage is
generally obtained for the input value with Hamming weight w equal to 0 (i.e.,
the input 0000). More quantitatively, the number of circuits that were found
to have their maximum (minimum) leakage at a given input value is plotted in
Figure 4.12 (Figure 4.13). Apparently, most occurrences have maximum leakage
for the input (0)10 = (0000)2, as occurs in the case without intra-die process
variations. There are also other small peaks around the inputs (8)10, (4)10, (2)10,
and (1)10, as they differ from (0)10 by only one bit, hence the corresponding
leakage can sometimes be higher than the case with input (0)10 due to variations,
although nominally it is lower (of course, this is less likely for inputs that differ
by a greater number of bits). Analogous considerations hold for the minimum
leakage: for example, leakage is minimum for the input (15)10 = (1111)2 as in
the case without variations, and there are other small peaks at inputs differing
by only one bit (i.e., (14)10, (13)10, (11)10, and (7)10). According to these
results, variations have a rather limited impact on the leakage dependence on
the input, and hence on the LPA attack outcome, which depends on the ability
to discriminate high and low values of leakage. In other words, LPA attacks are
expected to be still quite effective even in the presence of intra-die variations.
As a further elaboration, the leakage current is plotted in Figure 4.14 versus
the Hamming weight of the S-Box inputs . The average (with respect to Monte
Carlo iterations) leakage current trend is plotted in Figure 4.15.
It is useful to observe that the average curve in Figure 4.15 exhibits an
approximately linear trend as in (4.2), although this equation was derived an-
alytically under the assumption of bit sliced circuits. In other words, (4.2)
can be a good leakage model also for random logic blocks (i.e., non bit sliced).
Actually, analogous considerations were made in the past for traditional DPA
attacks, which were extended to random logic blocks in a very similar way. In
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Figure 4.12: Histogram distribution of highest leakage current versus the S-Box
input (standard CMOS logic style).
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Figure 4.13: Histogram distribution of lowest leakage currents versus the S-Box
input (standard CMOS logic style).
CHAPTER 4. LEAKAGE POWER ANALYSIS ATTACK 75
0 1 2 3 4
140
160
180
200
220
240
260
Le
ak
ag
e 
Cu
rre
nt
 [n
A]
Input Hamming Weight
Figure 4.14: S-Box leakage current trend versus input Hamming weight for
standard CMOS logic style.
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Figure 4.15: S-Box leakage current trend versus input Hamming weight for
standard CMOS logic style (average over 400 Monte Carlo iterations).
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this respect, LPA and DPA attacks are similar, as the linear model of power con-
sumption in (4.2) generally applies. Analysis of Figure 4.14 also shows that the
leakage dependence on the input Hamming weight in (4.2) is rather insensitive
to process variations. Indeed, other than keeping approximately a linear trend,
the extreme experience a rather small change due to process variations. More
specifically, from Figure 4.12 the left (right) extremum changes by 14% (19%)
compared to the average value. Again this intuitively confirms that variations
are expected to have a rather limited impact on LPA attacks.
To better understand the impact of intra-die process variations in practical
cases, let us analyze the statistics of the outcome of an LPA attack that was
repeated on 400 sample circuits implementing the simple crypto core depicted
in Figure 4.16. In this figure, the S-Box is the same used for the previous
considerations. These attacks were performed according to the five-step proce-
dure described in Section 4.3, and setting the secret key of the crypto core to
(5)10 = (0101)2. For each of the 400 sample circuits and for each key hypothesis,
the correlation coefficient ρ between the measured leakages and the Hamming
weight vector ρ(Ileak,i, Hij) was evaluated. According to the block diagram in
Figure 4.16, for each sample the Hamming weight Hij was evaluated on the
signal that results from the XOR between the i-th input and the j-th conjec-
tured key. Observe that only the first half of the possible keys (i.e., j = 0. . . 7
in this case) has to actually be considered, as ρ(Ileak,i, Hij) has the same mag-
nitude for symmetric keys because of the symmetry of the XOR function (i.e.,
|ρ(Ileak,i, Hij1)| = |ρ(Ileak,i, Hij2)| for j1 + j2 = 15 in this case).
The resulting values of ρ(Ileak,i, Hij) for the 400 sample circuits are plotted
in Figure 4.17 versus the conjectured key, considering only the first half of
the possible keys, as discussed above. Figure 4.17 shows the impact of intra-
die process variations on the outcome of an LPA attack. From Figure 4.17,
it is apparent that the correlation coefficient for the correct key can be lower
than that for other key guesses. However, this does not mean that the LPA
attack necessarily fails, as failure is observed only if the correlation coefficient
associated with the correct key is not the highest for a given sample circuit. For
example, the correlation coefficient obtained for the sample #135 (highlighted
in Figure 4.17) is such that the maximum value is obtained for the correct key,
which means the attack is successful for this sample. Hence, in general the
overlap in Figure 4.17 between the data for the correct and incorrect keys is not
an issue, and does not convey information on the LPA effectiveness.
According to the above considerations, to better understand the impact of
variations on the effectiveness of LPA, we have to check if the correct key is
associated with the highest correlation coefficient for each sample circuit, instead
of looking at all samples at the same time. To this aim, we plotted the key
that leads to the highest correlation coefficient versus the considered sample
in Figure 4.18. From this figure, it is apparent that in most cases the LPA
attack was successful (i.e., the highest correlation coefficient is obtained for the
correct key (5)10), with only very few exceptions. More specifically, the LPA
attack was successful for 375 sample circuits out of 400, i.e. in 94% of the
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Figure 4.16: Crypto core used to perform the LPA attack under process varia-
tions.
Figure 4.17: Correlation coefficients versus the key guess for all the considered
sample circuits (standard CMOS logic style).
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Figure 4.18: Plot of the key leading to the highest correlation coefficient versus
the considered sample circuit (standard CMOS logic style).
cases. Furthermore, the probability of success of LPA attack rapidly increases
if we broaden the search to the keys leading to the two highest values of the
correlation coefficients . In this case, the LPA attack is successful for 394 out
of 400 chips, hence in the 99% of the cases. This shows that LPA attacks can
be very effective in recovering the secret key of standard CMOS cryptographic
chips, even in the presence of intra-die process variations.
4.8 Analysis of LPA in presence of DPA resistant
logic styles under process variations
The analysis reported in Section 4.7 was extended to DPA resistant logic styles.
In Section 1.4 has been discussed that DPA can be counteracted through a
number of countermeasures at various levels of abstraction. At the transistor
level, the countermeasures are based on the adoption of logic styles whose power
consumption is constant or independent of the processed data, which is typically
obtained through differential signaling and precharged logic (see Chapter 5 for
details). Wave Dynamic Differential Logic (WDDL) is an example of a state-
of-the-art DPA-resistant logic style that can be implemented with a standard
CMOS cell library [102]. On the other hand, more resistant logic styles require
the development of a custom cell library as in the case of Sense Amplifier Based
Logic (SABL). Unfortunately SABL requires a perfectly balanced capacitive
load at the two nodes of each differential pair, which is not trivial to obtain
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during synthesis, placement and routing [96]. Three-phase Dual-rail Pre-charge
Logic (TDPL), which will be shown and discussed in Section 5.3, overcomes
these problems.
WDDL and TDPL were chosen as representative state-of-the-art logic styles
based on standard and custom cell libraries, respectively. The S-Box and the
simple crypto core in Figure 4.16 were designed using the reference 65nm CMOS
technology and using an automated design flow. A standard cell library available
from the foundry was used to synthesize the WDDL blocks, whereas a custom
cell library was adopted to synthesize the TDPL blocks. For each circuit, 400
different sample circuits were generated through Monte Carlo simulations.
4.8.1 Analysis of results for the WDDL logic style
The analysis presented in Section 4.7 has been repeated for the S-Box and
crypto core in the WDDL logic styles. In particular, the resulting statistical
distribution of the highest (lowest) leakage current of the S-Box is plotted in
Figure 4.19 (Figure 4.20) for the WDDL design. From Figure 4.19, it is apparent
that most sample circuits have maximum leakage for the input (0)10 = (0000)2,
as occurs in the case without intra-die process variations. However, there are
more peaks distributed over the other input values, compared with the standard
CMOS block (see Figures 4.12 and 4.13). This means that the process variations
have a more significant effect than in the standard CMOS version, although the
input value (0000)2 still maximizes leakage in typical cases. Figure 4.20 leads
to similar conclusions, although the peak of occurrences is less distinguishable.
Accordingly, process variations have a more significant impact on the leakage
dependence on the input in WDDL circuits, and hence on the LPA attack
outcome. This means that LPA attacks are expected to be less effective than
in standard CMOS circuits, but still successful in typical cases. This agrees
with the trend of the leakage current versus the Hamming weight of the S-Box
inputs for each sample circuit in Figure 4.21 and Figure 4.22 (Figure 4.22 is
the average on the 400 Monte Carlo iterations of the leakage current trend for
WDDL circuit reported in Figure 4.21). From Figure 4.22, a roughly linear
trend is still observed, but the curves are significantly flatter than in Figure
4.15. This means that the leakage dependence on the input in WDDL circuits
is significantly weaker than that of standard CMOS logic. As a consequence,
leakage reveals less information about the key, and hence the LPA attack is
expected to have a lower probability of success, compared to standard CMOS.
The above considerations on the WDDL logic style are confirmed by the
results obtained for the crypto core in Figure 4.16 designed by the WDDL logic
style. More specifically, the resulting correlation coefficient for the 400 sample
circuits are plotted in Figure 4.23 versus the conjectured key. From this figure,
the correlation coefficient values computed using the right key (0101)2 under
process variations are completely overlapped with the correlation coefficients
computed using wrong keys. As explained in Section 4.7, this does not neces-
sarily mean that the LPA attack always fails. As an example in the Figure 4.23,
the sample WDDL circuit #180 still has the maximum leakage under the correct
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Figure 4.19: Histogram distribution of highest leakage current versus the S-Box
input (WDDL logic style).
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Figure 4.20: Histogram distribution of lowest leakage currents versus the S-Box
input (WDDL logic style).
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Figure 4.21: S-Box leakage current trend versus input Hamming weight (WDDL
logic style).
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Figure 4.22: S-Box leakage current trend versus input Hamming weight for
standard WDDL logic style (average over 400 Monte Carlo iterations).
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Figure 4.23: Correlation coefficients versus the key guess for all the considered
sample circuits (WDDL logic style).
key, i.e. the LPA attack is successful for this circuit. However, the probability
of a successful LPA attack across all sample circuits will be certainly lower than
in the case of standard CMOS logic case.
More specifically, from Figure 4.24 we achieve a successful attack in 85 sam-
ple circuits out of the 400 considered circuits, i.e. LPA attack works in 21%
of the cases. On the other hand, the probability of success of LPA attack
increases if we broaden the search to the keys leading to the two highest val-
ues of the correlation coefficients. In this case, the LPA attack is successful
for 161 sample circuits, i.e. in 40% of the cases. From the above considera-
tions, LPA attacks can still be successful in a significant portion of a set of real
cryptographic chips, which agrees with the qualitative considerations made pre-
viously. In other words, although WDDL circuits have a rather high resistance
to DPA attacks, they are quite vulnerable to LPA attacks. Obviously, this is
not acceptable in applications requiring a high level of security, like those where
DPA-resistant logic styles are adopted. In those applications, LPA attacks must
be counteracted as well. Hence, a significant research effort will be required in
the future to deal with vulnerability to LPA attacks, as traditional techniques
to counteract DPA attacks are quite ineffective.
4.8.2 Analysis of results for the TDPL logic style
The resulting statistical distribution of the highest (lowest) leakage current of
the S-Box is plotted in Figure 4.25 (Figure 4.26) for the TDPL design. From
CHAPTER 4. LEAKAGE POWER ANALYSIS ATTACK 83
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Chip
Ke
y
Figure 4.24: Plot of the key leading to the highest correlation coefficient versus
the considered sample circuit (WDDL logic style).
these figures, it is no longer possible to distinguish the peak associated with
the correct key from those with incorrect key. Hence, TDPL is expected to be
more robust against LPA attacks, compared with WDDL and standard CMOS
logic styles. This agrees with the trend of leakage versus the input Hamming
weight in Figure 4.27 and Figure 4.28 (Figure 4.28 is the average on the 400
Monte Carlo iterations of the leakage current trend for TDPL circuit reported
in Figure 4.27), which is no longer monotonic for a significant fraction of sample
circuits.
Hence, the model in (4.2) can be rather inaccurate when estimating leakage,
which intuitively leads to a degradation in the probability of success of LPA
attacks.
This is also consistent with the plot of the correlation coefficient for the 400
sample circuits versus the conjectured key in Figure 4.29. Indeed, in this figure
correlation coefficient values computed using the correct key (0101)2 under pro-
cess variations are again completely overlapped with the correlation coefficients
computed using wrong keys. Nevertheless, LPA attacks can still be successful
for a portion of the sample circuits, as shown in the example of sample #217
in Figure 4.29. Now, let us analyze the plot of the key leading to the highest
correlation coefficient versus the considered sample circuit in Figure 4.30 for the
TDPL logic style. From this figure, the attack is successful in 94 sample circuits
(i.e., in 23% of the cases). If we broaden the search to the keys leading to the
two highest values of the correlation coefficients, the LPA attack is successful
for 150 sample circuits, i.e. in 38% of the cases.
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Figure 4.25: Histogram distribution of highest leakage current versus the S-Box
input (TDPL logic style).
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Figure 4.26: Histogram distribution of lowest leakage currents versus the S-Box
input (TDPL logic style).
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Figure 4.27: S-Box leakage current trend versus input Hamming weight (TDPL
logic style).
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Figure 4.28: S-Box leakage current trend versus input Hamming weight for
standard TDPL logic style (average over 400 Monte Carlo iterations).
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Figure 4.29: Correlation coefficients versus the key guess for all the considered
sample circuits (TDPL logic style).
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Figure 4.30: Plot of the key leading to the highest correlation coefficient versus
the considered sample circuit (TDPL logic style).
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Table 4.7: Comparison of the LPA attack outcome for different logic styles.
Finally, as was observed for WDDL, the TDPL logic style is vulnerable to
LPA attacks in a significant portion of real chips, which is clearly unacceptable
in the applications where TDPL is used. This confirms that the vulnerability to
LPA attacks is a serious concern in cryptographic chips requiring a high level of
security, even in the presence of countermeasures against DPA. In other words,
once countermeasures are introduced for DPA attacks, vulnerability to LPA
attacks becomes the weakness that severely limits the security against power
analysis attacks.
Table 4.7 summarizes the results of the presented LPA attacks for the three
different logic styles (CMOS, WDDL, TDPL) showing the successful cases when
the attack is performed considering only the key corresponding to the highest
correlation coefficient and when the attack is based on the two keys with the
highest correlation coefficient.
4.9 Conclusions
Leakage Power Analysis attack has been presented for the first time in the
literature.
Starting from a model which describes a relationship between the leakage
current and the Hamming weight of the input word, a simple attack procedure
based on the correlation coefficient evaluation has been introduced for the first
time.
In a first time, various LPA attacks to simple (bit sliced) circuits have been
performed in simulation and experimentally. Results confirm the validity of
the underlying assumption, and the effectiveness of this kind of attacks. Ex-
perimental issues have been discussed, including the effect of temperature and
process variations, which strongly affect the leakage current of sub-100 nm VLSI
circuits. In particular, it is shown that the temperature of the cryptographic
chip must be kept constant during the LPA attack, in order to recognize the
secret key.
In a second time analysis has shown that the Hamming weight as leakage
power model is not restricted to bit sliced circuits, but can also be used for
combinational circuits (e.g., S-Boxes) and more complex circuits (e.g., crypto
cores). In regard to the impact of process variations, Monte Carlo simulations
have shown that intra-die variations can influence the outcome of LPA attacks.
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In particular, the analysis of a simple crypto core in standard CMOS logic
allowed to successfully infer the secret key on 94% of sample circuits.
The effectiveness of LPA has been studied also attacking crypto cores de-
signed with DPA resistant logic families (WDDL and TDPL) under process
variations. In particular, results demonstrate that, even if transistor-level coun-
termeasures developed for DPA have some beneficial effects in preventing LPA
attacks, the success rate for LPA attacks is intolerably high (many orders of
magnitude greater than levels of security that are commonly required).
A theoretical analysis of LPA attacks has been developed to predict the result
of practical attacks. In particular, a closed-form expression of the correlation
coefficient between the estimated and measured leakage is provided as a function
of the parameters related to the attack. The model is shown to agree well with
experimental and simulation results.
Although this work clarifies various aspects of LPA attacks, it has to be
considered a starting point for further investigation, as many issues are not
fully understood. For example, the effect of temperature on attacks is not clear,
whereas simple criteria to properly set the chip temperature to maximize the
attack effectiveness would be desirable, in order to test cryptographic circuits
under worst conditions. For the same reason, criteria to build measurement
setups for fast and effective attacks are required. Moreover, experimental at-
tacks on more complex circuits should be performed to better understand the
robustness against LPA attacks versus their complexity. Furthermore, criteria
to consciously select the number of measurements to have a reasonably accurate
estimation of the correlation coefficient should be identified. Finally, much work
will be required in the future to devise countermeasures that are able to improve
the robustness of cryptographic circuits against LPA attacks.
Chapter 5
Transistor Level
Countermeasures
5.1 Logic families for cryptographic applications
Side channel attacks can disclose confidential data (i.e. cryptographic keys and
user PIN's) looking at the information leaked by the hardware implementation
of cryptographic algorithms. In particular, DPA exploits the fact that digi-
tal circuits feature a power consumption profile dependent on the processed
data: even small correlations between the circuit switching activity and the key
material can be revealed by measuring the current consumption over repeated
computations (see Chapter 2 for details).
Since the introduction of DPA, several hardware countermeasures have been
proposed in the technical literature at different logic levels: system-level, gate-
level and transistor-level countermeasures. In Section 1.4.2 a short description
of different solutions adopted in each level is reported, whereas, in this Chapter,
transistor-level countermeasures only are studied.
The transistor-level approach is based on the adoption of a logic style whose
power consumption is constant or independent of the processed data.
As shown in Chapter 2, standard-CMOS logic has a power consumption
which strongly depends on processed data. To weaken the relationship between
processed data and power consumption two different solutions has been intro-
duced.
A first adopted solution is the dynamic (or precharge) logic, where each signal
has an evaluation phase in which the signal assumes the logic value depending
on the realized logic function and a precharge phase in which each signal goes to
VDD. An additional clock signal as input to the gate defines the different phases.
To understand the advantage of this solution in cryptographic applications,
let us compare two 2NOR gates designed in CMOS logic and dynamic logic
respectively. If the inputs do not change or if they change, for example, from
01 to 10, the output of the CMOS 2NOR does not change remaining stable at
89
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VSS and this results in a constant power consumption revealing the behavior
of the logic; in the same circumstances, the output of 2NOR gate designed in
dynamic logic goes to VSS during the evaluation phase (like in CMOS design)
but everytime the gate enters precharge phase, it sets the output value to VDD,
producing a power consumption. The first drawback of this solution is the
added signal clock to each gate. From cryptographic point of view, when the
gate output in evaluation phase is high, there is no change with respect to the
precharge phase (this signal is high in both cases) and, therefore, the power
consumption profile reveals this state.
Another adopted solution is the dual-rail logic style in which each signal X
is replaced by the pair of signals X and its inverse X = not(X). In this logic
style, a 2NOR gate has four inputs (A, not(A), B, not(B)) and two outputs
(NOR and not(NOR) = OR). To understand the advantage of this solution
in cryptographic applications, just think that each time one output goes low
the other goes high producing a power consumption. The first drawback of this
solution is that each gate needs additional area to duplicate the logic. From
a security point of view, when the inputs do not change, the output does not
change too, as in CMOS.
To capture the strengths of both solutions, the dual-rail pre-charge (DRP)
logic style is often used to counteract DPA. In a dual-rail pre-charge (DRP) logic
style (e.g. Sense Amplifier Based Logic (SABL) [96], Wave Dynamic Differen-
tial Logic (WDDL) [102], Dual-Spacer DRP [90]), signals are spatially encoded
as two complementary wires and power consumption is constant under the as-
sumption that the differential outputs of each gate drive the same capacitive
load. Dual-rail pre-charge logics are not affected by glitches but building two
balanced wires requires a full-custom approach thus increasing design and main-
tenance costs. A DRP logic style can be implemented by using standard CMOS
gates, as in the case of the Wave Dynamic Differential Logic (WDDL) [102], or
by using a custom design in which each gate is transistor level designed, as in
the case of the Sense Amplifier Based Logic (SABL) [96].
Semi-custom design flows supporting differential logic families have been
proposed in the technical literature. For instance, a technique for the automatic
routing of balanced complementary lines has been introduced in [101]. Even if
an automatic place and route could reduce design time and increase the porta-
bility, the proposed balanced routing technique does not take into account the
dependence of the capacitive load on a line on the logic state of the adjacent
wires and, furthermore, introduces additional constraints for the routing tool
thus limiting its efficiency and, likely, causing an area overhead especially if
only few metal layers are available for the inter-cell routing. In addition, in a
modern deep sub-micron technology, local process gradients cannot be neglected
and they are the limiting factor for the load matching accuracy.
Another technique proposed in [77, 78] is based on a masked dual-rail pre-
charge logic style (MDPL) where, due to the random masking at the gate level,
power consumption is randomized. Moreover, since MDPL is a dual-rail pre-
charge logic, glitches are avoided and, at the same time, the complementary
wires do not need to be balanced thus removing the main drawback of the dual-
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rail circuits. As reported in [76], a first implementation of MDPL showed a
DPA leakage due to the early propagation of the input data with respect to
the masking ones. The authors propose an improved implementation (iMDPL)
where SR-latches are used to resynchronize the inputs thus forcing a combina-
torial cell to evaluate only when all the inputs are in an valid differential state.
The penalty with respect MDPL is a factor 3 and 1.5 in terms of area and power
consumption respectively.
The effectiveness of a DPA-resistant logic style is normally quantified by
means of two figures of merit: the Normalized Energy Deviation (NED) and the
Normalized Standard Deviation (NSD). The energy per cycle is computed as
E = VDD · IAV · TCK = VDD ·
∫ T
0
IDD(t)dt (5.1)
where IDD(t) is the current drawn from the supply.
Starting from (5.1), the normalized energy deviation (NED) estimates the
gap between the maximum and the minimum value of the energy consumption
(normalized to the maximum value). The lower the NED, smaller are the differ-
ences of energy consumption among the different processed data and therefore
better is the effectiveness of the logic in counteracting power analysis. The NED
is defined as:
NED =
max(E)−min(E)
max(E)
. (5.2)
The normalized standard deviation (NSD) estimates how much the different val-
ues of power consumption, for different processed data, deviate from the average
consumption. The lower the NSD, smaller are the distances of different energy
consumptions from the mean energy and therefore better is the effectiveness of
logic to counteract power analysis:
NSD =
σE
E
. (5.3)
where σE and E is the standard deviation and the average of E respectively.
In this Chapter three different logic families to counteract DPA attacks will
be presented. Starting from the standard CMOS logic gates, it will be shown
that each proposed solution is an improvement with respects to the previous
one concerning security and design criteria.
The first proposed solution (Section 5.2) is a novel dynamic differential logic
style (3sDDL) which relies on the use of signals with three possible states:
logic `1' (VDD voltage), logic `0' (GND voltage) and 3rd state (VDD/2 voltage)
following the idea proposed in [6].
A DRP logic gate presents a data independent power consumption under the
ideal hypothesis the two output loads are perfectly balanced. In a real circuit the
output loads are unbalanced by the mismatch induced by the different routing
of two outputs and by the input capacitance mismatch of the following gate.
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This means all logic families for cryptographic applications present this second
order relationship between processed data and power consumption.
The second proposed solution is a logic insensitive to unbalanced routing
capacitances (Section 5.3). It is obtained by introducing a three-phase dual-rail
pre-charge logic (TDPL) with an additional discharge phase where the output
which is still high after the evaluation phase is discharged as well. Since both
outputs are precharged to VDD and discharged to VSS , a TDPL gate shows a
constant energy consumption over its operating cycle. The main drawback of
this solution is the additional area for the routing of the three control signals.
The last solution consists of a completely novel approach to the design
of a secure logic family which is based on a standard two-phase operation
(precharge/evaluation) while being at the same time insensitive to unbalanced
load conditions (Section 5.4). In this proposed logic family, called DDPL, the
information is represented in the time domain by forcing a positive (logic-1) or
negative (logic-0) relative delay between the differential lines. Therefore, as in
TDPL, both outputs are precharged and discharged inside the operating cycles
but, due to the chosen data encoding, a single control signal is sufficient as in a
standard dual-rail logic.
For each logic style, implementation details and simulation results on a basic
set of logic gates are first reported. Simple and more complex case studies are
then discussed and extensive comparisons with others logic styles which are the
state of the art are carried out.
5.2 The 3-state Differential Dynamic Logic Fam-
ily
In a general DRP style each signal is replaced by a pair of wires: one wire usually
carries the non-inverted signal a while the other wire carries the inverted (com-
plementary) signal a. Moreover all logic signals alternate between a precharge
value (in this case the signals are in the so called precharge phase) and the logic
values that are processed (in this case the signals are in the so called evaluation
phase). The precharge value is either VDD (logic 1) or Ground (logic 0). The
sequence of the precharge phase and the evaluation phase is typically controlled
by the clock signal. In most cases, the logic value of the clock signal defines the
phase in which a circuit currently is.
The proposed logic style is a novel dual rail CMOS called 3-state Differential
Dynamic Logic (3sDDL). The logic style can be regarded as a differential and
dynamic logic style with precharge value equal to VDD/2.
The schematic of a generic 3sDDL gate is reported in Figure 5.1 (capacitors
represent output loads). The connections of the gate to VDD and ground nodes
are controlled by clocked MOS devices (note that differently from normal dy-
namic logic the pull-up device is clocked by notCK); a pass-transistor connects
the two output nodes. In a 3sDDL gate, the operations proceeds through two
phases.
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Figure 5.1: Schematic of the generic 3sDDL gate.
During the Precharge phase (CK = 0V , notCK = VDD), the pass-transistor
shorts the two output nodes Y and notY ; since one output node is initially at
0V and the other is at VDD (due a previous evaluation phase), at the end of
the precharge phase both output nodes are at VDD/2 by charge redistribution,
assuming perfect matching between the output capacitances.
During the Evaluation phase (CK = VDD, notCK = 0V ), the pass-transistor
is an open circuit and the logic gate is connected to VDD and ground; in this
phase the differential pull down network evaluates its outputs (charging one
of the output capacitances from VDD/2 to VDD and discharging the other from
VDD/2 to 0V ).
The above operating mode presents some relevant features with respect to
a normal DRP used in literature:
 the voltage swing required in the transition from precharge to evaluation
is halved with respect to standard dynamic logic: this potentially allows
faster operation and lower power consumption;
 each data line is loaded only by a single NMOS input capacitance;
 the third state in the logic signals can be easily detected by suitable cir-
cuits, which allows us obtaining a clock signal from data signals: this could
avoid clock routing to each gate, by locally generating the clock at each
gate;
 the use of cross-coupled pull-up transistors guarantees static operation in
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the evaluation phase allowing a direct connection of 3sDDL gates (differ-
ently from dynamic gates).
Obviously a single to dual-rail netlist conversion is required and interconnection
capacitances at Y and notY outputs have to be balanced for best performance
(as in all DRP logic styles known in literature).
The power analysis of the proposed logic can be easily carried out: at each
clock cycle one of the two outputs is charged from VDD/2 to VDD by the pull-up
of the gate, while the other is discharged from VDD/2 to zero by the differential
pull-down. The total charge required to the supply is given by CY · VDD/2
or CnotY · VDD/2, where CY is the capacitance at node Y and CnotY is the
capacitance at node notY . In the precharge phase, no current is drawn from the
supply (since charge redistribution is used). As a result, assuming CY = CnotY ,
at each clock cycle always the same current is drawn from the power supply.
Some design guidelines to optimize 3sDDL cell project from DPA resistance
point of view should be followed: a good balancing of dual rail wires and of
internal nodes parasitic capacitance; design of a differential pull down network
layout which is perfectly symmetrical from the viewpoint of series or parallel
connected devices and so that the number of series-connected transistors from
output to ground does not depend on the input pattern. It has to be noted that a
technique which allows the routing of a dual rail circuit by using standard place
and route tools has been recently proposed [99, 104]. This technique guarantees
a matching of the interconnection capacitances of two differential lines within a
few percent.
5.2.1 3sDDL cells library: design and simulations
The technology chosen for the present study is a 0.13µm CMOS. Circuit simu-
lations have been carried out by using the design kit of the HCMOS9 process
from STMicroelectronics in CADENCE IC 4.4.6 environment. A 1.2V supply
has been assumed. All n-channel and p-channel devices have been sized for
minimum area.
The schematic of a 3sDDL XOR gate is reported in Figure 5.2. It is evident
that the differential pull down guarantees the same number of series connected
devices between each output and ground for all input patterns. Furthermore,
due to the symmetry of the logic function, a good balance of parasitic capaci-
tance of internal nodes has been easily obtained. The power consumption of the
XOR gate has been studied for a 4 3sDDL XOR gate fan-out and taking into
account an interconnection capacitance of 12.5fF both at Y and notY outputs
(estimated from the layout). A clock period TCK = 10ns has been assumed for
all tests.
For each of the four output transitions the energy per cycle has been com-
puted as in (5.1). As figures of merit for the logic gates with respect to DPA
attacks, we have used the Normalized Energy Deviation (NED) and the Nor-
malized Standard Deviation (NSD) as calculated in (5.2) and (5.3) respectively.
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Figure 5.2: XOR-XNOR gate in 3sDDL.
Table 5.1: IAV with perfectly balanced interconnection capacitances (XOR
gate).
Transition IAV (µA) NED
0→ 0 1.020
0→ 1 1.020 0%
1→ 0 1.020
1→ 1 1.020
The average current IAV has been measured for each of the four output tran-
sitions; results are summarized in Table 5.1. In order to take into account inter-
connection capacitance mismatch, the average current IAV has been measured
for a 10% mismatch in the interconnection capacitances at the two outputs; the
results are summarized in Table 5.2.
A further analysis of the power consumption of the XOR-XNOR gate has
been carried out by simulating random input sequences of length 500 clock
cycles for the input signals as in [100]. In Figure 5.3 the output of the gate
and the current drawn from the supply IDD is reported. The average current
per cycle IAV has been computed for each of the 500 bits. A standard static
CMOS (sCMOS) XOR gate has been tested in the same conditions as for the
3sDDL gate. A summary of the comparison between sCMOS and 3sDDL XOR
gate is reported in Table 5.3, where EAV is the Energy per cycle averaged on
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Table 5.2: IAV for a 10% interconnection capacitance mismatch (XOR gate).
Transition IAV (µA) NED
0→ 0 1.026
0→ 1 1.102 14%
1→ 0 0.942
1→ 1 1.012
Table 5.3: Comparison between sCMOS and 3sDDL XOR gates.
sCMOS 3sDDL
NED 95% 0.02%
NSD 124% 0.006%
EAV 17 fJ 12 fJ
tp/tp0 1 0.883
the 500 clock cycles, tp is the propagation delay of the 3sDDL gate and tp0 the
propagation delay of the sCMOS gate.
We considered different implementations of the NAND gate in our work.
The simpler topology for the NAND gate in 3sDDL presents the asymmetry of
the differential pull down network which provides two series connected devices
for the NAND output and two parallel connected devices for the and output. An
analysis of the power consumption of this topology of a four AND-NAND gate
fan out has been carried out by using random bit sequences for the input signals.
The NED achieved by using this topology is about 14%. In order to obtain
better results in terms of NED new 3sDDL NAND gates have been designed
and tested. The topology which allows obtaining the better trade off between
area increase and NED improvement is reported in Figure 5.4: the pull down
stage has been designed to have the same number of series-connected devices for
each input pattern. Actually, the parasitic capacitances at Y and notY nodes do
Figure 5.3: Output voltage and current drawn from the supply.
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Figure 5.4: Proposed AND-NAND gate schematic.
not perfectly match; better results could be achieved by a different sizing of the
MOS devices connected to Y and connected to notY , but this would increase
area and input capacitance. Power consumption of the AND-NAND gate in
Figure 5.4 has been studied for a four gate fan-out and taking into account an
interconnection capacitance of about 10fF both at Y and notY outputs. The
NED achieved by using this topology is 3.6%. For a 10% and a 20% capacitance
mismatch the NED is 12% and 22% respectively. The random input test has
been carried out also for circuit in Figure 5.4 obtaining an NSD of 1.6%.
In order to compare 3sDDL against the main previously published SCA proof
logic styles, a Serpent Substitution Box (S-Box) [3] has been implemented in
sCMOS, DyCML [4], SABL [100] and 3sDDL logic styles. The S-Box has been
synthesized in the Synopsis Design Vision environment: libraries containing only
inverters, NAND gates and XOR gates for all the considered logic styles have
been used.
The synthesized S-Box circuit is made up of 43 NAND gates, 1 XOR gate
and 17 inverters which are necessary only for the sCMOS implementation. In-
terconnection capacitances have been extracted from the layout and 30fF has
been assumed as load for each of the four output lines. A summary of the
comparison between the different S-Boxes implemented in various logic styles is
reported in Table 5.4.
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Table 5.4: Comparison between the S-boxes designed with the different logic
styles.
Logic Style NED NSD EAV (fJ) # of MOS
sCMOS 95% 34.1% 173 216
DyCML 8.5% 1.9% 863 574
SABL 6.6% 1.5% 1381 706
3sDDL 2% 0.4% 544 570
5.2.2 Interfacing 3sDDL and standard CMOS
To implement the critical part of the encryption module in the proposed logic
we have to interface standard CMOS signals with the 3sDDL gates by using
registers composed of D-type flip-flop with conversion capability.
The flip-flops have been implemented as dynamic master-slave edge-triggered
flip flops based on 3sDDL inverters and pass-transistors. These flip flops receive
standard CMOS inputs and perform the conversion to the 3sDDL data.
An architecture implementing 3sDDL logic requires the routing of the clock
to each cell in the 3sDDL combinational logic, and therefore is not directly
compatible with a standard cell-based CMOS digital design flow. If we look at
format of data signals in 3sDDL it is apparent that the information of clock
transitions is present in the data signals. To obtain the clock signal, a circuit
which is able to detect the third (VDD/2) state in the data signal is needed. Since
this circuit  that we will call 3rd state detector  has to be included within
each logic gate, it has to be as compact as possible.
The aim of the 3rd state detector circuit is to distinguish between the 0
or VDD levels and the third state level VDD/2 and to provide the clock signal.
The schematic diagram of the proposed 3rd state detector circuit is reported in
Figure 5.5. The PMOS device in the first inverter after the detector core has to
be high threshold MOS transistors in order to have no static power consumption
when the inputs A and notA (see Figure 5.5) are at VDD/2.
Circuit simulations have been carried out by using the design kit of the HC-
MOS9 process from STMicroelectronics (devices with different threshold volt-
ages are available) in CADENCE IC 4.4.6 environment.
5.3 The Three-Phase Dual-Rail Pre-Charge Logic
Family
The 3sDDL logic family (discussed in the previous Section 5.2), like the others
DRP logic styles for cryptographic applications, presents a power consumption
independent of the processed data under the assumption that load capacitances
are perfectly balanced. Each one of the load capacitances CL and CL of a
DRP cell consist of the output capacitance of the cell itself Co, the capacitance
Cw of the wire to the subsequent cells and the sum of the input capacitances
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Figure 5.5: 3rd state detector circuit.
Ci of these cells. In order to balance CL and CL, the three parts of these
capacitances need to be pairwise balanced. For modern process technologies
of digital circuits, the biggest contribution to the capacitance at the output of
a logic cell is typically Cw. Therefore, balancing CL,w and CL,w is the most
essential task and this is done during placing and routing of the DRP cells. For
instance, a technique for the automatic routing of balanced complementary lines
has been introduced in [101]. Even if it pays attention to the P&R of the DRP
cells, the proposed balanced routing technique does not take into account the
dependence of the capacitive load on a line on the logic state of the adjacent
wires and, furthermore, introduces additional constraints for the routing tool
thus limiting its efficiency. Moreover, in this way the input capacitances Ci of
the subsequent cells become predominant in CL.
The Three-Phase Dual-Rail Pre-Charge Logic (TDPL) style is a further ap-
proach to the design of a dual-rail pre-charge logic family which is insensitive to
unbalanced load conditions thus allowing adopting a semi-custom design flow
(automatic place & route) without additional constraints on the routing of the
complementary wires.
The proposed concept is based on a three phase operation where an addi-
tional discharge phase is performed after the precharge/evaluation steps typical
of any dynamic logic style. Although the concept is general, it can be imple-
mented as an improvement of the standard DRP logics with a limited increase
in circuit complexity.
In the TDPL logic, during a first phase (precharge), the output lines of a
generic logic gate are both charged to VDD, then (second phase, evaluation) the
proper line is discharged to VSS according to the input data, thus generating
a new output data. Finally, during the last phase (discharge), the other line is
discharged too. As a consequence, since both wires are precharged to VDD and
discharged to VSS , a TDPL logic gate shows a constant energy consumption
over its operating cycle (independent of the input data), even if unbalanced
capacitive loads to VDD and/or VSS are taken into account.
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Figure 5.6: TDPL inverter.
The proposed logic style has been implemented as an enhancement of the
SABL logic style with a minimum increase in the required area. Therefore,
SABL cells are assumed as the benchmark for the equivalent TDPL cells in this
work. For instance, an TDPL inverter is shown in Figure 5.6, where the pull-
down NMOS transistors (N1, N4) and a PMOS switch (P1) have been added to
the SABL inverter in order to implement the discharge phase.
With reference to the timing diagram shown in Figure 5.7, the circuit oper-
ation is the following:
1. Charge: at the beginning of each cycle, signal discharge goes low, thus
closing P1. Signal charge goes low too and both output lines are precharged
to VDD.
2. Evaluation: during the charge phase new input data (in, in) are pre-
sented to the circuit. On the raising edge of signal eval, N7 is closed thus
discharging one of the output lines according to the input data.
3. Discharge: at the end of each operating cycle, input discharge is activated
in order to pull down (through the additional pull-down transistors N1,
N4) the output line which has not been discharged during the evaluation
phase.
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Figure 5.7: Timing diagram of the TDPL inverter.
Table 5.5: Capacitive loads.
to VDD to VSS
from out CV DDout = 8fF C
V SS
out = 4fF
from out CV DD
out
= 1fF CV SS
out
= 3fF
More complex gates are obtained changing the pull-down logic. As an ex-
ample, a 2-input NAND/AND and a XOR/NXOR are depicted in Figure 5.8.
A basic set of cells has been designed in a 65nm CMOS process. A 1.2V
supply voltage and a 100MHz operating frequency are adopted. Each transistor
is designed with a width W = 0.12µm and the minimum gate length L = 65nm
is assumed. Simulations are done in Spectre, using BSIM4 transistor models.
In order to simulate the cells in a real operating condition, the testbench
shown in Figure 5.9 has been defined, where each input to the gate under analysis
is driven by a TDPL inverter and unbalanced load capacitances to VDD (C
V DD
out ,
CV DD
out
) and VSS (C
V SS
out , C
V SS
out
) are assumed on the output lines (out, out).
Typical values for the local routing parasitic capacitances in a standard-cell
semi-custom layout are used (Table 5.5). The same testbench, with SABL
inverters on the inputs, has been used to simulate the corresponding SABL
cells. In both cases, only the current consumption of the gate under analysis is
taken into account and every input data transition is simulated.
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Figure 5.8: NAND/AND (a) and XOR/NXOR (b).
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Figure 5.9: Simulation testbench.
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Table 5.6: Simulation results for the three basic gates.
INV NAND/AND XOR/NXOR
SABL[96] TDPL SABL[96] TDPL SABL[96] TDPL
min(E)[fJ] 8.30 16.79 8.52 16.97 8.75 17.16
max(E)[fJ] 10.86 16.86 10.92 17.17 11.25 17.31
∆E [fJ] 2.55 0.08 2.40 0.20 2.51 0.15
NED 23.5% 0.5% 26.4% 1.4% 26.7% 1.0%
E[fJ] 9.58 16.83 9.17 17.09 10.00 17.23
σE [fJ] 1.26 0.04 0.96 0.08 1.12 0.07
NSD 13.2% 0.3% 12.5% 0.5% 13.5% 0.5%
# transistors 10 12 12 14 14 16
As in [96], the energy per cycle reported in (5.1) is adopted as figure of
merit to measure the resistance against power analysis attacks. The obtained
results for the three analyzed gates are summarized in Table 5.6, where ∆E is the
difference (max(E)−min(E)), the normalized energy deviation (NED) is defined
as in (5.2) and NSD is the normalized standard deviation defined as in (5.3).
As expected, SABL gates are sensible to unbalanced load conditions (NED>
25%, NSD> 12%) thus confirming that a balanced routing must be necessary
employed to obtain a constant energy consumption. On the contrary, TDPL
cells show an extremely balanced energy consumption (NED< 2%, NSD< 1%)
in spite of unbalanced load capacitances.
From Table 5.6, it follows that, as expected, an increase in the mean energy
per cycle must be taken into account since both output lines are discharged in
each cycle. On the contrary, the penalty in terms of silicon area is minimal (16%
for the NAND/AND), especially if compared with what is reported for MDPL
[78]. With respect to SABL, TDPL requires the routing of two additional sig-
nals (charge and discharge). However, if at least four metal layers are available
for signal routing, an increase in silicon area is not expected, especially in reg-
ular structures such as data-paths. Notice that MDPL is affected by a similar
drawback due to the routing of the random data for masking.
5.3.1 TDPL flip-flop implementation
The flip-flops in DRP circuits, as the SABL flip-flop reported in [96], consist
of two stages, as shown in Figure 5.10. With respect to the flip-flop, when the
previous DRP combinational logic is in one of the two phases (that is the same
of Stage 2 and the following combinational DRP cells) Stage 1 is in the other
phase. To clarify this behavior, let's assume Stage 1 is in the precharge phase
when Stage 2 and the combinational DRP cells are in the evaluation phase. In
this case, Stage 2 of the DRP flip-flops provides the stored logic values to the
combinational DRP cells. The combinational DRP cells calculate their output
values according to the respective input values. Just before Stage 2 of the DRP
flip-flops and the combinational DRP cells are precharged, Stage 1 of the DRP
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Figure 5.10: Generic DRP Flip-Flop.
flip-flops stores the logic values at its inputs. This behavior ensures that all cells
of the DRP circuit are precharged during a clock cycle and that the processed
logic values are not lost during the precharge phase.
The implementation of a data flip-flop compatible with TDPL gates is based
on the scheme shown in Figure 5.11: it includes a first TDPL inverter, an
intermediate circuit which drives the set/reset inputs to a CMOS SR-latch and
a second TDPL inverter on the output.
Its operation is similar to the SABL flip-flop reported in [96] where the ad-
ditional circuitry after the first TDPL inverter avoids the latch invalid input
(set = reset = 0) by forcing a logic-1 during both the phases of discharge
and charge. In other words, the input TDPL inverter with the additional cir-
cuitry on its outputs behaves as a SABL inverter. The timing diagram shown
in Figure 5.12 clarifies the flip-flop operation where eval_n is equal to eval
negated and discharge∗, charge
∗
are the discharge and charge signals referred to
eval_n. Therefore, as discharge, charge are active when eval = 0, discharge∗,
charge
∗
are active when eval_n = 0.
With reference to Figure 5.12, on the eval falling edge, the input inverter
enters its evaluation phase and node1 is set to D. Further changes of the input
data during the evaluation phase do not affect node1. Transistors N1,N3 are
closed (P2,P4 are open) and the CMOS SR-latch is either set or reset depending
on node1 thus storing the input data (node2). Meanwhile, the output inverter
is in the discharge and charge phases thus being insensitive to its inputs.
When the input inverter enters its discharge phase (on the eval raising
edge), N1 and N3 are open and P2, P4 are closed thus forcing the hold state
of the SR-latch (set = reset = 1). Hereafter, changes on node1 due to the dis-
charge/charge phase in the first invert do not affect node2. The output inverter
enters its evaluation phase thus setting Q according to node2.
Ultimately, the value assumed by the output Q during the evaluation phase
on the eval raising edge is equal to the value taken by the input D during the
evaluation phase on the previous eval raising edge according to the master-slave
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Figure 5.11: TDPL flip-flop.
operation.
5.3.2 Case study
As a case study, the circuit shown in Figure 5.13 has been simulated. It includes
two 4-bit input registers (data_i, key_i), four XOR gates, the S-box S0 from
the Serpent algorithm [3] and a 4-bit output register (data_o). The circuit has
been implemented in TDPL and SABL as well. In order to take into account
the unbalanced routing in a semi-custom layout, every gate output is loaded
with unbalanced load capacitances to VDD and VSS . In details, the asserted
lines are loaded with 4fF and 2fF to VDD and VSS respectively, while 0.5fF
and 1.5fF have been used for the negated lines. These are reasonable parasitic
capacitance values for the local routing in the adopted technology.
A histogram of the observed energies per cycle reported in Figure 5.14 shows
that TDPL guarantees a balanced energy consumption, independent of the pro-
cessed data, even in presence of unbalanced interconnections. Notice that the
same scale has been used for the energy per cycle.
The obtained simulation results are summarized in Table 5.7 for both SABL
and TDPL, where the energy consumption has been evaluated on both the clock
cycles necessary to process the input data. These results confirm that, as for
the single logic gates, TDPL shows an extremely balanced energy consumption
in spite of unbalanced semi-custom routing.
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Table 5.7: Simulation results for the case study circuit (Figure 5.13).
I clock cycle II clock cycle
SABL[96] TDPL SABL[96] TDPL
max(E)[fJ] 746.53 1305.23 750.50 1305.59
min(E)[fJ] 726.91 1302.44 722.53 1302.63
∆E[fJ] 19.62 2.79 27.97 2.97
NED 2.63% 0.21% 3.73% 0.23%
E[fJ] 739.35 1304.07 738.32 1303.94
σE [fJ] 4.16 0.54 5.54 0.66
NSD 0.56% 0.04% 0.75% 0.05%
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Figure 5.14: Case study - energy consumption per cycle: SABL (left) vs. TDPL
(right).
5.4 The Delay-based Dual-rail Pre-charge Logic
Family
In the previous section it has been shown how the problem concerning the
unbalanced load conditions is addressed by the TDPL logic family in which
however two additional control signals are needed ( Section 5.3).
In this section, a completely innovative logic style is proposed as a further
approach to the design of a DRP logic family which is insensitive to unbalanced
load conditions. This logic style is called Delay-based Dual-rail Pre-charge Logic
(DDPL) and it can be considered an improvement of the TDPL logic style.
DDPL exploits the time domain data encoding shown in Figure 5.15: dur-
ing the precharge phase both differential lines are charged to VDD and, in the
evaluation phase, are both discharged to VSS . The information is encoded in
the order with which the lines are discharged. For a logic-1, the negated line
is discharged after a delay ∆ with respect to the asserted one. Conversely, for
a logic-0, the negated line is discharged first. Since over the operating cycles
both lines are charged and discharged once, the total current consumption is
data-independent.
A 2-input NAND/AND and a XOR/NXOR which operate accordingly to
the introduced data encoding are depicted in Figure 5.16.
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With reference to the timing diagram shown in Figure 5.17, the NAND
operation is the following:
1. Precharge: at the beginning of each cycle, signal clk goes high, thus closing
N1 and N2 and pre-charging both output lines VDD. Since during this
phase the input lines are high (outputs from another DDPL gate), the
pull-up logic is open.
2. Evaluation: the new DDPL encoded input data (A, A), (B, B) are pre-
sented to the circuit on the falling edge of signal clk. Since A, B go low
before A,B (both inputs are logic-1's), the negated output Y is discharged
before Y , thus generating a logic-0, as expected in a NAND gate.
The NAND operation for the other input combinations is similar.
In order to convert a single-rail CMOS data to the DDPL format, the con-
verter shown in Figure 5.18 is used: during the precharge phase (clk = 1), both
outputs are charged to VDD while, on the clock falling edge, they are discharged
to VSS forcing a delay ∆ between them, accordingly to the single-rail input data
A. If A = 1, Y = 0 and Y = 0 after a delay ∆. Conversely, for A = 0, Y = 0
and Y = 0 after a delay ∆. By construction, the CMOS-to-DDPL converter
has a data independent current consumption.
This basic set of cells has been designed in a 65nm CMOS process. A 1V
supply voltage and a 100MHz operating frequency are adopted. Each transistor
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Figure 5.19: Simulation testbenches: balanced (a) and unbalanced (b) loads.
is designed with a width W = 0.12µm and the minimum gate length L =
65nm is assumed. A delay ∆ = 1ns is used for the CMOS-to-DDPL converter.
Simulations are done in Spectre, using BSIM4 transistor models.
In order to simulate the cells in a real operating condition, the testbenches
shown in Figure 5.19 have been defined where, each input to the gate under
analysis is driven by the CMOS-to-DDPL converter. To simulate both balanced
and unbalanced loads, a different number of CMOS inverter is used on the two
outputs. The same testbench has been used to simulate the corresponding SABL
and WDDL cells. In both cases, only the current consumption of the gate under
analysis is taken into account and every input data transition is simulated.
For the NAND/AND gate, a superimposition of the power supply current
traces IDD(t) for the 16 input transitions is depicted in Figure 5.20 in case of
unbalanced loads. In both the cells SABL and DDPL, each operation phase
can be clearly identified in the supply current profile. Notice that, in unbal-
anced load conditions, SABL cells show a data dependent current consumption
especially during precharge. In the DDPL cells, the precharge current pulse is
constant. In the evaluation phase, two pulses are visible which correspond to
the transitions at distance ∆ = 1ns of the outputs lines. These two pulses show
some data dependency but the sum of their energies is constant (Table 5.8).
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Figure 5.20: NAND/AND - superimposition of the power supply current traces:
SABL (above) vs. DDPL (bottom).
Clearly, if a measuring setup is available which allows to resolve the single
peaks within one operating period, both logics can be attacked. However, it is
worth noting that DDPL shows an advantage with respect to SABL since the
two evaluation peaks at distance ∆ = 1ns must be resolved in order to detect a
data dependency while, for SABL, resolving the precharge peak is sufficient.
In other terms, in a standard precharge logic like SABL, the operating fre-
quency constraints the logic synthesis of the design and determines, at the same
time, the achievable security level. On the contrary, in DDPL, the clock fre-
quency does not fix the security since it depends on the delay ∆ which must be
chosen considering only the critical path tcrit of the design (∆ > tcrit). There-
fore, a cryptographic core in DDPL can run at a low frequency (for instance
in a power constrained application) having, in spite of that, a high resistance
against DPA.
As in [96], the energy per cycle assumed as in equation (5.1) is adopted as
figure of merit to measure the resistance against power analysis attacks. The
obtained results for the analyzed gates are summarized in Table 5.8 and Table
5.9, where the normalized energy deviation (NED) and the normalized standard
deviation (NSD) are defined as in equations (5.2) and (5.3) respectively.
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Table 5.8: Simulation results of DDPL NAND and XOR gates.
Balanced loads Unbalanced loads
NAND XOR NAND XOR
max(E)[fJ] 3.756 4.007 5.375 4.896
min(E)[fJ] 3.720 3.986 5.337 4.873
∆E[fJ] 0.036 0.021 0.038 0.023
NED 1% 0.5% 0.7% 0.5%
E[fJ] 3.739 3.996 5.358 4.883
σE [fJ] 0.010 0.008 0.011 0.007
NSD 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
# transistors 12 16 12 16
Table 5.9: NAND - comparison with SABL and WDDL.
Balanced loads Unbalanced loads
SABL[96] WDDL[102] DDPL SABL[96] WDDL[102] DDPL
max(E)[fJ] 3.121 8.613 3.756 4.615 10.24 5.375
min(E)[fJ] 2.958 7.983 3.720 2.958 8.014 5.337
∆E[fJ] 0.163 0.630 0.036 1.657 2.223 0.038
NED 5.2% 7.3% 1% 35.9% 21.7% 0.7%
E[fJ] 2.989 8.261 3.739 4.195 9.491 5.358
σE [fJ] 0.041 0.176 0.010 0.699 0.801 0.011
NSD 1.4% 2.1% 0.3% 16.7% 8.4% 0.2%
# transistors 16 30 12 16 30 12
As expected, SABL and WDDL gates are sensitive to unbalanced load condi-
tions (NED> 21.7%, NSD> 8.4%) thus confirming that a balanced routing must
be necessary employed to obtain a constant energy consumption. Conversely,
DDPL cells show an extremely balanced energy consumption (NED< 0.7%,
NSD< 0.2%) in spite of unbalanced load capacitances.
From Table 5.9, it follows that, as expected, an increase in the mean energy
per cycle must be taken into account since both output lines are discharged in
each cycle. In terms of silicon area (see transistor count in Table 5.9), DDPL
shows a certain improvement with respect to SABL (25% for the NAND/AND)
and a relevant advantage with respect to WDDL (60%). Compared to TDPL,
a lower area consumption is also expected since DDPL does not require the
routing of additional control signals.
5.4.1 A combinational case study
In order to confirm the results discussed in the previous section, a DDPL full
adder, designed as depicted in Figure 5.21, has been tested and compared
with the equivalent SABL design. An implementation based on XOR/NXOR
and NAND/AND gates is employed and cascaded gates are connected using
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Figure 5.21: DDPL/SABL full adder.
Table 5.10: Simulation results for the FULL ADDER.
Balanced loads Unbalanced loads
SABL[96] DDPL SABL[96] DDPL
max(E)[fJ] 20.263 24.778 22.922 27.909
min(E)[fJ] 19.573 24.676 19.768 28.001
∆E[fJ] 0.690 0.102 3.154 0.092
NED 3.41% 0.41% 13.76% 0.33%
E[fJ] 19.709 24.731 21.309 27.959
σE [fJ] 0.136 0.027 0.734 0.025
NSD 0.69% 0.11% 3.44% 0.09%
a Domino logic where the static inverters are included inside the gates (Figure
5.16) and they do not cause an unbalanced energy consumption because, in each
cycle, both inverters on each couple of output wires switch two times (0-1 com-
mutation during the precharge phase and a 1-0 event during the evaluation). On
the contrary, in the SABL approach balanced interconnections between inverter
and the following gate are necessary.
As for the simulation of a single gate, balanced and unbalanced load condi-
tions have been used on the outputs (Figure 5.19). A superimposition of the
power supply current traces IDD(t) for the 64 possible transitions of the 3-bit
input {A,B,Cin} is depicted in Figure 5.22 for both implementations SABL
and DDPL in the unbalanced case.
A histogram of the observed energies per cycle reported in Figure 5.23 shows
that DDPL guarantees a balanced energy consumption, independent of the pro-
cessed data, even in presence of unbalanced loads. Results summarized in Table
5.10 confirm the improvement which has been obtained with respect to SABL.
5.4.2 DDPL flip-flop implementation
The implementation of a data latch for the proposed logic style is based on the
scheme shown in Figure 5.24: the DDPL encoded data input is converted to a
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Figure 5.22: FULL ADDER - superimposition of the power supply current
traces: SABL (above) vs. DDPL (bottom).
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Figure 5.23: FULLADDER - energy consumption per cycle: SABL (left) vs.
DDPL (right).
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Figure 5.24: DDPL latch.
dual-rail CMOS format by an input converter (CONV −1) whose outputs are
the set/reset inputs to a CMOS SR-latch. On the outputs, a CMOS-to-DDPL
converter as in Figure 5.18 is used to regenerate a DDPL data for the following
combinatorial logic. A DDPL data flip-flop is obtained cascading two latches in
master-slave configuration.
The input DDPL-to-CMOS converter and the corresponding timing dia-
grams are shown in Figure 5.25(a) and 5.25(b) respectively: during the first
semi-period of the clock signal clk, P1 is open and the outputs set, reset are
both forced high by N1, N4 (hold state for the SR-latch). On the clock falling
edge, P1 is closed, the outputs are released and the DDPL encoded input data
(A,A) is presented to the circuit. As soon as the first input line goes low, P2
is closed and, depending on which input line goes low first, the corresponding
output line goes low as well thus storing the correct logic value in the CMOS
SR-latch. The cross-coupled NMOS transistors N2, N3 force the other output
in the opposite logic state.
In Figure 5.25(b), ∆ is the delay forced by the CMOS-to-DDPL converter of
the previous flip-flop. Obviously, the starting delay ∆ changes during the prop-
agation through the combinatorial logic. It must be ensured that ∆f > ∆setup,
where ∆f is the final delay on the flip-flop inputs and ∆setup = t
HL
p + t
LH
p +
RonCo, being t
HL
p and t
LH
p the NXOR propagation delays, Ron the resistance of
the series (P1,P2,P3/4) and Co the total capacitance on the P3/4 drains. How-
ever, as said above, the flip-flop regenerates a valid DDPL data thus ensuring
that the propagation through the next combinatorial network starts with the
original delay ∆. In addition, since the input converter evaluation phase is
driven by the input signals themselves, the proposed logic is insensitive to a
skew on the clock signal clk as long as it does not exceed ∆f .
It is worth noting that NXOR gate in Figure 5.25(a) switches two times
in each cycle. Therefore, under the assumption that a symmetric full-custom
layout is used for the internal interconnections, the DDPL flip-flop is by con-
struction DPA resistant.
5.4.3 A sequential case study
As a second case study, the circuit shown in Figure 5.13 has been simulated. It
includes two 4-bit input registers (data_i, key_i), four XOR gates, the S-box
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Table 5.11: Simulation results for the sequential case study circuit (Figure 5.13).
I clock cycle II clock cycle
SABL[96] DDPL SABL[96] DDPL
max(E)[fJ] 622.11 1151.74 625.42 1152.52
min(E)[fJ] 605.76 1147.63 602.11 1147.63
∆E[fJ] 16.35 4.12 23.31 4.89
NED 2.63% 0.36% 3.73% 0.82%
E[fJ] 616.12 1149.92 615.27 1150.52
σE [fJ] 3.47 0.72 4.62 0.82
NSD 0.56% 0.06% 0.75% 0.07%
S0 from the Serpent algorithm [3] and a 4-bit output register (data_o). The
circuit has been implemented in DDPL and SABL as well. In order to take
into account the unbalanced routing in a semi-custom layout, every gate output
is loaded with unbalanced load capacitances to VDD and VSS . In details, the
asserted lines are loaded with 4fF and 1.5fF to VDD and VSS respectively,
while 1fF and 3fF have been used for the negated lines. These are reasonable
parasitic capacitance values for the local routing in the adopted technology.
The obtained simulation results are summarized in Table 5.11 for both SABL
and DDPL, where the energy consumption has been evaluated on both the clock
cycles necessary to process the input data. These results confirm that, as for
the single logic gates, DDPL shows an extremely balanced energy consumption
in spite of unbalanced semi-custom routing.
5.5 Conclusions
Differential power analysis attacks work because the power consumption of cryp-
tographic devices depends on processed data. The aim of a hardware counter-
measure is to remove this dependency. Transistor level countermeasures have
been analyzed in this Chapter showing how the DRP logic styles counteract
DPA attacks. Three dynamic differential logic styles to protect security devices
against power attacks have been designed and in-depth evaluated.
The 3sDDL, based on signals with three allowed states, has been shown as
first. The designed gates and flip-flops have achieved a strong reduction of both
the NED and the NSD parameters with reasonable penalty in terms of area and
total power dissipation. A circuit which is able to recover the clock from 3sDDL
data signals has also been proposed. Simulation results have shown a strong
reduction of both the NED and the NSD with respect to the standard CMOS
and others logic styles for cryptographic applications. The main drawback of
3sDDL has been shown to be that a 3sDDL gate has an independent power
consumption on processed data under the assumption that load capacitance are
perfectly balanced.
To address this drawback a second logic style has been proposed, the TDPL.
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The design of an innovative DRP logic family whose power consumption is
insensitive to unbalanced load conditions has been investigated by the adoption
of an additional third (discharge) phase after precharge and evaluation. In this
way, the TDPL logic style allows to adopt a semi-custom design flow (automatic
place & route) without any constraint on the routing of the complementary
wires. In particular a flip-flop compatible with the TDPL logic family has been
introduced and compared to the state of the art in the technical literature.
Experimental results on a case study in a 65nm CMOS process confirm that the
proposed implementation shows a constant energy consumption even in presence
of asymmetric interconnections. The simulated energy consumption per cycle
shows an improvement in the energy consumption balancing in excess of 10 times
with respect to the corresponding SABL implementation without requiring any
constraint on the geometry of the complementary wires. The main drawback
of TDPL is represented by the additional two control signals defined to set the
three phases. These additional signals make more difficult the place and route
processes.
The third proposed solution, the DDPL logic family, promises to be a com-
pletely innovative logic style. The DDPL style is based on a novel encoding
concept where the information is represented in the time domain rather than
in the spatial domain as in a standard dual-rail logic. Even if a DDPL gate
works with only one control signal (as a standard DRP logic), it presents a
power consumption which is insensitive to unbalanced load conditions as in the
case of TDPL logic. A complete set of combinatorial gates and a data flip-flop
have been designed and simulated showing that the proposed logic family has a
constant energy consumption even in presence of asymmetric interconnections.
The simulated energy consumption per cycle is up to 50 times more balanced
than in the corresponding SABL gates without requiring any constraint on the
geometry of the complementary wires. In terms of area, DDPL is compara-
ble to SABL and 60% smaller than WDDL. The introduced time domain data
encoding allows to set the DPA-resistance independently from the operating fre-
quency by choosing the delay parameter ∆ according to the expected resolution
of current consumption measurements.
Chapter 6
Random Number Generator
6.1 RNG and PRNG
A random number generator (often abbreviated as RNG) is a computational
or physical device designed to generate a sequence of numbers or symbols that
lack any pattern, i.e. appears random. Random numbers are extensively used in
many crypto-graphic operations. Public/private key pairs for asymmetric algo-
rithms are generated from random bit streams; a random bit generator (RBG)
is also needed for key generation in symmetric algorithms, for generating chal-
lenges in authentication protocols, and for creating padding bytes and blinding
values [63].
The many applications of randomness have led to the development of several
different methods for generating random data. Many of these have existed since
ancient times, including dice, coin flipping, the shuing of playing cards, the
use of yarrow stalks (by divination) in the I Ching, and many other techniques.
Because of the mechanical nature of these techniques, generating large amounts
of sufficiently random numbers (important in statistics) required a lot of work
and/or time. Thus, results would sometimes be collected and distributed as
random number tables. Nowadays, after the advent of computational random
number generators, a growing number of government-run lotteries, and lottery
games, are using RNGs instead of more traditional drawing methods, such as
using ping-pong or rubber balls.
There are two principal methods used to generate random numbers. In a
True or physical RNG (TRNG) a physical phenomenon, that is expected to
be random, is measured and then used to generate sequences of zeros and one.
In a so called Pseudo RNG (PRNG) a computational algorithm that produce
long sequences of apparently random results is used; in this case the generated
sequences are completely determined by a shorter initial value, known as a seed
or key. A physical random number generator can be based on an essentially ran-
dom atomic or subatomic physical phenomenon whose unpredictability can be
traced to the laws of quantum mechanics. Sources of entropy include radioactive
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decay, thermal noise, shot noise, avalanche noise in Zener diodes, clock drift,
the timing of actual movements of a hard disk read/write head, and radio noise.
However, physical phenomena and tools used to measure them generally feature
asymmetries and systematic biases that make their outcomes not uniformly ran-
dom. A randomness extractor, such as a cryptographic function, can be used to
obtain uniformly distributed bits from a non-uniformly random source, though
at a lower bit rate.
An example of a PRNG is the linear congruential generator, which uses the
recurrence
Xn+1 = (aXn + b) modm (6.1)
to generate numbers where m is the maximum number of numbers the for-
mula can produce.
For random numbers used in cryptography, a flat statistic is not sufficient
and their unpredictability is the main requirement.
A random bit generator (RBG) is a system whose output consists of fully
unpredictable (i.e., statistically independent and unbiased) bits. In security ap-
plications, the unpredictability of the output also implies that it must not be
possible for an attacker to observe or manipulate the generator. An RBG basi-
cally differs from a pseudo-random generator because the complete knowledge
of the generator structure and of whatever previously generated sequence does
not result in any knowledge of any following bit. In other terms, the entropy
of an n-bit output sequence should be ideally equal to n. On the contrary, the
entropy of a n-bit output sequence from a pseudo-random generator cannot ex-
ceed the entropy of its seed, whatever n is. While pseudo-random generators are
suitable in those applications where just a flat statistic is needed [84], random
number generators are required in security applications, where unpredictability
is the main goal.
A true RBG must be necessarily based on some kind of nondeterministic
phenomena that could act as the source of the system randomness. Electronic
noises and time jitter are usually the only stochastic phenomena that are suitable
for the integration in embedded systems as chipcard integrated circuits (ICs).
When designing an RBG for a chipcard IC, a wide spectrum of implementa-
tion issues has to be considered and fulfilled. Due to cost reasons and mechanical
stress requirements, the silicon area is a limited resource in a chipcard microcon-
troller (a typical area is 5− 10mm2 for a 8/16-bit card) and, at the same time,
there is the demand to integrate nonvolatile memory blocks of ever-increasing
size. As a consequence, the silicon area for integrating the CPU core and its pe-
ripheral devices (including the RBG module) must be minimized. Furthermore,
no external components can be used due to packaging constraints and security
reasons: any externally accessible circuit node seriously affects the chip tamper
resistance [71].
To avoid complex power management policies, power consumption is another
stringent constraint, especially in a contactless chipcard IC. A related issue is the
chip resistance against power analysis attacks [53]: when the RBG is employed
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in a key generation algorithm, a current consumption profile highly correlated
to the RBGs output bit stream can be exploited by an attacker to infer the
generated secret values.
Four different techniques for generating random streams are reported in the
technical literature: direct amplification of a noise source [14, 22, 47], jittered
oscillator sampling [23, 38, 50, 75, 74], discrete-time chaotic maps [88, 91] and
metastable circuits [13, 40].
The direct amplification of a white noise source has been proved to be an
effective technique to obtain high-speed random streams. Nevertheless, the
sampling of a jittered oscillator is the preferred method because of its higher
robustness and lower sensitivity to external disturbances [75].
An oscillator-based RBG exploits the cycle-to-cycle time drift (jitter) in free
running oscillators to produce a random bit sequence. In the basic scheme, a
fast oscillator is sampled by a lower frequency oscillator in a D flip-flop and,
under the hypothesis that the standard deviation of the slow oscillator period is
greater than the fast oscillator period, the states of the latter in two successive
sampling times can be assumed uncorrelated, thus generating a random bit
stream. To fulfill the mentioned constraint and, at the same time, to have a
high generation speed, in [21] the low frequency oscillator is provided with an
amplified noise source. The main drawback of this solution is the increased
power consumption which is a main constraint, especially for the integration in
contact-less chipcards.
To maximize the exploitation of the oscillator jitter when an explicit noise
source is not employed, a new concept has been introduced in [15] where the fast
oscillator phase is controlled to force the sampling close to one of its edges (offset-
compensated oscillator-based RBG). That allows relaxing the jitter requirement
and, in order to generate random bits, a jitter greater than the phase control
resolution becomes the condition to be fulfilled in this case. Moreover, since
in [15] both oscillators are reset every time a new bit is produced, the output
stream is not affected by frequency beating between the sampled and sampling
oscillator which, enhancing the pseudo-random behavior of the sequence, makes
difficult detecting a lack of randomness. As a further advantage, this noise source
is suitable to be implemented as a fully digital standard-cell based circuit, with
a substantial advantage in terms of design time, power and area requirements
with respect to other designs where a significant analog part is present.
Hardware RBGs can feature a very high throughput, but the random sources
commonly used present several statistic defects, due to physical limitations
(noise intensity, bandwidth limitation, fabrication tolerances, aging and tem-
perature drifts), deterministic disturbances (power supply and substrate inter-
ference), and external attacks aimed at manipulation. Therefore, the post-
processing of the raw bit stream from the source with a carefully designed com-
pressing algorithm must be employed. A lower speed bit stream with increased
statistical quality is generated from a high-speed near-random input stream by
concentrating its entropy.
Even if, historically, the only requirement for an RBG was to fulfill bunches
of statistical tests aimed to reveal defects in the generated data, nowadays, in
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the technical community, it is well accepted that, for random numbers used
in cryptography, the focus must be on the verification of a minimum entropy
requirement and statistical tests are significant only if the statistical model of
the random source under evaluation is known [86].
The German IT security certification authority (BSI) has adopted this ap-
proach in its AIS 31 publication [55] where the physical noise source is separated
from the digital post-processing and criteria and statistical tests are defined for
the noise source output (digitized noise signal) in order to verify a minimum en-
tropy limit for the post-processor's output (internal random numbers). Namely,
the entropy requirement on the final data is guaranteed by defining a minimum
entropy limit for the raw data from the source and, at the same time, requesting
that the adopted post-processing algorithm does not reduce its input entropy.
In [24] and [26], the authors go further ahead with this approach defining
an RBG based on a stateless (memoryless) noise source and a stateless post-
processing algorithm.
Since the noise source is assumed memoryless, the generated symbols are
independent and, since the post-processor is also memoryless, the internal ran-
dom numbers are independent too. Therefore, the entropy limit can be verified
directly after the post-processor, controlling that the assumed compression ratio
in the post-processor is well chosen with respect to the available entropy per bit
from the source. In this scheme, very fast noise sources, but with a low entropy
per bit (spread entropy sources), can be adopted, provided that a sufficient
compression is applied. In other terms, the relevant figure of merit becomes the
entropy throughput (entropy/second) instead of the entropy per bit, and the
design of the noise source is not any more constrained by the statistical quality,
but efficiency and robustness can be taken as the main goals.
Finally, in [23] the authors propose a novel concept for an oscillator based
RBG which exploits the relative jitter between two identical ring oscillators
sharing the same delay elements. The oscillators start synchronously and a
detecting circuit signals when a relative jitter greater than a given threshold has
been accumulated. Therefore, the generation rate is automatically adapted to
the available noise and no pseudo-random patterns are generated thus improving
the module testability.
In this Chapter two works on two distinct RNGs are presented.
The first part of the Chapter (Section 6.2) reports a side-channel attack on a
chaos-based Random Number Generator based on power consumption analysis.
The analyzed RNG has been designed by the research group of Professor Setti
(University of Bologna, Italy) in a 3.3V , 0.35µm CMOS technology. The aim
of this attack is to verify if it is possible to retrieve information regarding the
internal state of the chaotic system used to generate the random bits. In fact,
one of the most common arguments against this kind of RNGs is that, due to
the deterministic nature of the chaotic circuit on which they rely, the system
cannot be truly unpredictable. The power consumption profile of a chaos-based
RNG prototype analyze is analyzed, showing that a side-channel attack based
on a power analysis can determine only the external (digital) state of the system
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Figure 6.1: Micro-photograph of the 0.35µm CMOS prototype (detail).
but not the internal (analog) state.
In the second part of the Chapter (Section 6.3) measures on a RNG prototype
chip are analyzed. The RNG manufactured in a 0.12µm CMOS process by
Infineon Technologies is based on the shot noise associated to the leakage current
of a reverse biased p-n junction. After a short presentation of the RNG, the
obtained experimental results are evaluated to prove the randomness of the
prototype chips.
6.2 Attacking a Random Number Generator
A power consumption based side-channel analysis on a chaos-based RNG is
presented in this Section. After an explanation on how the RNG works, results
about the side-channel analysis demonstrate power consumption reveals the
generated bit but not the internal state of the RNG.
6.2.1 Architecture of the designed RNG
The RNG analyzed in this work has been designed in a 3.3V 0.35µm CMOS
technology. A detail micro-photograph of it can be seen in Figure 6.1.
The core of this RNG is a chaotic map, formally a 1D discrete-time dynamical
system whose state evolution is described by:
xk = M (xk−1) (6.2)
with M : I → I while the random output bit Dk is given through the
quantization function Q : I → 0, 1 from the state of the map:
Dk = Q (xk−1) (6.3)
In the prototype the state xk of the chaotic map is implemented as a dif-
ferential voltage ranging in I = [=1, 1]V and the two functions M and Q are
respectively:
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Figure 6.2: Basic architecture of the chaos-based RNG prototype. The map
state xk is implemented with the two differential analog voltages x
+
k and x
=
k ,
while the random bit is the digital signal Dk.
M (x) =

2x+ 2 if x ≤ − 12
2x if − 12 < x ≤ 12
2x− 2 if x > 12
(6.4)
Q (x) =
{
1 if − 12 < x ≤ 12
0 elsewhere
(6.5)
Despite the deterministic evolution of the analog state xk, that is regulated
by equation (6.2), the succession of the quantized state Dk can be theoretically
proved to be effectively a random, unpredictable bitstream. The proof can be
found in [35]; here it is enough to recall that the only assumption required is that
the initial condition of the system is unknown and randomly drawn according
to a continuous probability density function (that is verified assuming the initial
condition is affected by noise).
A block diagram of the prototype is depicted in Figure 6.2. The core of
the circuit is the chaotic map, implementing both M and Q functions, and the
unity delay blocks required to achieve the dynamic behavior as in equation
(6.2). It is designed as a fully-differential switched capacitors circuit, a detailed
description of which can be found in [79]. Due to testing purposes both the
random generated bit Dk and the differential analog chaotic map state xk are
made available to output pins. The buffers used to drive these output pins have
to be taken into account when analyzing the power supply current of the circuit,
since due to limitation in the standard I/O cells available for this technology,
they share the power supply line with the core circuit.
An example of waveforms generated by the prototype can be seen in Figure
6.3, showing at the same time the state of the chaotic map, the generated random
bit and the current profile on the power supply line. Note that the state of the
chaotic map is shown along with the two thresholds of the Q function: according
to (6.4) and (6.5) when the state is in between the threshold, the random bit
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Figure 6.3: Prototype measurements. From top to bottom: differential analog
internal state of the chaotic map (channel A); generated random bits (channel
2); power supply current (channel 1). The probe used for the the current sensing
has a sensitivity of 5mV/mA.
at the next time step is high, while when it is outside, the next random bit is
low. Note also that, since the probe used for sensing the power supply current
requires an AC coupling, we are observing only the dynamic power, i.e. the
variations with respect to the mean value of the current. Peaks in the current
profile are present in correspondence to each clock edge (not shown in the figure);
highest peaks can be found when the random output bit has a transition from
low to high. To understand what is the expected current profile, let us consider
the diagram of Figure 6.4. At the rising edge of the clock the analog state
of the chaotic map switches with a short transient from the value xk to the
value xk + 1 = M (xk), and the output random bit from Dk = Q (xk=1) to
Dk + 1 = Q (xk). During these transients, we can observe a peak in the power
supply current due to the contribution of these three subcircuits: a) the chaotic
map; b) the analog output buffers; and c) the output digital buffer. Generally,
if the chaotic map gives the highest contribution to static power supply (it is
designed only with class-A amplifiers), its contribution to the dynamic power is
not particularly high. The same behavior can be observed for the analog buffers,
while the digital buffer requires only dynamical power. Furthermore, due to the
large capacity of the output pins, and to the single-ended configuration, this
power is expected to be quite high only when observing a low-to-high transition.
This is exactly what we can observe in Figure 6.3.
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Figure 6.4: Typical current profile during a transients.
6.2.2 Analysis of the power supply current
As observed in Section 6.2.1, due to I/O cells constraints we have a dominant
contribution to the dynamic current from the output random bit buffer (i.e.
the digital buffer). Consequently, we can expect four kinds of current profiles,
according to the random bit transition, which have been shown in Figure 6.5.
Two major peaks can be observed, the first one corresponding to the rising edge
of the clock, and the second one to the falling edge. Additionally, if we compare
the two profiles associated with the low-to-low and high-to-high transition (i.e.
the cases where there is no transition in the output random bit), we can see
they are very similar.
We can verify from prototype measurements that the dynamic current profile
is not directly related to the analog state of the chaotic map, but only to the
generated random bit. More precisely, and using the same symbols of Figure 6.4,
i.e. indicating respectively with xk and xk+1 (Dk and Dk+1) the chaotic map
state (random output bit) before and after the transient, the current profile
during the transient does not depends directly on xk and xk+1 but only on
Dk and Dk+1. To prove this, we have to isolate the contribution given by the
Dk → Dk+1 transition considering separately the four cases corresponding to the
four transitions considered in Figure 6.5. For all these cases, we have considered
two scatter plots where the internal (analog) and the external (digital) state
of the chaotic map measured from a long acquisition are compared with the
observed current profile. Actually, to this purpose we need a numeric indicator
of the current profile, which has been chosen as the charge required by the
transient in a period T [96]:
∆qk =
T∫
0
iD (t− kT ) dt (6.6)
where iD is the measured dynamic current, so ∆qk is actually a differential
charge.
In order to check if any relation exists between the state of the map and
the power consumption it is useful to scatter plot the 4qk corresponding to a
CHAPTER 6. RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR 127
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
 0
 0.01
 0.02
 0.03
 0.04
 0.05
 0.06
-0.2  0  0.2  0.4  0.6
t/T
Cl
oc
k 
ris
in
g 
ed
ge
 p
ea
k
Cl
oc
k 
fa
lli
ng
ed
ge
 p
ea
k
low-to-low
low-to-high
high-to-low
high-to-high
Figure 6.5: Example or the four kinds of dynamic current profile, according to
the random output bit transition.
state transition. In this way in a scatter plot where 4qk is in y-axis and the
RNG state is in x-axis, if the clusters points corresponding to the different RNG
states (xk) are at different levels along y-axis this means that each RNG state
can be identified by its power consumption. Otherwise, if the clusters points
corresponding to the different RNG states (xk) cover indistinctly all area long
y-axis this means that the same 4qk value corresponds to different RNG states
and thus the RNG internal state can not be catched.
In Figure 6.6 the relation between the analog (internal) state and the power
consumption is shown where the value of 4qk is associated to the internal state
(xk); conversely, in Figure 6.7 the relation between the digital (external) state
and the power consumption is shown where the value of 4qk is associated to
the external state Dk+1 = Q(xk).
Note that in both the figures the values of (xk) are correctly in the range
=1 < xk < −1/2 or 1/2 < xk < 1 when Dk+1 = Q(xk) = 0, instead when
Dk+1 = Q(xk) = 1 the values of (xk) are compelled in the range −1/2 < xk < 1/2.
By observing the Figure 6.6 it is evident that the same charge 4qk cor-
responds to both RNG states. On the contrary, by observing the Figure 6.7
the charges 4qk corresponding to two different RNG states are clearly distinct.
This means that no relation between the current profile and the internal state of
the chaotic map can be measured, whereas the digital output Dk+1 = Q(xk) is
clearly traceable. Therefore, the RNG is internally secure but the digital output
buffers are sensitive to side-channel attack.
As an additional test, it may be interesting checking if a relation exists
between the observed current profile and the successive random bit Dk+2. This
test effectively plays the role of the prediction of the following bit given the
random bitstream and the current profile.
To get an intuitive idea, let us refer to Figure 6.8, showing the two distri-
butions of the measured charge 4qk, which has been separated in two groups
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Figure 6.6: Scatter plot of the charge ∆qk required when the successive random
bitDk+1 is high and low compared with the internal (analog) state of the chaotic
map (xk).
Figure 6.7: Scatter plot of the charge ∆qk required when the successive random
bitDk+1 is high and low compared with the external (digital) state of the chaotic
map Dk+1 = Q(xk).
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Figure 6.8: Conditional distribution density of the charge ∆qk during a tran-
sient, assuming the successive random bit Dk+2 is high (continuous line) or low
(dotted line), in the case of a high-to-low random bit transition (case a) and
of an unchanged high random bit (case b, referred to as high-to-high). The
distributions are obtained with a 10 bins histogram of frequencies.
according to the value of Dk+2. Roughly speaking, given an observed transition
Dk → Dk+1 (more precisely, high-to-low transition for the case of Figure 6.8a,
and a constant high value for the case of Figure 6.8b) we want to know if the
group of 4qk giving rise to Dk+2 = 0 is distributed as the group of 4qk giving
rise to Dk+2 = 1.
Obviously, if these two distributions were defined in two different (or slightly
overlapping) regions it would be possible to determine with a high probability if
the successive random bit Dk+2 would be high or low from the measure of 4qk.
On the contrary, as in the case of Figure 6.8, from two distributions almost
superimposing it would not be possible to predict if Dk+2 would be high or low
with an accuracy much greater then the one given by pure chance. This means,
by definition, that Dk+2 is unpredictable.
To formally obtain a numerical measure of the similarity of the two obtained
distributions, and therefore of the unpredictability of Dk+2, we can use the
concept of entropy and mutual information.
While the entropy of a random variable X is defined as the average informa-
tion provided by each of its realization, the average mutual information between
two random variables X and Y is defined as the average information provided
about a realization of X by the occurrence of the realization of Y [41]. Math-
ematically, given a discrete random variable X with possible values x1, x2, . . .
and associated probabilities PX(x1), PX(x2), . . ., its entropy H(X), measured in
bit, is defined as
H (X) = −
∑
k
PX (xk) log2 PX (xk) (6.7)
while the average mutual information I(X;Y ) between the two discrete ran-
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dom variables X and Y is
I (X;Y ) =
∑
k
∑
j
PXY (xk, yj) log2
PXY (xk, yj)
PX (xk)PY (yj)
(6.8)
where PY is the probability distribution of Y, and PXY is the joint proba-
bility distribution of X and Y .
If we consider Dk+2 as the random variable X, and 4qk as Y (actually, since
4qk is a continuous random variable, we need to discretize it in a limited number
of bins in order to apply the above definition, as already done in Figure 6.8),
I(X;Y ) is the quantity of average information about Dk+2 we can get from the
observation of 4qk, i.e. the indicator of how well 4qk can be used to predict
Dk+2. Note that, according to this notation, the plots of Figure 6.8 represent
the two conditional probability densities PY |X , with X = 0 and X = 1.
Assuming X and Y are unrelated, I(X;Y ) = 0; if instead X and Y are
completely dependent, I(X;Y ) = H(X) = 1 bit. In the two cases of the
example of Figure 6.8 the mutual information is measured in I = 0.03 bits
for the high-to-low (low-to-high) transition case, and I = 0.021 bits for the
high (low) constant value case. These very low values clearly show the lack of
mutual information, i.e. the impossibility to retrieve information on Dk+2 from
the observation of 4qk.
6.2.3 Conclusions
In this Section power analysis on a prototype of a chaos-based RNG has been
considered. Measures on a prototype showed that it is not possible to get in-
formation on the internal state either from the observation of the generated
bitstream, or from a side-channel attack based on power analysis. The power
supply current trace is shown to depend only on the random digital bit, prin-
cipally for the presence of the buffer driving the chip pad, while a dependency
between the current trace and the internal state of the chaotic map cannot be
observed.
6.3 Measurements on the leakage based RNG
An RNG based on the p-n junction leakage current is presented in this Section.
The proposed RNG is first introduced. Measurements on some test chips are
shown to prove its functionality and its randomness.
6.3.1 The proposed RNG
A reverse biased p-n junction (e.g. a n/n+ resistance diffused in a p-type sub-
strate) shows a leakage current (dark current) Id due to thermally generated
minority carriers. A shot noise is produced by such a current:
id =
√
2qId∆f (6.9)
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Figure 6.9: Noisy discharge of a reverse biased p-n junction.
where q = 1.6× 10−19C is the electron charge.
If a tri-state buffer is used to force a voltage VDD for a time tpre (Figure
6.9), when the buffer is disabled, the capacitance Cdiff of the depletion region
discharges from VDD with the noisy current (Id + id). A CMOS inverter is
used to detect when the diffusion voltage Vdiff (t) reaches the inverter threshold
Vth. During the discharge time, the shot noise id(t) is integrated by Cdiff
thus obtaining a variance for Vdiff (t) which increases as the integration time
increases. As a consequence, the inverter switching time ts is a random variable
whose variance can be exploited to generate a random bit.
As shown in Figure 6.10, two nominally identical diffusions are precharged
by two nominally identical drivers and, from the inverter outputs, a random
bit is obtained using a DFF as sampling device. Due to process mismatches
(e.g. between the diffusions, the driver timings, the inverter thresholds, inter-
connection delays, etc...), a mismatch in the mean integration times ts1 and
ts2 is expected which results in an unbalanced bit stream {s[i]}. In spite of
that, it is worth observing that the noise source is stateless since the diffusions
are re-charged to VDD thus cancelling the memory of the previously generated
bit. As long as the jitter Jrms =
√
2σts is larger than the mean integration
time mismatch, the output bits are biased but independent and an unbiased bit
sequence can be extracted using a proper compression function [49].
However, in order to obtain a design robust against process variations, the
alignment of the mean switching times is controlled by the feedback loop shown
in Figure 6.11, where the upper inverter output is delayed by ∆T1 = (T2−T1)/2,
whereas the lower one is followed by a variable delay ∆T2 ∈ [T1, T2], controlled
by an up/down counter which estimates the mean value of the random stream
{s[i]}. A precision δ smaller than Jrms is required to adjust ∆T2. When a
random bit is generated, a new charge pulse is required to charge again the
diffusion capacitances. The DFF clock signal is used to trigger a new charge
pulse thus obtaining a continuous operation.
The mismatch compensation loop makes the noise source non-stationary
(non-stateless). However, the resulting random process can be modeled as a
discrete-time Markov chain and a post-processor which produces i.i.d. output
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Figure 6.10: Generation of a random bit using two n+ diffusions.
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Figure 6.11: Feedback loop to cancel the output sequence bias.
words can be still defined, how it is reported in [27].
The output throughput is fixed by the mean integration time:
ts1 ∼= ts2 = ts = VDD − Vth
Id/Cdiff
(6.10)
where Cdiff is assumed constant between VDD and (VDD − Vth) and equal
to Cdiff (VDD).
Since both Id and Cdiff are directly proportional to the diffusion area Adiff ,
the difference VDD − Vth is the only circuit parameter which can be used to
control the data-rate. For the variance of the diffusion voltage at the end of the
integration time ts, it holds [98]:
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Figure 6.12: Integration time variance.
σ2Vdiff =
qId
C2diff
ts (6.11)
where q = 1.6× 10−19C is the electron charge.
Being ts  σts , from (6.11) it follows:
σ2Vdiff
∼= qId
C2diff
ts. (6.12)
As shown in Figure 6.12, the integration time has a non-symmetrical prob-
ability distribution and it holds:
t+3σs − ts =
3σVdiff
VDD − Vth − 3σVdiff
ts (6.13)
ts − t−3σs =
3σVdiff
VDD − Vth + 3σVdiff
ts. (6.14)
However, being σVdiff  VDD −Vth, it follows t+3σs − ts ∼= ts− t−3σs and the
available jitter is
Jrms ∼=
√
2
σVdiff
VDD − Vth ts. (6.15)
From (6.10), (6.12) and (6.15) it follows:
Jrms =
√
2Cdiffq(VDD − Vth)
Id
. (6.16)
Using the values in Table 6.1, where the leakage current Id is a measured
data, a bit generation time ts = 0.84ms and a rms jitter Jrms = 2.6µs is
obtained. Since Jrms is less than 1% of ts, the control loop is actually necessary
to make the design robust. On the other hand, the available jitter is large
enough to request only a coarse-grained delay line whose design is not critical.
The obtained data-rate (about 1.2Kb/s) is quite low but sufficient in most
cryptographic applications. Moreover, the circuit is extremely compact and
multiple instances can be used if a higher throughput is required.
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Table 6.1: Parameters for a sample design in a 0.12µm CMOS process.
Parameter Symbol Value
Power supply VDD 1.2V
Inverter threshold Vth 0.8V
Depletion capacitance @VDD Cdiff 84fF
Leakage (dark) current Id 40pA
Figure 6.13: Testchip micro-photograph.
6.3.2 Testchip design
A prototype testchip has been designed and manufactured in a 0.12µm CMOS
process from Infineon Technologies (a micro-photograph is shown in Figure
6.13).
Post-processing and compression are based on a hash function implemented
by means of a 32-bit LFSR. Even if not strictly required since the LFSR is not
operated in free evolution, a primitive polynomial is adopted having care to
choose a polynomial with a spread distribution of its terms. That provides a
better diffusion after the reset.
In order to estimate on-line the entropy of the generated bit sequence,
the concept of deterministic model of the noise source was introduced in [27],
namely, a model which describes the source behavior under the hypothesis that
the stochastic part of the system is neglected.
Due to the re-charge to VDD of both diffusions, the adopted noise source has a
straightforward deterministic behavior. In particular, if Jrms = 0 (i.e. Jrms 
δ), the device produces the periodic sequence 010101... resulting from the
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Figure 6.14: RBG testchip and digital post-processing.
mismatch compensation loop. Other potential deterministic behaviors can arise
because of transients or failures in the feedback loop. In this case, a constant
sequence stuck at one or zero is expected. The entropy is estimated by counting
the number of transitions in the raw stream {s[i]} that are unexpected according
to the discussed deterministic model. As in [27], the following transition counter
is adopted:
Ntrans =
∑
i
(s[i]⊕ s[i− 2]) · (s[i]⊕ s[i− 1]⊕ s[i− 2]⊕ s[i− 3]). (6.17)
As depicted in Figure 6.14, the entropy estimator includes the transition
counter (6.17), a bit counter Nbit and a decision algorithm to signal that the
required amount of random bits has been generated by the source. The ok reset
both counters to start the generation of a new byte and, if the signal certif is
active, the LFSR is reset as well (certification mode).
Two configuration parameters are used: the maximum compression ratio
kmax after which the output byte is delivered anyway, and the minimum number
of transitions on the bit stream Nmintrans to be counted before releasing a new
output byte. In Figure 6.14, Nmintrans is multiplied by 2 (i.e. the transitions
counted by (6.17) in a maximal entropy byte) thus implicitly fixing a minimum
compression kmin = N
min
trans. The output byte is released if k = kmax even if
the required number of transitions has not been reached yet and, in this case,
an alarm is raised. Therefore, a time-out is implemented, as requested in a real
application to avoid software deadlocks.
Additionally, a minimum number of input bits Nminbit = 8·Nmintrans is requested
too. In other terms, the input sequence is compressed at least how much a
maximal entropy sequence would be. As a further condition, always an even
number of bits are processed, as discussed in [27].
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Algorithm 6.1 Decision algorithm.
decision (in: Ntrans,Nbit, N
min
trans, kmax;
out: ok) {
if (kmax > 0)&((Nbit ≥ 8 · kmax)|
(Ntrans ≥ 2 ·Nmintrans))&(Nbit ≥ 8 ·Nmintrans)&
(Nbitmod 2 == 0) then
ok = 1;
else ok = 0;
}
Table 6.2: Measured mean integration time mismatch and relative jitter.
Chip# ts2 − ts1[µs] Jrms[µs]
1 −256 4.95
2 372 11.8
3 −422 19.1
4 −522 15.6
5 415 26.4
6 194 6.32
6.3.3 Experimental results
A first set of measurements has been performed to evaluate the available jitter
Jrms and the mismatch in the mean integration times ts1 and ts2. In Figure
6.15, the two output voltages Vout1, Vout2 (trace 1 and 2, respectively) and their
difference (trace M) are visible. By measuring average and standard deviation
of the pulse width in M , mismatch ts2− ts1 and jitter Jrms have been obtained.
The measured values for six dies from different wafers (different process
corners) are reported in Table 6.2. It can be observed that the measured jitter
is always larger than the expected value derived from (6.16). This results from
the fact that the leakage current reported in Table 6.1 is a worst case value (with
respect to process variations). The values in Table 6.2 confirm that the relative
jitter is a fraction of the mean integration time mismatch and, therefore, the
bias cancellation feedback loop in Figure 6.11 is actually needed.
Raw bit sequences {s[i]} for each tested die have been collected and the
estimated coefficients of the autocorrelation function RSS [j], for j = 1, 2, . . . , 10,
are evaluated as in (6.18) and reported in Table 6.3. It is worth noting that,
since Jrms  δ, the effect of the feedback loop on the autocorrelation coefficients
is negligeble.
RSS [j] =
E{(S[i]− µ) · (S[i+ j]− µ)}
σ2
(6.18)
In order to evaluate the entropy of the post-processed random bytes r[i],
raw sequences of 10 × 106 bits have been generated for each of the tested dies
and the corresponding random bytes have been calculated. The post-processor
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Figure 6.15: Oscilloscope screenshot (chip #20).
Table 6.3: Correlation coefficients.
Chip# r[1] r[2] r[3] r[4] r[5]
1 −0.075 −0.065 −0.055 −0.047 −0.038
2 −0.033 −0.031 −0.029 −0.028 −0.025
3 −0.020 −0.020 −0.019 −0.020 −0.017
4 −0.025 −0.024 −0.022 −0.023 −0.021
5 −0.014 −0.015 −0.014 −0.015 −0.013
6 −0.061 −0.053 −0.047 −0.041 −0.036
Chip# r[6] r[7] r[8] r[9] r[10]
1 −0.035 −0.029 −0.024 −0.020 −0.018
2 −0.024 −0.022 −0.021 −0.019 −0.019
3 −0.017 −0.017 −0.015 −0.015 −0.015
4 −0.020 −0.019 −0.017 −0.016 −0.017
5 −0.013 −0.013 −0.012 −0.012 −0.012
6 −0.032 −0.029 −0.025 −0.021 −0.019
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Table 6.4: χ2 test and entropy estimate in certification mode.
Chip# Nmintrans kmax Lskip Nr k THR(kb/s) χ
2 Ĥ
1 4 32 16 1199701 6.25 0.19 260.28 7.99984
2 4 32 16 1199690 6.25 0.19 254.43 7.99985
3 4 32 16 1199725 6.25 0.19 284.52 7.99983
4 4 32 16 1199732 6.25 0.19 218.99 7.99987
5 4 32 16 1199853 6.25 0.19 282.04 7.99983
6 4 32 16 1199672 6.36 0.18 260.26 7.99984
is operated in certification mode, configured to release a byte after counting 8
transitions in the raw stream (2 × Nmintrans = 8) and a maximum compression
ratio kmax = 32 is chosen. For the number of raw bits to be skipped between
two input sub-sequences we chose the conservative setting Lskip = 16, thus
obtaining a mean compression k = 6 for an ideal sequence.
Since the processed bytes r[i] have been proved to be independent, their
distribution can be tested using Pearson's chi-square test (χ2) with 255 degrees
of freedom (confidence level α = 0.05):
255∑
i=0
(Nr · Pr(i)−Nr/256)2
Nr/256
< χ20.95(255) = 293.25 (6.19)
where Pr(i) is the empirical estimate of the distribution of the output bytes
r[i] and Nr is the number of generated output bytes r[i]. The obtained results
are summarized in Table 6.4, which shows that the collected sequences pass the
applied test. An estimate of the entropy per byte is also reported using the
plug-in estimate:
Ĥ = −
∑
i
Pr(i) logPr(i). (6.20)
For the final throughput after compression, it holds:
THR =
1
ts · k¯
(6.21)
where k is the average post-processor compression (including the 16 skipped
bits) and ts = 0.84ms.
The quality of the post-processed bytes in certification mode has been also
tested using the statistical tests defined in the AIS 31 publication for random
bit generators belonging to the functionality class P2 [55]. The obtained results
are reported in Table 6.5 and they are largely within the acceptance ranges,
thus confirming the results in Table 6.4.
As a final verification, the AIS 31 tests have been repeated on a sequence of
processed bytes collected operating the post-processor in normal mode (post-
processing reset disabled). As discussed in [27], since a linear post-processing is
employed, the entropy is expected to be not lower than what is measured when
CHAPTER 6. RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR 139
Table 6.5: AIS 31 statistical tests (functionality class P2) in certification mode.
Test Description Acceptance range Chip#1 Chip#2 Chip#3
P2.i.vii.a one-dimensional distribution < 0.025 0.0012 0.0002 0.0003
P2.i.vii.b one-step transition distribution < 0.020 0.0012 0.0021 0.0004
P2.i.vii.c 2-step dependency test < 15.13 0.1066 1.6474 0.7683
P2.i.vii.d 3-step dependency test < 15.13 3.4778 6.3394 4.4935
P2.i.vii.e Coron test > 7.976 && < 8.026 8.0027 8.0006 7.9994
Test Description Acceptance range Chip#4 Chip#5 Chip#6
P2.i.vii.a one-dimensional distribution < 0.025 0.0018 0.0009 0.0025
P2.i.vii.b one-step transition distribution < 0.020 0.0004 0.0005 0.0025
P2.i.vii.c 2-step dependency test < 15.13 0.1883 2.1517 2.9338
P2.i.vii.d 3-step dependency test < 15.13 1.0858 1.6937 1.8242
P2.i.vii.e Coron test > 7.976 && < 8.026 7.9950 8.0023 8.0007
Table 6.6: AIS 31 statistical tests (functionality class P2) in normal mode.
Test Description Acceptance range Chip#1 Chip#2 Chip#3
P2.i.vii.a one-dimensional distribution < 0.025 0.0001 0.0013 0.0029
P2.i.vii.b one-step transition distribution < 0.020 0.0003 0.0002 0.0029
P2.i.vii.c 2-step dependency test < 15.13 1.3834 0.7683 0.2509
P2.i.vii.d 3-step dependency test < 15.13 2.2849 1.3005 0.9418
P2.i.vii.e Coron test > 7.976 && < 8.026 8.0056 7.9997 7.9987
Test Description Acceptance range Chip#4 Chip#5 Chip#6
P2.i.vii.a one-dimensional distribution < 0.025 0.0013 0.0002 0.0023
P2.i.vii.b one-step transition distribution < 0.020 0.0008 0.0041 0.0017
P2.i.vii.c 2-step dependency test < 15.13 3.5617 2.2445 1.9220
P2.i.vii.d 3-step dependency test < 15.13 2.2984 4.9601 1.4906
P2.i.vii.e Coron test > 7.976 && < 8.026 7.9999 8.0000 8.0023
operating the RBG in certification mode. The results in Table 6.6 confirm the
assumption.
6.3.4 Conclusions
A noise source for a random bit generator has been proposed which exploits the
shot noise associated to the leakage current of a reverse biased p-n junction. A
model of the source is discussed and a sample design in a 0.12µm CMOS process
has been presented which is expected to provide a 1.2kb/s high quality random
bit stream with limited area and power requirements.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
Cryptographic devices have become essential building blocks of many systems
that we daily use. Consequently, the research on security topics became more
and more important and today it covers different aspects of human sciences at
different levels. Many works on the implementation of new kind of attacks and,
at the same time, new countermeasures have been reported in the technical
literature. In 1996 Kocher suggested the idea that the secret key of a crypto-
graphic device could be discovered by using some physical quantities indirectly
correlated with the key. The dynamic power consumption is the side-channel ex-
tensively used in literature. The analysis (directly or by statistical evaluations)
of power traces of the cryptographic device under attack is the foundation of
the so called power analysis attack. Consequently, the SPA and much more the
DPA constitute the major threat to the cryptographic devices. On the other
side a number of software and hardware countermeasures have been proposed
to prevent power analysis attacks on chipcards. DPA-resistant logic styles are
a class of hardware countermeasures that is implemented at the cell level. The
basic idea is to build logic cells with a power consumption that is independent
of the processed logic values.
This thesis work is focused on both aspects by proposing new ideas about
the power attacks and different techniques to counteract these attacks.
A circuit, named SCM, to improve the DPA attack has been proposed as
first activity in Chapter 3. The SCM provides a low impedance current input
and an additional DC feedback loop to control the voltage at the input pin,
thus supplying the device under attack with a stable voltage. From the analysis
and simulation of the SCM, several advantages have been showed with respect
to the standard resistor-based setup. These advantages have been confirmed by
measuring the current consumption of an FPGA implementing a part of Serpent
algorithm.
Compared to a resistor-based measurement, the presented circuit shows a
20dB improvement in the sensitivity to the current consumption variations of a
device under attacks. Finally, an attack has been implemented on the adopted
140
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS 141
case study and on a DES realization showing a noticeable improvement if the
SCM is used.
After proposing a novel circuit to improve DPA, a novel side-channel has
been investigated in Chapter 4. Since in sub-100nm technologies leakage cur-
rent is becoming more predominant in the total power consumption, a power
attack based on leakage current (named LPA) has been proposed. A model in
which leakage is linearly related to the Hamming weight of the signal under
attack has been proposed and experimentally evaluated. A systematic attack
procedure based on the correlation coefficient evaluation has been introduced.
Experimental issues involved in each step of this procedure have been discussed.
Moreover, due to the strong leakage sensitivity to temperature, it was shown
that the operating temperature must be kept constant during the LPA attack. It
was also shown that LPA attacks are extremely simple and require inexpensive
equipment (even cheaper than that used in traditional power analysis attacks
based on the dynamic power consumption). An experimental LPA attack to a
simple circuit has been performed for the first time. Results confirm the valid-
ity of the underlying assumption, and the effectiveness of this kind of attacks.
Moreover analysis has shown that the Hamming weight as leakage power model
is not restricted to bit sliced circuits, but can also be used for combinational cir-
cuits (e.g., S-Boxes). In regard to the impact of process variations, Monte Carlo
simulations have shown that intra-die variations can influence the outcome of
LPA attacks. In particular, the analysis of a simple crypto core in standard
CMOS logic allowed to successfully infer the secret key on 94% of sample cir-
cuits. This probability of success drops to 21% in crypto cores implemented in
WDDL, and to 24% in TDPL logic style. The percentage of success has been
found to respectively rise to 99%, 40% and 38% for CMOS, WDDL and TDPL,
if the adversary accepts to broaden the search of the secret key to those leading
to the two highest correlation coefficients. Results demonstrate that, even if
transistor-level countermeasures developed for DPA have some beneficial effects
in preventing LPA attacks, the success rate for LPA attacks is intolerably high
(many orders of magnitude greater than levels of security that are commonly
required). This means that the body of work focused on countermeasures to
DPA attacks does not solve the security issues arising with LPA attacks. Hence,
in the future a significant research effort will be required to devise appropriate
solutions and countermeasures against LPA that keep the security level to the
current standards.
DPA-resistant logic styles are a class of hardware countermeasures that is
implemented at the cell level. A DPA-resistant logic family is based on the idea
that each build logic cell must have a power consumption that is independent
of the processed logic values.
In Chapter 5 three different logic styles to counteract power analysis have
been proposed. The 3sDDL is a dual rail precharge logic with a precharge value
at VDD/2. The figures of merit considered in literature to prove the efficiency
of a DPA-resistant logic style, NED and NSD, have been taken into account
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showing an improvement with respect to the standard CMOS and the others
secure logic styles.
All DRP gates proposed in literature for cryptographic applications have a
power consumption independent on processing data under the ideal assumption
that the load at two differential outputs are perfectly matched. This means
that all proposed DPA-resistant logic family have a leakage of information. The
second logic style proposed in this thesis work, named TDPL, addresses this
problem by introducing a third phase to the two normally used in the DRP
logic gates. A complete set of cells has been proposed and a TDPL flip-flop
has been designed. Experimental results on a case study in a 65nm CMOS
process confirm that TDPL shows a constant energy consumption even in pres-
ence of unbalanced loads. NED and NSD show an improvement in the energy
consumption balancing in excess of 10 times with respect to the corresponding
SABL implementation without requiring any constraint on the geometry of the
complementary wires.
The main drawback of TDPL logic style is represented by the presence of the
additional two control signals needed to set the three phases which make more
difficult the placing and routing. The third proposed logic style is the DDPL
which is based on a completely novel encoding concept where the information
is represented in the time domain rather than in the spatial domain as in a
standard dual-rail logic. DDPL permits to have the same improvements of
the TDPL with respect to the others DPA-resistant logic styles (and thus a
DDPL cell has a power consumption which is insensitive to unbalanced load
conditions) but with only one control signal, as in the standard DRP logic
styles. Much attention has been placed in the design of the DDPL sequential
blocks. Complete case studies have been proposed showing that the simulated
energy consumption per cycle is up to 50 times more balanced than in the
corresponding SABL gates without requiring any constraint on the geometry
of the complementary wires. A main advantage of DDPL logic style is that
the introduced time domain data encoding allows to set the DPA-resistance
independently from the operating frequency by choosing the delay parameter
according to the expected resolution of current consumption measurements.
Finally, in Chapter 6, two works on RNG prototypes are presented. In the
first part of this Chapter, power analysis on a prototype of a chaos-based RNG
has been proposed. Measurements prove that the considered RNG is sensitive to
power analysis because of digital output drivers. Experimental results proved
that power consumption is not related to the internal state but only to the
externally generated bit. In the second part of Chapter 6 a leakage based RNG
is presented. Measurements on six samples of the RNG and post-processing
tests of the acquired output data have proved its functionality and randomness.
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